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INTRODUCTIONT HE Constitution contains two clauses that protect persons
against governmental interference with their property. The
Due Process Clause provides that "No person shall.., be deprived
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."' The Tak-
ings Clause adds, "nor shall private property be taken for public
use, without just compensation."2 Both provisions appear to im-
pose a threshold condition that a claimant have some "property" at
stake before the protections associated with the Clause apply.
Thus, under the Due Process Clause, it would seem that a claimant
must have an interest in "property" (or in "life" or "liberty") be-
fore we move on to ask whether the state has "deprived" such a
person of this interest without "due process of law." And the Tak-
ings Clause appears to require that a claimant have "private
property" before we proceed to ask whether this interest has been
I U.S. Const. amend. V. A substantively identical provision appears in the
Fourteenth Amendment. Id. amend. XIV, § 1.2 Id. amend. V. The Supreme Court has held that the Takings Clause applies to the
States through the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New
York City, 438 U.S. 104, 122 (1978) (citing Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v.
Chicago, 166 U.S. 226,239 (1897)).
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"taken" by the government for a "public use" without the payment
of "just compensation."
The Supreme Court has not always been attentive to the "prop-
erty" threshold under these clauses. During a brief period in the
early 1970s, it spoke as if procedural due process applies to any in-
terest that is "important," whether or not such an interest can be
properly categorized as "property" (or "life" or "liberty").3 In addi-
tion, cases from the 1960s and early 1970s seem to say that the
substantive due process requirement of minimum rationality ap-
plies even if a claimant has no liberty or property interest.4
Starting in 1972 with its landmark decision in Board of Regents
v. Roth,5 however, the Court has become increasingly insistent that
persons seeking protection for economic interests under either the
Due Process or Takings Clauses must establish they have "prop-
erty" if they are to avoid dismissal of their lawsuit. This
understanding is most securely established in Roth's own area-
procedural due process. The Court has rendered numerous deci-
sions in the wake of Roth reaffirming the idea that property is a
precondition of procedural due process protection.6 In the takings
context, the understanding that a claimant must demonstrate the
existence of a property interest is reflected in older federal eminent
3 The period lasted from Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), to Board of
Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972); in other words, about two years. The case that
seems to most clearly adopt the "important interest" threshold is Bell v. Burson, 402
U.S. 535, 539 (1971) (explaining that the automatic suspension of a driver's license
when an uninsured motorist has an accident triggers due process because it "involves
state action that adjudicates important interests of the licensees").
4 See Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78, 81--84 (1971) (rejecting the claim that
Social Security benefits are analogous to property for purposes of substantive due
process protection, but considering whether a change in benefit levels violated the
minimum rationality requirement of due process); Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers
Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 898 (1961) (finding that the exclusion of petitioner
from a government facility implicated no liberty or property interest, but "assum[ing]"
that she could not constitutionally be excluded for reasons "patently arbitrary or
discriminatory"); Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 611 (1960) (holding that, although
claimant had no property right in accrued Social Security benefits, the interest "is of
sufficient substance to fall within the protection from arbitrary governmental action
afforded by the Due Process Clause").
5 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
6 See, e.g., American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 59 (1999) ("The
first inquiry in every due process challenge is whether the plaintiff has been deprived
of a protected interest in 'property' or 'liberty."').
2000]
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domain decisions,7 and thus antedates Roth. Nevertheless Roth
clearly has had a major impact here as well. In several regulatory
takings cases decided after Roth, the Court has pointedly asked
whether a claimant has a cognizable interest in property before
proceeding to consider whether this interest has been taken.8 And
in making this threshold inquiry, the Court has generally followed
the method prescribed by Roth.!
Substantive due process is the one area in which the Court until
recently had remained silent about the need for a threshold identi-
fication of an affected property interest. No doubt this is because
substantive due process protection of property has been modest
throughout the post-World War II era.0 During the 1998 Term,
however, in College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary
7 See, e.g., United States v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 365 U.S. 624, 629 (1961)
(holding that flowage easement is property entitled to just compensation when
taken); United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 266-68 (1946) (finding that airplane
overflights interfered with respondent's property and hence could give rise to a
compensable taking under the Fifth Amendment); United States v. Willow River
Power Co., 324 U.S. 499 (1945) (rejecting a takings claim on the ground that the
utility had no property interest in the head of water in a river); United States ex rel.
Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Powelson, 319 U.S. 266, 276-81 (1943) (finding that a
utility's power of eminent domain under state law was not property and hence that its
abrogation in a federal eminent domain proceeding did not give rise to a claim for
additional compensation).
8 See, e.g., Phillips v. Washington Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 172 (1998) (finding
that the interest in question was property and remanding for determination of
whether it was taken without just compensation); Bowen v. Public Agencies Opposed
to Soc. Sec. Entrapment, 477 U.S. 41, 55-56 (1986) (finding that the interest in
question was not property and hence did not provide the basis for a takings claim);
Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1003-04, 1013-14 (1984) (finding that the
interest in question was property and concluding that it was taken during some
periods but not during others); Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies v. Beckwith, 449 U.S.
155, 164-65 (1980) (finding that the interest in question was property and that it was
taken).
9 See Phillips, 524 U.S. at 164 (quoting Roth, 408 U.S. at 577); Monsanto, 467 U.S. at
1001 (quoting Webb's, 449 U.S. at 161, quoting Roth, 408 U.S. at 577); Webb's, 449
U.S. at 161 (quoting Roth, 408 U.S. at 577).
10 See generally Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Fundamental Property Rights, 85 Geo.
L.J. 555 (1997) (noting the contrast between substantive due process protection of
liberty and property and urging recognition of fundamental property rights). The only
exception has been the Court's imposition of mild restraints on court awards of
punitive damages in civil cases. See BMW of N. Am. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 584-85
(1996) (holding that a two million dollar punitive damage award for failure to disclose
the repainting of a car was excessive in relation to legitimate state interests and hence
in violation of substantive due process).
888 [Vol. 86:885
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Education Expense Board," the Court ruled that the interest of a
business firm protected by a statutory cause of action for false ad-
vertising is not "property" within the meaning of the Due Process
Clause, and hence Congress had no power to adopt legislation pro-
tecting this interest under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The property trigger has thus now been unambigu-
ously extended to substantive due process claims.
After College Savings Bank, one thing seems reasonably clear:
Parties seeking to protect an economic interest under the Due
Process or Takings Clauses, whether advancing a procedural or a
substantive claim, must be prepared to demonstrate that their in-
terest is "property." Yet how to do this remains unclear. In
addition to College Savings Bank, the Court has rendered three
other decisions in the last two years about the meaning of property
under federal law. The first decision, Phillips v. Washington Legal
Founddtion," applies the conventional method of looking to state
law to identify constitutional property, but reaches a highly im-
plausible result. The second, Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel 3 ignores
the conventional method and enunciates a new limitation on the
scope of property for takings but not due process purposes. The
third, College Savings Bank, ignores the conventional method and
adopts a federal definition of property that is consistent with the
common law concept of property, but inconsistent with precedent
under the Due Process Clause. The fourth and most recent deci-
sion, Drye v. United States,4 involves an interpretation of the
Internal Revenue Code rather than the Constitution and also de-
parts from the conventional method, but at least seems to have
some continuity with the conventional method and with prior deci-
sions in the tax area.
What is perhaps most remarkable about this burst of seemingly
inconsistent pronouncements from the Court is that not one of the
four decisions makes any reference to any of the others, or makes
any effort to integrate its innovations (in the case of the two deci-
sions that break new ground, Eastern Enterprises and College
Savings Bank) into the preexisting fabric of the law. This state of
1 527 U.S. 666 (1999).
12524 U.S. 156 (1998); see infra text accompanying notes 29-49.
13 524 U.S. 498 (1998); see infra text accompanying notes 50-85.
14 527 U.S. 666 (1999); see infra text accompanying notes 115-20.
2000] 889
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affairs is, to put it mildly, likely to produce bewilderment among
lower courts and practicing lawyers. The Court has rendered four
decisions, each of which is like a flare that briefly illuminates a
darkened landscape and then fades away. My objective in this Ar-
ticle is to construct a vision of what that landscape might look like
if viewed in a fuller and more sustained light than provided by the
Court.
The perspective I adopt is that of an internal participant in our
legal system seeking to make sense of the landscape of constitu-
tional property in the wake of the Court's recent pronouncements.
The task is to try to fit the Court's outcomes and rationales into the
existing legal universe, as defined by the relevant propositions
about constitutional protection of property that are reasonably set-
tled. The approach is thus normative, but the judgments are
constrained by the path .dependency of common-law constitutional-
ism.
One reason why an approach that tries to make sense of existing
judicial doctrine is appropriate at this juncture is that the academic
literature about the meaning of constitutional property is surpris-
ingly thin. A spate of articles written in the late 1970s and early
1980s in the aftermath of Roth focused on the meaning of property
for procedural due process purposes."5 But once the Supreme Court
15 See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Substance and Due Process, 1982 Sup. Ct. Rev.
85 (1983); Robert Jerome Glennon, Constitutional Liberty and Property: Federal
Common Law and Section 1983, 51 S. Cal. L. Rev. 355 (1978); Douglas Laycock, Due
Process and Separation of Powers: The Effort to Make the Due Process Clauses
Nonjusticiable, 60 Tex. L. Rev. 875 (1982); Frank I. Michelman, Formal and
Associational Aims in Procedural Due Process, in XVIII NOMOS: Due Process 126
(J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1977); Henry Paul Monaghan, Of
"Liberty" and "Property," 62 Cornell L. Rev. 405 (1977); Martin H. Redish &
Lawrence C. Marshall, Adjudicatory Independence and the Values of Procedural
Due Process, 95 Yale L.J. 455 (1986); Edward L. Rubin, Due Process and the
Administrative State, 72 Cal. L. Rev. 1044 (1984); Peter N. Simon, Liberty and
Property in the Supreme Court: A Defense of Roth and Perry, 71 Cal. L. Rev. 146
(1983); Rodney A. Smolla, The Reemergence of the Right-Privilege Distinction in
Constitutional Law: The Price of Protesting Too Much, 35 Stan. L. Rev. 69 (1982);
Timothy P. Terrell, "Property," "Due Process," and the Distinction Between
Definition and Theory in Legal Analysis, 70 Geo. L.J. 861 (1982); Laurence H. Tribe,
Structural Due Process, 10 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 269 (1975); Mark Tushnet, The
Newer Property: Suggestion for the Revival of Substantive Due Process, 1975 Sup. Ct.
Rev. 261 (1976); William Van Alstyne, Cracks In "The New Property": Adjudicative
Due Process in The Administrative State, 62 Cornell L. Rev. 445 (1977); Stephen F.
Williams, Liberty and Property: The Problem of Government Benefits, 12 J. Legal
[Vol. 86:885890
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resolved the most burning controversy that emerged during these
years," academic interest faded away, and the issue has lain dor-
mant for more than a decade. With respect to the Takings Clause,
there is an enormous literature about what it means to "take"
property," and there is substantial writing about the "public use" 8
and "just compensation"'9 requirements. But the threshold re-
quirement that a claimant have "private property" has received
less attention." Thus, rather than using the Court's recent decisions
Stud. 3 (1983).
16 This was the "bitter with the sweet" controversy. See infra text accompanying
notes 156-81. The Court settled the controversy in Cleveland Board of Education v.
Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 539-41 (1985), and academic writing about the meaning of
property for procedural due process purposes fell off noticeably thereafter.
17Without in any way being comprehensive, see, for example, Bruce A. Ackerman,
Private Property and the Constitution (1977); Richard A. Epstein, Takings: Private
Property and the Power of Eminent Domain (1985); William A. Fischel, Regulatory
Takings: Law, Economics, and Politics (1995); Lawrence Blume & Daniel L.
Rubinfeld, Compensation for Takings: An Economic Analysis, 72 Cal. L. Rev. 569
(1984); Hanoch Dagan, Takings and Distributive Justice, 85 Va. L. Rev. 741 (1999);
Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 509
(1986); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., A Critical Reexamination of the Takings Jurisprudence,
90 Mich. L. Rev. 1892 (1992); Molly S. McUsic, The Ghost of Lochner. Modem
Takings Doctrine and Its Impact on Economic Legislation, 76 B.U. L. Rev. 605
(1996); Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical
Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 1165 (1967); Jeremy
Paul, The Hidden Structure of Takings Law, 64 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1393 (1991); Andrea L.
Peterson, The Takings Clause: In Search of Underlying Principles Part I-A Critique
of Current Takings Clause Doctrine, 77 Cal. L. Rev. 1299 (1989); Joseph L. Sax,
Takings and the Police Power, 74 Yale L.L 36 (1964) [hereinafter Sax, Police Power];
Joseph L. Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81 Yale L.J. 149 (1971)
[hereinafter Sax, Public Rights].
11 See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 17, at 161-81; Thomas W. Merrill, The Economics of
Public Use, 72 Comell L. Rev. 61 (1986); Jed Rubenfeld, Usings, 102 Yale L.J. 1077
(1993).
19 See, e.g., Victor P. Goldberg et al., Bargaining in the Shadow of Eminent Domain:
Valuing and Apportioning Condemnation Awards Between Landlord and Tenant, 34
UCLA L. Rev. 1083 (1987); Michael A. Heller & James E. Krier, Deterrence and
Distribution in the Law of Takings, 112 Harv. L. Rev. 997 (1999); Benjamin E.
Hermalin, An Economic Analysis of Takings, 11 J.L. Econ. & Org. 64 (1995); Glynn
S. Lunney, Jr., Compensation for Takings: How Much Is Just?, 42 Cath. U. L. Rev.
721 (1993).
20 See Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Judicial Takings, 76 Va. L. Rev. 1449, 1523 n.277
(1990) ("[T]he question of what property means in the takings context has not been
rigorously analyzed by scholars and judges-despite the fact that it would seem
central to any formulation of a coherent takings doctrine."). Aspects of takings
property are discussed in several sources. See, e.g., Ackerman, supra note 17, at 4
(contrasting "Ordinary Observer" and "Scientific Policymaker" understandings of
property for takings purposes); Epstein, supra note 17, at 20-24 (urging adoption of
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as a launching pad for engaging in political or economic theorizing,
it may be more helpful at this juncture to take stock of where we
stand in terms of the judicial doctrine seeking to define constitu-
tional property, and to consider how it might be sorted out in a way
that makes sense.
After describing the four recent decisions in Part I, the paper
will turn in Part II to a consideration of the Court's most sustained
effort to date to delineate a methodology for identifying constitu-
tional property-the case law that grows out of the foundational
decision in Roth. The Court stated there that property interests are
not created by the Constitution, but rather are created (and their
dimensions defined by) nonconstitutional sources such as state
law." This approach to identifying property, which concentrates on
the source of property and imposes little or no limit on its content,
gave rise to what may be called the positivist trap. The most
prominent version of the trap was then-Justice William
Rehnquist's bitter-with-the-sweet thesis: that the procedures pre-
scribed by nonconstitutional law qualify the scope of the property
right, and hence compliance with these procedures automatically
satisfies due process.' More broadly, however, the trap arises
whenever nonconstitutional law generates either too little property
or too much property relative to some independent norm that is
important to the Court. I will review various devices the Court de-
veloped during years following Roth in response to different
versions of the trap.
Drawing upon the lessons that may be gained from the experi-
ence with Roth, Part III will seek to determine the optimal method
for identifying constitutional property rights, with particular refer-
Blackstone's definition of property for purposes of interpreting the Takings Clause);
McUsic, supra note 17, at 647-59 (arguing that the Court implicitly regards private
property under the Takings Clause to mean interests in land); Paul, supra note 17, at
1416-24 (contrasting "physical" and "market" models for defining takings property);
Thompson, supra, at 1522-27 (contrasting positivist and romantic theories of
property). In addition, there are a few sources that consider the meaning of property
as reflected in specific cases. See, e.g., Frank I. Michelman, Property, Federalism, and
Jurisprudence: A Comment on Lucas and Judicial Conservatism, 35 Wm. & Mary L.
Rev. 301 (1993) (discussing the definition of property implicit in Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992)); D. Benjamin Barros, Note, Defining
"Property" in the Just Compensation Clause, 63 Fordham L. Rev. 1853 (1995) (same).
21 See Roth, 408 U.S. at 577.
2 See Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974) (plurality opinion).
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ence to the appropriate division of labor between constitutional
and nonconstitutional law. I reject both a "natural property" and a
"pure positivist" approach, and instead endorse what I call the
"patterning definition" method. Under this strategy, courts would
proceed in two steps. First, they would identify, as a matter of
federal constitutional law, general criteria that distinguish constitu-
tional property from other interests or expectancies that do not rise
to the level of property. Second, they would canvas sources of non-
constitutional law (most prominently but not exclusively state law)
to determine whether the claimant has a legally recognized interest
that satisfies these criteria and hence constitutes constitutional
property. An approach very much like this was recently endorsed
in Drye for defining property for federal tax purposes.
In Part IV, I will turn to the more difficult question of determin-
ing what the patterning definition of constitutional property should
be. Although awkward from a textualist perspective, I argue that
the best approach is to adopt different definitions for procedural
due process, the Takings Clause, and substantive due process. I call
these three definitions property-as-entitlement, property-as-
ownership, and property-as-wealth respectively.
The patterning definition for procedural due process, property-
as-entitlement, is broad but not open-ended. Drawing upon existing
decisional law, I suggest the definition should ask whether noncon-
stitutional sources of law confer an entitlement on a claimant
having a monetary value that can be terminated only upon a find-
ing that a specific condition has been satisfied. This definition
would encompass both traditional common law property and gov-
ernment entitlements protected by "for cause" termination
provisions.
The patterning definition for purposes of the Takings Clause,
property-as-ownership, is significantly narrower. Building on the
Court's recent decisions in Eastern Enterprises and College Savings
Bank, I argue that the definition in this context should ask whether
nonconstitutional sources of law confer an irrevocable right on a
claimant to exclude others from interfering with specific assets.
This definition would hew fairly closely to the private law concept
of property. It would not be triggered by changes in taxes or liabil-
ity rules because these sorts of government actions affect a
claimant's wealth but do not undermine any ownership rights in
2001
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specific assets. It would also exclude entitlements to government
benefits because these entitlements are not irrevocable in the
strong sense that common law property rights are.
The patterning definition for purposes of substantive due proc-
ess is more difficult to specify. As a constitutional doctrine,
substantive due process is a mile wide and an inch deep. It in-
cludes, for example, the principle that all economic regulation must
be minimally rational' and the principle that retroactive changes in
tax and liability rules require special justification.4 The breadth
(and the weakness) of the doctrine suggests that the definition of
property for these purposes should also be broad. Lacking any sig-
nificant guidance in the Court's decisions, I tentatively suggest that
property in this context should mean property-as-wealth, in other
words, the definition would ask whether nonconstitutional sources
of law confer an entitlement on a claimant having a monetary
value. This is the broadest of the three patterning definitions.
Part V will briefly consider an issue that poses a special chal-
lenge to any attempt to set forth a comprehensive strategy for
defining constitutional property: whether contract rights are prop-
erty for purposes of the Due Process and Takings Clauses. The key
stumbling block here is the Framers' decision to forbid the States
from passing any law "impairing the Obligation of Contracts,"' but
not to impose this prohibition on the federal government. If we are
to respect this decision, then "contracts" cannot be coterminous
with "property." Otherwise, every impairment of contract could
just as easily be challenged as a regulatory taking, and, assuming
the Takings Clause provides more protection than the Contract
Clause (which seems to be the modern Court's view26), federal im-
pairment of contracts would be subject to the same degree of
constitutional constraint as state impairments, contrary to the con-
stitutional design.
13 See, e.g., Concrete Pipe & Prods. v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust, 508
U.S. 602, 637-41 (1993).24 See, e.g., United States v. Carlton, 512 U.S. 26, 31 (1994) (stating that retroactive
change in tax laws must meet a burden of justification not faced by prospective
legislation); Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 14-20 (1976) (applying
the same principle to a retroactive liability rule).
U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. '
See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987) (giving
short shrift to a Contract Clause claim relative to a takings claim).
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I. FouR FLARES IN TE DARKNESS
In the last two years the Supreme Court has issued four pro-
nouncements about the meaning of property. Three of these
edicts-the ones most immediately relevant here--concern the
meaning of property for purposes of substantive constitutional pro-
tection under either the Due Process or the Takings Clauses. Each
of the constitutional rulings was decided by a vote of 5-4, with the
same coalition of Justices on each side. The majority in each case
was composed of Chief Justice William Rehnquist and Justices
Sandra Day O'Connor, Antonin Scalia, Anthony Kennedy, and
Clarence Thomas; this coalition may be labeled the "pro-property"
wing of the CourtY The dissenters in each case were Justices John
Paul Stevens, David Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Stephen
Breyer; this group we may call the "pro-regulation" faction.' Our
three cases, however, suggest that such labels are potentially mis-
leading. Two of the three decisions-the two that change the law in
the most significant respects-restrict the domain of constitutional
property relative to what it was before they were decided.
The fourth and most recent decision about the meaning of prop-
erty-which is only indirectly relevant to our topic-arose under
the tax lien provisions of the Internal Revenue Code. Nevertheless,
Justice Ginsburg's brief unanimous opinion for the Court provides
in many respects the most useful model for integrating the Court's
various pronouncements about the meaning of constitutional prop-
erty.
A. Phillips v. Washington Legal Foundation
The first of the four decisions to be argued and decided, Phillips
v. Washington Legal Foundation," arose out of a constitutional
challenge to Interest on Lawyer Trust Accounts ("IOLTAs").
IOLTAs are an artifact of federal banking regulations. Under
27The same five Justices voted to find an unconstitutional taking in Dolan v. City of
Tigard, 512 U.S. 374,375 (1994), and in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505
U.S. 1003,1005 (1992), where they were joined by Justice White, now retired.
28Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg, joined by the late Justice Blackmun,
dissented in Dolan, 512 U.S. at 396, 411, and Justices Stevens and Souter dissented in
Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1036, 1061, 1076.
524 U.S. 156 (1998).
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those regulations, Negotiable Order of Withdrawal ("NOW") ac-
counts (interest-earning demand accounts) are available only to
individuals and charitable organizations.' Consequently, lawyers
who hold small amounts of funds for clients have traditionally
commingled these monies in ordinary non-interest-bearing check-
ing accounts. In 1981, the Federal Reserve Board issued an opinion
letter stating that lawyers could place client funds in a NOW ac-
count, provided all interest was paid over to a charitable
organization.3' Prompted by this ruling, forty-eight States and the
District of Columbia adopted rules requiring lawyers to place client
funds in IOLTAs, with the interest going to charitable foundations
that fund legal services for the poor.
The Court granted certiorari in Phillips to resolve a conflict over
the narrow question "whether 'interest earned on client trust funds
held by lawyers in IOLTA accounts [is] a property interest of the
client or lawyer"' for purposes of the Takings Clause. 2 Everyone
agreed that the principal sum of money deposited in an IOLTA be-
longs to the client.3 Moreover, under the Texas IOLTA program at
issue in Phillips, it was conceded that if the client's funds were suf-
ficiently large to generate net interest-interest in excess of the
administrative costs of establishing a separate account-then the
lawyer was required to establish a separate client account for the
funds, in which case the net interest would be credited to the cli-
ent.' IOLTAs could thus be used only in situations where, but for
the IOLTA program, the client's money would be placed in an or-
dinary commingled checking account and would earn no interest.
Phillips presented something of a brainteaser of an issue:
whether the fruits of X's property that may only be enjoyed by Y
are nevertheless the property of X. But the Court's approach to re-
solving that question was highly conventional. The Court framed
its analysis with the observation that "[b]ecause the Constitution
protects rather than creates property interests, the existence of a
property interest is determined by reference to 'existing rules or
understandings that stem from an independent source such as state
30 See 12 U.S.C. § 1832(a) (1994).
31 See Phillips, 524 U.S. at 161.
32 Id. at 164 n.4 (quoting Petition for Cert. at i).
33 See id. at 164.
4 See id. at 169.
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law.' '.. This invocation of nonconstitutional law as the source of
constitutional property is, as we shall see, a well-established conceit
in both the due process and the takings contexts.
The most notable aspect of Phillips was not the Court's method,
but the fact that the Court appeared to reach the wrong result un-
der that method. In an opinion written by Chief Justice Rehnquist,
the Court held that IOLTA interest "is the property of the client."36
Yet if we assume a method that identifies constitutional property
by looking to "independent source[s] such as state law" means a
court is to look to all relevant provisions of state law, the client did
not have any property in IOLTA interest. This is because, under
the Texas Supreme Court rules, client funds that would not earn
net interest in a separate account must be placed in an IOLTA, and
if placed in an IOLTA, those funds would not earn interest for the
client. Hence, any client who consulted all "independent source[s]
such as state law" should know in advance of depositing a small
sum of money with a Texas lawyer that, under the law of Texas,
those funds would earn no interest.
On its face, it is unclear why the majority deployed the conven-
tional method in such an apparently flawed way. The Chief
Justice's opinion offers no explanation why some provisions of
nonconstitutional law-in this case, common law precedents from
Texas and elsewhere stating that "interest follows principal"'37-are
relevant in determining whether IOLTA interest is the property of
the client, whereas other provisions of nonconstitutional law-
most notably the Texas Supreme Court's IOLTA rules-somehow
do not count in resolving the property question.
The only whiff of a theory lies in the adjectival phrases the Chief
Justice employed in describing different provisions of law. The le-
gal rules cited favorably by the Chief Justice had been "established
under English common law since at least the mid-1700's," were
"firmly embedded in the common law of the various States," re-
flected "traditional property law principles," and had a long
"historical pedigree."3 In contrast, those provisions deemed irrele-
vant, such as the Federal Reserve Board's opinion letter and the
-15Id. at 164 (quoting Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564,577 (1972)).
31 Id. at 160.
Id. at 165-66 & n.5.
31 Id. at 165-68.
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rules promulgated in 1984 by the Texas Supreme Court, were not
part of the "'background principles' of property law."39 This selec-
tion of descriptive phrases intimates that perhaps long-established
common law rules are central to the identification of "true" prop-
erty interests, whereas rules enacted by regulatory agencies are
not. But the suggestion is just that-an intimation. The Rehnquist
opinion sets forth no theory that would justify its result.
The most persuasive thing the Court said in support of its judg-
ment was that physical things can be property, even if they have no
economic value." Similarly, "[w]hile the interest income at issue
here may have no economically realizable value to its owner, pos-
session, control, and disposition are nonetheless valuable rights
that inhere in the property."41 This suggests that the, value the
Court (and the respondents) attached to the property determina-
tion was a recognition of the client's right to exclude others from
the interest. The client might not be able to get his hands on the in-
terest, but at least he could make sure that no legal aid lawyer got
it either.
The problem with rationalizing the decision on this basis, how-
ever, is that the victory was purely pyrrhic. The Texas IOLTA rules
in effect had already inversely condemned the client's right to ex-
clude others by requiring that all funds that could not otherwise
earn net interest be deposited in IOLTA accounts. As Justice
Souter persuasively argued in dissent,42 the Texas Supreme Court's
elimination of the client's right to exclude others from the interest
would not give rise to any actionable claim for a "taking" or for the
payment of "just compensation." Two of the established variables
for determining whether a regulation exacts a taking are its eco-
nomic impact and the degree to which it interferes with
investment-backed expectations.43 Since, absent the IOLTA pro-
gram, a client would earn no interest on funds held by a lawyer, the
program would seem not to have any adverse economic impact on
391d. at 168 (quoting Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1030
(1992)).
See id. at 169-70.
41 Id. at 170.
42 See id. at 174-78 (Souter, J., dissenting).
43 See, e.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104,124 (1978).
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ordinary clients and would not seem to interfere with any invest-
ment-backed expectations.
Similarly, the formula for determining just compensation looks
to the value of the property before and after the challenged regula-
tion is adopted.' Since client funds earned zero net interest before
being placed in an IOLTA account, and earned zero interest after
being placed in such an account, there was no change in valuation
requiring the payment of compensation. Thus, the value of the
judgment to the respondents, and evidently also to the Court ma-
jority, was simply the gratification of being able to proclaim that
this type of device for funding litigation on behalf of the poor is
"confiscatory." 5 This was constitutional law as symbolic politics.
Beyond symbolic politics, there is one respect in which Phillips
highlights a more general dilemma in takings jurisprudence. This is
what Margaret Radin has called the problem of "conceptual sever-
ance." 6 The problem derives from the fact that property can be
conceptually subdivided into physical fractions of different sizes or
into bundles of rights composed of different sticks or strands. The
more a parcel of land or bundle of rights is disaggregated, the more
draconian a government regulation will seem, because the regula-
tion will have a greater impact on a fractional parcel or a single
strand than it will have on a larger aggregation of interests. Thus,
conceptual severance makes it more likely that a court will find a
government regulation is a taking. The Court in fact has recognized
the danger of conceptual severance and has warned that "a claim-
ant's parcel of property could not first be divided into what was
taken and what was left for the purpose of demonstrating the tak-
ing of the former to be complete and hence compensable."'47
See, e.g., United States'v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369,373 (1943) ("The owner is to be put
in as good position pecuniarily as he would have occupied if his property had not been
taken.").
45 Phillips, 524 U.S. at 171 (referring to the State's "confiscation of respondents'
interest income").
46 Margaret Jane Radin, The Liberal Conception of Property: Cross Currents in the
Jurisprudence of Takings, 88 Colum. L. Rev. 1667, 1677 (1988). For a recent
discussion, see Courtney C. Tedrowe, Conceptual Severance and Takings in the
Federal Circuit, 85 Cornell L. Rev. 586 (2000).
41 Concrete Pipe & Prods. v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust, 508 U.S. 602, 644
(1993).
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The Phillips decision acquiesced in an egregious form of concep-
tual severance. By accepting the characterization of the interest on
an IOLTA as a property right separate and distinct from the prin-
cipal, the Court made it seem plausible to describe the IOLTA
rules as effecting a complete "confiscation" of property. If, how-
ever, the relevant unit of analysis were the principal amount of
funds deposited with a lawyer, then the IOLTA rules would at
most represent a diminution in value of property relative to what it
might be worth under other arrangements.' Phillips thus under-
scores what Justice Scalia confessed in Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council 9 -that the Court has no idea how to prevent the
definition of property from being manipulated through conceptual
severance so as to influence the outcome of takings controversies.
B. Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel
The second of the three decisions, Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel,'
followed closely on the heels of Phillips. At issue was the constitu-
tionality of the Coal Industry Retiree Health Benefit Act ("Coal
Act") 15 ' a federal statute enacted in 1992 requiring companies that
had formerly been in the coal mining business to contribute to a
fund providing health care benefits to retired coal miners and their
families. With respect to the petitioner, Eastern Enterprises, the
Coal Act meant that it had to pay for health care benefits for per-
sons it -had employed between 1946 and 1965, the year it turned
over its coal mining operations to a wholly-owned subsidiary.
These payments were compelled by law even though Eastern En-
terprises, during the 1946 to 1965 period, had entered into no
'formal contractual commitments to pay such benefits beyond the
term of individual collective bargaining agreements. The Coal Act
therefore could be said to change the legal consequences of em-
4 Indeed, the Chief Justice acknowledged that if the principal amount of client
funds were regarded as the relevant property, the IOLTA rules would need to be
considered a regulation of property, not a confiscation, and it would be unlikely that
any takings challenge could be successfully mounted to such a regulation. See Phillips,
524 U.S. at 164.
49 505 U.S. 1003, 1016-17 n.7 (1992).
524 U.S. 498 (1998).
5126 U.S.C. §§ 9701-9722 (1994).
52 The subsidiary paid more than $100 million in dividends to Eastern from 1965
until it was sold in 1987. See Eastern Enterprises, 524 U.S. at 516.
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ployment contracts some thirty-plus years after the fact. Eastern's
cumulative expected liability under the statute was estimated to be
between $50 and $100 million. 3 Thus, Eastern Enterprises, unlike
Phillips, was at least a fight over real money.
Also unlike Phillips, where the Court granted certiorari for the
express purpose of deciding the constitutional property issue, the
possibility that there was no property at stake in Eastern Enter-
prises did not make its appearance until well after the case had
been briefed and argued. The claim was not raised in any of the
briefs filed by the parties.' And notwithstanding the usual vigorous
questioning at oral argument, the contention that there was no
property within the meaning of the Takings Clause was neither
urged by any of the lawyers nor floated by any Justice at the argu-
ment.
55
From the published opinions, it appears Justice O'Connor was
assigned to write a majority opinion invalidating the Coal Act as it
applied to Eastern. It appears she circulated a draft opinion assum-
ing that the Takings Clause applied to the controversy and
invalidating the Act as an uncompensated regulatory taking.'
What happened next is unclear. But it may be that before
O'Connor was able to gather five join memos, Justice Breyer circu-
lated his dissenting opinion, advancing-among other arguments-
the newly minted notion that the Coal Act did not take any prop-
erty within the meaning of the Takings Clause. 7 In any event, when
the dust settled, Justice Kennedy also concluded (whether before
or after Justice Breyer circulated his dissent is unclear, although
my own guess is that it was after58) that he too was unpersuaded
53The exact amount was disputed: The higher number was the company's estimate
and the lower number was the union's estimate. See id. at 529.
'4 See Brief for Petitioner; Brief for Respondents The UMWA Combined Benefit
Fund and Its Trustees; Brief of Respondents Peabody Holding Co., Eastern
Associated Coal Corp. and Coal Properties Corp.; Brief for the Federal Respondent;
Reply Brief for Petitioner, Eastern Enterprises (No. 97-42).
5- See Transcript of Oral Argument, March 4, 1998, Eastern Enterprises (No. 97-42).
5Even in its published form, Justice O'Connor's opinion contains only glancing
references to the constitutional property issue. These references appear in transitional
passages, see, e.g., Eastern Enterprises, 524 U.S. at 521-23, 528-29, and are of the sort
that could easily have been inserted in making revisions to the opinion in response to
the circulations of other Justices.
PSee id. at 554 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
mJustice Breyer's discussion of why the Takings Clause was not implicated started
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that the Coal Act gave rise to any issue under the Takings Clause. 9
Justice Kennedy did not change his vote to invalidate the Coal Act,
however. Instead, he authored an opinion concurring in the judg-
ment and agreeing with Justice Breyer that no property was at
issue within the meaning of the Takings Clause, but finding that
the Coal Act violated substantive due process. At the end of the
day, therefore, there were five votes to hold the Coal Act unconsti-
tutional-four as a taking and one as a violation of substantive due
process-but also five votes for the proposition that the Coal Act
did not take any property within the meaning of the Takings
Clause.
It is easy to understand why Justice O'Connor sought to invali-
date the Coal Act under the Takings rather than the Due Process
Clause. Two of the Justices in the pro-property coalition-Justices
Scalia and Thomas-are adherents of the view that substantive due
process is an "oxymoron,"' and they often decline to join decisions
by emphasizing that there had been no taking of a specific property interest from an
individual followed by a transfer to the government, see id. at 554, although by the
time he concluded it was not clear that the private transfer feature was critical. See id.
at 556 ("If the [Takings] Clause applies when the government simply orders A to pay
B, why does it not apply when the government simply orders A to pay the
government, i.e., when it assesses a tax?"). Justice Kennedy specifically rejected the
implausible notion that the Takings Clause applies only when property is transferred
from an individual to the government, see id. at 542-43 (Kennedy, J., concurring in
the judgment and dissenting in part), suggesting that perhaps he had the benefit of
Justice Breyer's draft while composing his own. For an academic theory that would
limit the Takings Clause to instances where resources are transferred to the
government, which conceivably may have been the original inspiration for Justice
Breyer (or his clerk), see Rubenfeld, supra note 18, at 1079-80.
59See Eastern Enterprises, 524 U.S. at 539-47 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the
judgment and dissenting in part).
6 The argument is that "process" means procedure and hence the phrase
"substantive due process" is like describing a color as "green pastel redness." John
Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust 18 (1980). The critique is highly popular among
legal conservatives, almost entirely it would seem, because it undermines Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). Whether the critique is sound is debatable. Although
"process" as a textual matter may equate to procedure, there is considerable evidence
that "due process of law" was understood by the Framers to be a term of art
incorporating the Magna Carta's "law of the land" guarantee. See James W. Ely, Jr.,
The Oxymoron Reconsidered: Myth and Reality in the Origins of Substantive Due
Process, 16 Const. Commentary 315, 320 (1999); see also sources cited infra note 161
(discussing the meaning of property for procedural due process purposes). The "law
of the land" idea, in turn, is sufficiently vague that it could incorporate certain
substantive restraints on legislative action.
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that rest on the doctrine.61 Thus, Justice O'Connor probably steered
away from substantive due process and toward the takings analysis
in an attempt to secure five votes, rather than writing a plurality
opinion for only three.62 Unfortunately, Justice O'Connor's effort to
cast the Coal Act, which imposed a general liability, as a taking of
property was sufficiently implausible that she lost the vote of Justice
Kennedy-a Justice who had crossed the substantive due process
rubicon in Planned Parenthood v. Casey' and evidently saw no
jurisprudential objection to deploying due process to achieve sub-
stantive protections for property rights.
The Breyer/Kennedy argument as to why no takings property
was implicated by the Coal Act was a novel one, in the sense that
neither Justice was able to cite any legal authority in support of his
thesis. Nevertheless the argument was presented as an inductive
generalization drawn from the holdings of the Court's takings
cases, and in this sense was not radical. Justice Breyer stressed that
prior takings cases had all involved physical property, intellectual
property, or a specific fund of money.' It was true, he conceded,
that two recent decisions had entertained takings challenges to
employee benefit schemes that imposed new liabilities on employ-
ers. But those challenges had been rejected, so there was no
holding of the Court that applied the Takings Clause to a statute
imposing a "general liability."' Justice Kennedy provided an even
more complete review of prior takings decisions, concluding that
they all involved what he variously called "an identified property
interest," a "specific property right" or a "specific property inter-
61 See, e.g., BMW of N. Am. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 598 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting,
joined by Thomas, J.); United States v. Carlton, 512 U.S. 26, 39 (1994) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in judgment, joined by Thomas, J.); TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance
Resources Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 470 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment, joined
by Thomas, J.).
See Eastern Enterprises, 524 U.S. at 537-38 (plurality opinion) (declining to reach
the substantive due process claim in part because "this Court has expressed concerns
about using the Due Process Clause to invalidate economic legislation").
505 U.S. 833 (1992) (joint opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.).
'1See Eastern Enterprises, 524 U.S. at 554-55 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
See id. at 555 (citing Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 225





est."'67 Thus emerged the Breyer/Kennedy thesis: Property for Tak-
ings Clause purposes refers only to identified property rights, not
to general liabilities that reduce net worth or general wealth.
Both Justice Breyer and Justice Kennedy bolstered their induc-
tive generalization with policy arguments, which each Justice
offered in his distinctive style. As befits the former Harvard law
professor, Justice Breyer argued that the Takings Clause ought not
to apply to a statute imposing a general liability because such an
exercise "bristles with conceptual difficulties."' In particular, he
noted that the contrary conclusion would mean that the Takings
Clause would apply to any statute assessing a tax, or any regulatory
statute that creates burdens for some while benefiting others.9
Justice Kennedy offered a more pragmatic assessment of why
such an application of the Takings Clause would be "unwise, '70 one
centering on federalism concerns. After noting that the regulatory
takings doctrine imposes a notoriously "difficult and uncertain"
standard, he observed:
The difficulties in determining whether there is a taking or a
regulation even where a property right or interest is identified
ought to counsel against extending the regulatory takings doc-
trine to cases lacking this specificity. The existence of at least
this outer boundary for application of the regulatory takings
rule provides some necessary predictability for governmental
entities.71
Eastern Enterprises is a decision of many ironies, not the least of
which is that in the course of resolving a major controversy about
the constitutionality of retroactive government action, five Justices
saw fit to adopt a legal theory that had never been considered by
the lower courts, briefed by the parties, mentioned at oral argu-
ment, or previously endorsed by the Court. A majority of five
Justices thus roundly denounced the unfairness of retroactive law-
making at the same time that another coalition of five Justices
perpetrated it.72
6Id. at 540-42 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part).
61 Id. at 556 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
6See id.70 Id. at 540 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part).
7, Id. at 542.
2 Judicial decisions of course are by their nature retroactive, in the sense that if they
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Irony aside, the new limitation on the meaning of property rec-
ognized by the separate opinions in Eastern Enterprises has
potentially far-reaching implications for the Takings Clause, in two
respects. First, if the Takings Clause applies only to interferences
with specific property rights but not to reductions in net worth due
to the imposition of general liabilities, the Clause cannot be used in
any coherent fashion to consider issues involving the general dis-
tribution of wealth. The category of specific property rights was no
doubt intended by Justices Breyer and Kennedy to be a broad one,
covering not just real estate and personal property but also intel-
lectual property rights, securities, and even bank accounts. But the
wealth or net worth of individuals and firms is comprised of the
sum of their specific assets minus their liabilities. This means that
the Breyer/Kennedy move, assuming it sticks, eliminates any pos-
sibility of using the Takings Clause as an instrument for achieving
distributive justice-or perhaps more relevantly, for policing sup-
posedly misguided attempts by the political branches to achieve
distributive justice. It will be at most an instrument for corrective
justice-rectification of government actions that "single out" cer-
tain owners for economic harm,73 considered in isolation from more
general concerns about the distribution of shares of the social pie.74
Issues of distributive justice have dominated academic discus-
sions about the Takings Clause in recent decades.' Most
prominently, Richard Epstein has set forth a grand vision in which
the Takings Clause prohibits any attempt by the state to modify the
distribution of wealth produced by voluntary exchanges of prop-
adopt new rules, those rules apply to the parties to the decision and others who have
pending claims in the courts. See Harper v. Virginia Dep't of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86,
96-97 (1993); James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529 (1991). Given
this inherent retroactivity, however, it would seem especially important that courts
confine themselves to the consideration of points of law that the parties in the case
have briefed and argued.
73 Molly S. McUsic, Looking Inside Out: Institutional Analysis and the Problem of
Takings, 92 Nw. U. L. Rev. 591, 642-43 (1998).
74See Daryl J. I. vinson, Making Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and the
Allocation of Constitutional Costs, 67 U. Chi. L. Rev. 345 (2000) (reviewing distri-
butional and corrective justice theories of just compensation).
75 See generally Leif Wenar, The Concept of Property and the Takings Clause, 97
Colum. L. Rev. 1923, 1932-34 (1997) (noting the tendency of leading takings scholars
to substitute "economic value or welfare" for property and "to apply political
philosophy to ... the topic of government actions that have redistributive effects on
resources and thus welfare").
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erty acquired through first possession. 6 In order to effectuate this
vision, Epstein insists that "[aill regulations, all taxes, and all modi-
fications of liability rules are takings of private property prima
facie compensable by the state."' Epstein's project would thus ap-
pear to be squarely foreclosed by the Breyer/Kennedy position in
Eastern Enterprises. Other commentators, perhaps most notably
Joseph Sax, have also assumed that the Takings Clause might be
construed as a general impediment to the redistribution of shares
of wealth, and have devoted themselves to articulating a new vision
of property that would avoid this understanding." If Eastern Enter-
prises is right, this lifetime of effort was unnecessary.
Second, the limitation of takings property to specific property
rights could contain the seeds of a partial solution to the problem
of conceptual severance, so prominently on display in Phillips.
Conceptual severance comes about when property is conceived to
be a "bundle of rights," and the claimant contends that certain
strands in the bundle are themselves free-standing "property
rights."79 A regulation that has the effect of eliminating a single
strand is then claimed to be a total taking of this freestanding
property right. If takings property is limited to discrete assets,
however, then some significant constraints may be imposed on
conceptual severance. For example, if the only identifiable prop-
erty right of the client in Phillips was the amount of money the
client placed with the lawyer, then it would not be permissible to
conceptually sever this asset into two rights-the right to the prin-
cipal and the right to the interest-and argue that there has been a
confiscation of the free-standing property right to the interest.Y
76 See Epstein, supra note 17, at x.
nId. at 95.
78 See, e.g., Sax, Police Power, supra note 17, at 75-76; Sax, Public Rights, supra note
17, at 149-50; see also Thomas W. Merrill, Compensation and the Interconnectedness
of Property, 25 Ecology L.Q. 327 (1998) (describing this feature of Sax's writings on
the Takings Clause).
7 See Radin, supra note 46, at 1677-78; Wenar, supra note 75, at 1927-28.
81 One of the many anomalies of Eastern Enterprises is that no Justice took the
trouble to explain how the new specific property rule could be squared with Phillips.
The only "specific property" that could be identified with confidence in Phillips was
the principal amount of client funds deposited with the lawyer. Interest was earned on
this property only because the client funds were commingled with other funds, and
only because the interest was made payable to someone else. Was the client's
phantom share of the interest on this commingled fund an "identifiable" or "specific"
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Whether Eastern Enterprises leads to such a limitation on con-
ceptual severance depends on how courts interpret what Justices
Kennedy and Breyer variously called an "identified property inter-
est""' or a "specific interest in physical or intellectual property. '
Some of the examples of specific property interests cited by Justice
Kennedy are rife with the potential for conceptual severance. Thus,
his enumeration included not just pre-packaged bundles of rights,
such as "real property," "trade secrets," "easement[s]," and
"liens," but also individual strands in such bundles, such as a "right
of access to property," a "right to transfer property by devise or in-
testacy," a "right to affix on structures," the "right to sell personal
property," and the "right to extract mineral deposits. ' If a "spe-
cific property interest" includes every conceivable incident of
property, including the right to inherit and the right to sell, then
takings claimants can have a conceptual severance field day.
Other passages in Justice Kennedy's opinion and in Justice
Breyer's opinion, however, suggest that a "specific property inter-
est" is an assembled bundle of rights that conforms to a legally
recognized form of property and is created, exchanged, or enforced
by economic actors with enough frequency to be recognized as a
discrete type of asset. From this perspective, land, intellectual
property rights, and a fund of money (to use Justice Breyer's ex-
amples) 8' would be specific property rights, but the right to inherit
or sell would not be. If specific property is given this latter inter-
pretation-discrete assets or "things"' -then the opportunities for
conceptual severance will be considerably reduced.
asset of the client? This is doubtful. It would take some explaining to demonstrate
why the new "outer boundary for application of the regulatory takings rule"
established in Eastern Enterprises, 524 U.S. at 542 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the
judgment and dissenting in part), did not put the issue in Phillips, decided just 10 days
earlier, beyond the pale of the Takings Clause.
81 Eastern Enterprises, 524 U.S. at 540 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment and
dissenting in part).
8 Id. at 554 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
83 Id. at 541-42 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part).
14 See id. at 554-55 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
85 Cf. Bernard Rudden, Things as Thing and Things as Wealth, 14 Oxford J. Legal




C. College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary
Education Expense Board
The most recent decision about the meaning of constitutional
property is College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary
Education Expense Board,' handed down on the last day of the
1998 Term. The issue arose indirectly, in the course of deciding
whether Congress has the power to subject state governments to
suit in federal court for violations of the Lanham Act. One ques-
tion before the Court was whether Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment, authorizing Congress to adopt "appropriate legisla-
tion" to enforce the Due Process Clause,' supplied such power.
Although there were a number of avenues the Court could have
taken in rejecting the Section 5 argument,' Justice Scalia's opinion
on behalf of the usual group of five Justices chose to reject this
possible source of congressional authority on the ground that the
petitioner's interests protected by the Lanham Act were not prop-
erty within the meaning of the Due Process Clause.
The petitioner, College Savings Bank, marketed certificates of
deposit designed to finance the costs of college education. The
State of Florida, through its agency Florida Prepaid Postsecondary
Education Expense Board, offered a similar product. College Sav-
ings filed suit in federal court alleging that Florida Prepaid had
527 U.S. 666 (1999).
U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 5 ("The Congress shall have power to enforce, by
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.").
In a companion case addressing College Savings Bank's patent claim, the Court
conceded that patents are property, but held that Congress had not established a
sufficient predicate of state government disregard of patent rights to justify legislation
under Section 5. See Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College
Say. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 642-48 (1999) [hereinafter Florida Prepaid]. Presumably, the
same rationale could have been used to reject the authority of Congress to extend the
Lanham Act's prohibition on false advertising to the states. The fact that the Court
abjured this relatively fact-bound basis for resolving the Section 5 claim in College
Savings Bank, and instead reached out for the broad ruling that the interest protected
by the Lanham Act is not "property," betrays an eagerness to declaim on the meaning
of property-and to cut back on the scope of constitutional property-that is
somewhat puzzling. It is generally assumed that the pro-property faction on the Court
is indeed pro-property, and is willing to sacrifice some local autonomy in the interests
of federal protection of property rights. See, e.g., Michelman, supra note 20, at 303-08
& n.25. But in College Savings Bank, the Court chose to vindicate state autonomy and
went out of its way to do so by diminishing federal protection of property rights.
[Vol. 86:885908
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infringed its patent on the financing product' and had violated Sec-
tion 43(a) of the Lanham Act by making false and misleading
statements about the Florida tuition savings plan. Notwithstanding
unequivocal language in the Trademark Remedy Clarification Act
of 1992 subjecting States to suit in federal court for Lanham Act
violations, the lower courts dismissed the false advertising claim as
barred by sovereign immunity.' The Supreme Court affirmed, re-
jecting first the argument that Congress had power to overcome
state sovereign immunity under its Section 5 power, and second
that Florida had impliedly waived any claim of sovereign immunity
when it entered the commercial marketplace in competition with
College Savings Bank.9
With respect to the Section 5 issue, College Savings Bank
seemed to have trouble articulating a consistent theory of why it
had property at stake in a suit against a state agency for false ad-
vertising. Sometimes it seemed to stress that the cause of action
created by the Lanham Act was itself a property right.' At other
times, it argued either that its business goodwill was the property,
or that the customers and revenues it allegedly lost because of the
false advertising were the property.' College Savings Bank was
dealt a severe blow on the Section 5 issue when the Solicitor Gen-
eral, representing the United States as intervenor, declined to
defend the Trademark Remedies Act under the Section 5 theory.
61 The Court held that the patent claim did not survive the State's defense of
sovereign immunity in the companion case. See Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 647.
10 See College Savings Bank, 527 U.S. at 671-72. The Lanham Act itself was passed
pursuant to Congress's power under Article I of the Constitution, and the Court had
held in Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 55-73 (1996), that Congress could not
abrogate state sovereign immunity pursuant to its Article I powers. The question was
therefore whether the Trademark Remedy Act of 1992, which extended the Lanham
Act's cause of action to suits brought against States in federal court, could be
sustained as an exercise of Congress's power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976) (holding that the
Fourteenth Amendment implicitly qualifies the implied sovereign immunity
recognized by the Eleventh Amendment).
91 See College Savings Bank, 527 U.S. at 691. The latter issue commanded the bulk
of the attention of the Justices, and resulted in the overruling, in the face of bitter and
lengthy dissents, of Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184 (1964), the leading case
endorsing the implied waiver idea.
9 See Reply Brief for Petitioner at 8-9, College Savings Bank (No. 98-149).
91 See Brief for Petitioner at 21-23, College Savings Bank (No. 98-149).
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Instead, the Solicitor General relied exclusively on the claim of im-
plied waiver.'
The Court ruled that Congress had no authority under Section 5
to subject the states to Lanham Act suits alleging false advertising.
With respect to the claim that the Lanham Act's cause of action
against false advertising was property, Justice Scalia, writing for the
majority, followed the script written by the Solicitor General," add-
ing some signature embellishments:
The hallmark of a protected property interest is the right to ex-
clude others. That is "one of the most essential sticks in the
bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property."
That is why the right that we all possess to use the public lands
is not the "property" right of anyone-hence the sardonic
maxim, explaining what economists call the "tragedy of the
commons," res publica, res nullius. The Lanham Act may well
contain provisions that protect constitutionally cognizable
property interests-notably, its provisions dealing with in-
fringement of trademarks, which are the "property" of the
owner because he can exclude others from using them. The
Lanham Act's false-advertising provisions, however, bear no re-
lationship to any right to exclude; and Florida Prepaid's alleged
misrepresentations concerning its own products intruded upon
no interest over which petitioner had exclusive dominion."
With respect to claims based on the alleged deprivation of
goodwill or future revenues associated with College Savings Bank's
business, Justice Scalia characterized the complaint as asserting "a
more generalized right to be secure in one's business interests."'
He then noted that such a claim suffered from the "same flaw" as
the first, in other words, it reflected an interest that did not entail
the right to exclude others.' Relying heavily on italics, he sought to
explain:
The assets of a business (including its good will) unquestionably
are property, and any state taking of those assets is unques-
14See Brief for the United States at 12, College Savings Bank (No. 98-149).
The government's brief asserted that "[t]he hallmark of a property interest is the
right to exclude others." Id. at 32.
College Savings Bank, 527 U.S. at 673 (citations omitted).
97Id. at 672.93 d. at 675.
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tionably a "deprivation" under the Fourteenth Amendment.
But business in the sense of the activity of doing business, or the
activity of making a profit is not property in the ordinary
sense-and it is only that, and not any business asset, which is
impinged upon by a competitor's false advertising. 9
Justice Scalia's distinction between the assets of a business (=
property) and the activity of doing business (# property) was rather
obscure. Perhaps what he was saying is that College Savings Bank
was alleging a loss of fiuture customers and revenues, and it had no
right to exclude competitors from capturing its prospective cus-
tomers and revenues. Thus, although College Savings Bank may
have had a sufficient interest in securing future customers and
revenue to support a cause of action sounding in tort, this interest
did not represent a property right.1"
Whatever the motivations underlying the Court's rejection of
the Section 5 claim in College Savings Bank, the bottom line is that
the Court has now endorsed, unequivocally and in a majority
opinion, a federal definition of constitutional property.'' The
"hallmark" of constitutional property is the right to exclude others.
This is by no means an aberrant idea. As I have recounted more
fully elsewhere,"f the right to exclude has been regarded as an es-
9 Id.
110 So restated, the Scalia analysis basically tracks the distinction between Pierson v.
Post, 3 Cai. R. 175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805) and Keeble v. Hickeringill, 103 Eng. Rep.
1127 (Q.B. 1707). Pierson holds that there is no property right in wild animals that
have not been reduced to capture; Keeble qualifies this by recognizing an action for
unfair competition when someone deliberately frightens off a wild animal in order to
prevent someone else from capturing it. In other words, the law of property requires
possession, but the law of tort (specifically, the action for trespass on the case) will
protect interests that fall short of possessory property rights. See Benjamin L. Fine,
Comment, An Analysis of the Formation of Property Rights Underlying Tortious
Interference with Contracts and Other Economic Relations, 50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1116,
1126-39 (1983).
101The dissenting Justices had relatively little to say about the constitutional
property aspect of College Savings Bank, concentrating their efforts on the Court's
overruling of Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184 (1964). Justice Stevens could only
sputter that the second property interest asserted by College Savings-loss of business
revenues and profits-"is the same kind of 'property' that Congress described in § 7
of the Sherman Act and in § 4 of the Clayton Act. A State's deliberate destruction of
a going business is surely a deprivation of property within the meaning of the Due
Process Clause." College Savings Bank, 527 U.S. at 693 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(citations omitted).
112 See Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 Neb. L. Rev. 730
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sential element of property by a wide range of influential thinkers.
Yet no previous decision of the Court had offered such an unquali-
fied endorsement of the centrality of the exclusion right. The right
to exclude has always been described as "one of the most essential
sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as
property."'" And indeed, no prior decision had appeared to assert
in such an unqualified fashion that the definition of property is a
matter of direct interpretation of the constitutional language.
The Court's disposition of the constitutional property issue in
College Savings Bank raises a number of perplexing questions. As
in Eastern Enterprises, Justice Scalia made no effort to reconcile
the articulation of a federal definition of constitutional property
with the traditional understanding, stated as orthodoxy as recently
as Phillips, that property rights are created and their dimensions
defined by independent sources such as state law. We are left won-
dering whether the oversight was simply inadvertent, whether the
Court has abandoned the older approach, or whether it envisions
some reconciliation but has not troubled to tell us what it is.
A more serious concern about College Savings Bank is the in-
complete research underlying both the general conclusion that the
"hallmark" of property is the right to exclude, and the specific ap-
plication of that conclusion to questions such as whether an
unadjudicated cause of action is a property right. The sound bite
line in College Savings Bank-"[t]he hallmark of a protected prop-
erty interest is the right to exclude others"'--bears an uncanny
resemblance to a sentence in another case we shall encounter in
the next part of the Article, Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co."~ The
Logan line states: "The hallmark of property, the Court has em-
phasized, is an individual entitlement grounded in state law, which
.(1998). This article, which argues that the right to exclude is the sine qua non of
property, was published within a few days of College Savings Bank being handed
down. Thus (for better or worse), I cannot claim any influence on the Court's
endorsement of a similar perspective with respect to constitutional property.
103 Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979) (emphasis added); see
also, e.g., id. at 179-80 (describing the right to exclude as "a fundamental element of
the property right"); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419,
435 (1982) (describing the right to exclude as "one of the most treasured" rights of
property).
104 College Savings Bank, 527 U.S. at 673.
455 U.S. 422 (1982).
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cannot be removed except 'for cause."' 1 Thus, the United States
Reports now contain two "hallmarks of property," which single out
two very different defining attributes."
Logan is embarrassing for a more fundamental reason, however.
Logan squarely holds that an unadjudicated cause of action (in that
case, for employment discrimination) is constitutional property for
due process purposes. Logan was cited in College Savifigs Bank's
briefs (although, inexplicably, it was not identified as holding that a
cause of action is property),1" but was not cited by Justice Scalia.
Nor did Justice Scalia make any effort to distinguish other cases,
including the prominent due process precedent Mullane v. Central
Hanover Bank & Trust Co.," which arguably stand for the proposi-
tion that an unadjudicated cause of action is property under the
Due Process Clause. 10
The failure to attend to Logan and the procedural due process
case law points to what will surely prove to be the most vexing
problem created by College Savings Bank. The right to exclude
others is commonly thought to be a differentiating feature of tradi-
tional common law property.' If we now understand the
"hallmark of property" for substantive due process purposes to be
the right to exclude others, what does this do to the legions of pro-
cedural due process cases that rest on the idea of the "new
, Id. at 430.
,o A "hallmark" originally referred to the official stamp of the British Hall-marking
Authority, indicating that articles such as plateware were made of genuine gold and
silver of a certain degree of purity. See 6 The Oxford English Dictionary 1045 (2d ed.
1989).
'0sSee Brief for Petitioner at 22; Reply Brief for Petitioner at 7, College Savings
Bank (No. 98-149).
,09339 U.S. 306 (1950).
10 See also Tulsa Prof'l Collection Servs. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478, 485 (1988) (treating
a cause of action for breach of contract as property for procedural due process
purposes); Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 281-82 (1980) (stating that a state tort
claim is "[a]rguably... a species of 'property' protected by the Due Process Clause").
It should be noted that the cause of action in Mullane was designed to protect an
existing property right-the beneficial interest in a trust fund-and it may be that the
Court was relying on the underlying trust property to satisfy the property
requirement. See Timothy P. Terrell, Causes of Action as Property: Logan v.
Zimmerman Brush Co. and the "Government-as-Monopolist" Theory of the Due
Process Clause, 31 Emory L.J. 491, 510 (1982); infra notes 344-47 and accompanying
text (suggesting that for substantive due process purposes the property inquiry should
focus on the underlying entitlement rather than the cause of action).
1, See infra notes 303-13 and accompanying text.
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property?" '112 Does the proclamation that the hallmark of property
is the right to exclude announce the beginning of a movement to
overrule Goldberg v. Kelly113 and its progeny on the ground that
they rest on an incorrect federal definition of property? Or is it
possible to understand the right to exclude in some abstract sense
that incorporates the new as well as the old property? These issues
may bedevil the lower courts in coming years, especially if state
governments seek to avoid procedural due process obligations by
urging the overruling of precedents called into doubt by College
Savings Bank.
D. Drye v. United States
The most recent foray by the Court into the meaning of prop-
erty, Drye v. United States,"' is straightforward and uncontroversial
compared to the three preceding efforts. Rohn Drye owed the fed-
eral government $325,000 in unpaid taxes, for which notices of
federal tax liens had been filed. Drye's mother then died intestate,
leaving an estate worth $233,000 to which Drye was the sole heir.
Drye disclaimed the inheritance, as he was entitled to do under
Arkansas law, whereupon his daughter became the heir. She used
the proceeds to establish a spendthrift trust, naming Drye as a life
beneficiary. The IRS took a dim view of these transactions. It
sought to seize the trust's assets on the ground that it had been
funded by property belonging to Drye-that is to say, the money
he stood to inherit had he not disclaimed. This action by the gov-
ernment raised the legal question whether an Arkansas heir who
exercises the right to disclaim an inheritance has a "property" right
in the disclaimed inheritance.115
Drye argued that the question was to be resolved as a matter of
state law. Justice Ginsburg, writing for the Court, agreed that state
law was relevant, but not dispositive. She reasoned that the exact
rights persons have with respect to resources are determined by
112 See infra notes 142-53 and accompanying text.
f 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
114120 S. Ct. 474 (1999).
"
5 The federal tax lien statute provides: "If any person liable to pay any tax neglects
or refuses to pay the same after demand, the amount.., shall be a lien in favor of the
United States upon all property and rights to property, whether real or personal,
belonging to such person." 26 U.S.C. § 6321 (1994).
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examining the relevant provisions of state law. But the characteri-
zation of these fights as constituting either "property" or "fights to
property" within the meaning of the federal tax lien statute is an
issue of federal law. As she put it: "We look initially to state law to
determine what rights the taxpayer has in the property the Gov-
ernment seeks to reach, then to federal law to determine whether
the taxpayer's state-delineated rights qualify as 'property' or 'rights
to property' within the compass of the federal tax lien legisla-
tion."' 6
This allocation of responsibility between federal and state law
required, of course, that the Court identify an appropriate federal
definition of property. Ginsburg took note of lower court decisions
holding that whether an asset has pecuniary value and whether it is
transferable are key variables in ascertaining whether it is property
for federal tax lien purposes. 7 But she declined to hold that either
factor is dispositive."' Instead, she concluded that the critical ques-
tion is "the breadth of control" the taxpayer exercises over a
resource."9 Under Arkansas law,
the heir inevitably exercises dominion over the property. He
determines who will receive the property-himself if he does
not disclaim, a known other if he does. This power to channel
the estate's assets warrants the conclusion that Drye held
"property" or a "righ[t] to property" subject to the Govern-
ment's liens.'20
In effect, the Court held that "property," at least for purposes of
the federal tax lien statute, means "the power to channel" a valued
asset.
Although superficially different, Drye's "power to channel" test
is analytically not too dissimilar from College Savings Bank's "right
to exclude" criterion. The former emphasizes the positive side of
dominion and control over an asset-the power to determine who
gets the beneficial use; the latter emphasizes the negative side-the
power to determine who does not get the beneficial use. The power
, 
6Drye, 120 S. Ct. at 481.
117See id. at 482-83.
118 See id.
119 Id. at 483 (quoting Morgan v. Commissioner, 309 U.S. 78, 83 (1940)).
10 Id. at 483 (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
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to channel and the right to exclude can thus be viewed as different
manifestations of a more general "gatekeeper power"-"the right
to determine who has access to particular resources and on what
terms.... Unfortunately, the Drye Court missed an opportunity to
bring some closure to the Court's proliferating statements about
the meaning of property by failing to reconcile or even cite College
Savings Bank-or any of the other recent decisions about the
meaning of constitutional property.
Still, Drye comes as a breath of fresh air after the three previous
decisions. It articulates a clear conception of the relationship be-
tween federal and state law in determining the existence of
property, it sets forth a reasonably clear federal criterion for the
identification of property, and it applies this criterion to the facts in
a way that seems persuasive. If only constitutional law were that
simple.
II. BOARD OF REGENTS V. ROTH AND THE REIGN OF PURE
POsITIVIsM
The Court's recent explorations of the meaning of constitutional
property have all been in the context of substantive protections-
takings and substantive due process. There has been comparatively
little action in recent years on the procedural due process front,
perhaps because the Court has lost interest in further expanding
the scope of procedural due process protections." Nevertheless,
considerable judicial energy was expended on ascertaining the
meaning of property as a threshold condition of affording proce-
dural due process protection from the early 1970s to the mid-1980s.
Moreover, the methodology for identifying property developed in
this context eventually spilled over into the takings case law, where
it generated analogous if more episodic issues. There are important
121 Merrill, supra note 102, at 740 n.37.
122 Professor Richard Pierce has suggested that the Court has had second thoughts
about the wisdom of the procedural due process revolution of the 1970s and as a
consequence has begun a process of rolling back the scope of procedural due process
protections. See Richard . Pierce, Jr., The Due Process Counterrevolution of the
1990's?, 96 Colum. L. Rev. 1973 (1996). I agree with his general assessment of the
direction of the law in this area, although I have ascribed the cause not just to
dissatisfaction with the due process revolution but also to a more general pessimism
about the administrative state. See Thomas W. Merrill, Capture Theory and the
Courts: 1967-1983, 72 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 1039, 1096-100 (1997).
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general lessons to be learned about the conundrums of constitu-
tional property through a reconsideration of the experience of that
earlier era."z
A. Roth and the Emergence of Pure Positivism
The decision that initiated the Court's inquiry into the meaning
of property for procedural due process purposes was Board of Re-
gents v. Roth.124 The Court there announced, "[t]he requirements of
procedural due process apply only to the deprivation of interests
encompassed by the Fourteenth Amendment's protection of lib-
erty and property."'" Thus, a finding that either "liberty" or
"property" is threatened is a condition precedent to any applica-
tion of the Due Process Clause." Although the Court cautioned
against "rigid or formalistic limitations" on the definition of these
threshold interests, it recognized the need for "certain bounda-
ries." 7 To establish these boundaries, the Court continued, "the
,13 For a variety of reasons, including the dominance of the Contract Clause as a
source of protection of economic rights in the nineteenth century and the grounding
of substantive due process primarily in liberty of contract during the Lochner era, the
Court gave little attention to the definition of property for constitutional purposes
prior to the due process revolution of the 1970s. See Monaghan, supra note 15, at 435
("The existence, vel non, of 'property' seldom raised any issue reaching the Supreme
Court in the first half of the twentieth century."). See generally Stephen A. Siegel,
Understanding the Nineteenth Century Contract Clause: The Role of the Property-
Privilege Distinction and "Takings" Clause Jurisprudence, 60 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1 (1986)
(describing nineteenth century Contract Clause litigation and the degree to which the
property-privilege distinction and Takings Clause jurisprudence of the time affected
that litigation).
1 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
115 Id. at 569.
12 Oddly, the Court did not mention "life." It is possible that the omission is related
to the fact that Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), was pending before the Court at the
same time it was deciding Roth. One of the issues in Roe was whether a fetus is a
"life" within the meaning of the Due Process Clause, see Roe, 410 U.S. at 159-62, and
the Court in Roth may have wanted to steer clear of any statement that would have
generated speculation about how Roe would resolve this issue. Subsequent decisions
have made clear, of course, that interests in "life" can also trigger the protections of
due process. See, e.g., County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833 (1998) (stating
that due process bars official acts that result in loss of life in a way that "shocks the
conscience").
1
7 Roth, 408 U.S. at 572.
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words 'liberty' and 'property' in the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment must be given some meaning.""
The reason for this prominent attention to the concepts of lib-
erty and property in 1972 is not hard to find. Just two years before
Roth, the Court in Goldberg v. Kelly29 had unsettled due process
law by requiring states to follow highly elaborate hearing proce-
dures before they could terminate welfare benefits. Goldberg and
the torrent of due process litigation it unleashed represented a
dramatic expansion of the domain of .procedural due process.3
Welfare and other public assistance programs had previously been
regarded as "privileges" to which procedural protections could be
fixed in the discretion of the legislature. 3' Moreover, the Court's
expansive interpretation of the Due Process Clause in Goldberg
appeared to draw inspiration from articles written by a Yale Law
School professor, Charles Reich." Reich's articles denounced the
rights/privileges distinction and urged that "government largesse"
be recharacterized as constitutionally protected "new property" in
order to provide security to the growing numbers of persons de-
pendent on the government for their livelihood. 3 By appearing to
endorse these ideas, the Court was vulnerable to the charge that it
was writing fashionable academic theories into constitutional law.
Roth's disquisition on constitutional liberty and property is
therefore best understood as an effort to secure the legitimacy of
the due process revolution started by Goldberg."3 The Court's
strategy was to make the revolution appear more law-like and
hence less revolutionary than it actually was. This accounts for the
18 Id.
397 U.S. 254 (1970).
m As Judge Henry Friendly noted in 1975, "[W]e have witnessed a greater
expansion of procedural due process in the last five years than in the entire period
since ratification of the Constitution." Henry J. Friendly, "Some Kind of Hearing,"
123 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1267,1273 (1975).
13 See 2 Kenneth Culp Davis & Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Administrative Law Treatise
11-13 (3d ed. 1994) (discussing pre-Goldberg law and the change wrought by
Goldberg).
- See Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 262 n.8 (quoting Charles A. Reich, Individual Rights
and Social Welfare: The Emerging Legal Issues, 74 Yale L.J. 1245, 1255 (1965) and
citing Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 Yale L.J. 733 (1964) [hereinafter
Reich, The New Property]).
" Reich, The New Property, supra note 132, at 734-39.
3 See Rubin, supra note 15, at 1067-68, 1104.
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Court's announcement that the Due Process Clause applies only to
a limited range of entitlements that have discernible "boundaries,"
and for its tacit disclaimer of earlier suggestions that protected en-
titlements be identified based on a judicial assessment of whether
the challenged action imposes a "grievous loss"135 or implicates
"important interests.""
Significantly, the Court outlined distinctively different method-
ologies for identifying constitutional liberty and property. Liberty
was defined in terms of a list of freedoms recited in a substantive
due process decision from the 1920s:
Without doubt, [liberty] denotes not merely freedom from bod-
ily restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to
engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire
useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up chil-
dren, to worship God according to the dictates of his own
conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recog-
nized... as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free
men. 
1 37
In later decisions, the Court described these freedoms as ones
that "originate in the Constitution, 138 or that are "guaranteed di-
rectly by the Due Process Clause."'3 In effect, the Court looked to
history to identify those interests that are so "'deeply rooted' in our
traditions"'' 0 that they can be presumed to be directly enshrined in
the "liberty" protected by due process.14" '
115 Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 263 (quoting Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v.
McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)); see also Wisconsin
v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437 (1971) (same).
16 Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971).
137 Roth, 408 U.S. at 572 (omission in original) (quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.
390, 399 (1923)).13 Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215,226 (1976).
1 Kentucky Dep't of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989); see
Monaghan, supra note 15, at 413 (observing that Roth's definition of liberty "assumes
that the due process clause itself creates rights").
140 Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (opinion of Powell, J.).
141 In later years, some Justices quarreled with the idea that liberty interests are
"created" by the Due Process Clause, suggesting instead that the RothlMeyer list
reflects those "unalienable rights" that belong to all persons by reason of their
humanity. See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 489 (1995) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(arguing that "'liberty' springs from "'unalienable Rights' with which all persons are
'endowed by their Creator') (quoting the Declaration of Independence para. 2 (U.S.
1776)); Meachum, 427 U.S. at 230 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("I had thought it self-
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With respect to constitutional property, the Court described a
very different methodology. In what was to become a workhorse
passage in subsequent decisions, the Court explained:
Property interests, of course, are not created by the Constitu-
tion. Rather, they are created and their dimensions are defined
by existing rules or understandings that stem from an inde-
pendent sourcb such as state law-rules or understandings that
secure certain benefits and that support claims of entitlement to
those benefits.142
This has been described as a "positivist" method for defining
property,143 meaning that nonconstitutional law establishes the
terms and conditions under which individuals may acquire interests
in "property" protected by the Due Process Clause.'"
By linking property to independent sources such as state law,
Roth appeared to reject the development of a new constitutional-
ized definition of "property"-a course that would seem to entail
federal judges making contestable judgments about the relative
importance of different interests. Instead, courts would henceforth
evident that all men were endowed by their Creator with liberty as one of the cardinal
unalienable rights."). It is not clear what practical consequences would turn on
whether "core" liberty interests are thought of as being rights created directly by the
Constitution or are conceived to be preconstitutional natural rights. In either event,
the method of identifying protected liberty interests is to ask whether the interest is
one of sufficient importance as to be beyond legislative revision, and to look to
history, at least in large part, in order to identify such interests.
142 Roth, 408 U.S. at 577.
- See, e.g., Jerry L. Mashaw, Due Process in the Administrative State 104-06
(1985); Michelman, supra note 15, at 131-32.
I" Use of the word "positivism" is potentially misleading in this context, since
positivism is more typically used to distinguish the law of the sovereign-government-
created law-from natural law or moral law. See, e.g., Joseph Raz, The Authority of
Law: Essays on Law and Morality 37-77 (1979); H.L.A. Hart, Legal Positivism, in 4
Encyclopedia of Philosophy 418 (1967). See generally Jack Goldsmith & Steven Walt,
Erie and the Irrelevance of Legal Positivism, 84 Va. L. Rev. 673, 677-80, 702-03
(1998) (reviewing different meanings of positivism). In discussing Roth and its method
of identifying constitutional property, however, "positivism" has been employed as a
term of art to distinguish nonconstitutional law, including federal and state statutory,
administrative, and common law, from law derived directly from the Constitution.
See, e.g., Michelman, supra note 15, at 131-32. Because of this potential confusion
about the meaning of "positivism," I will generally use the more clumsy phrase
"nonconstitutional law" rather than "positive law" in referring to the methodology
prescribed by Roth. Nevertheless, I will also from time to time refer to Roth's
"positivism," understood to be shorthand for Roth's injunction to define property in
terms of nonconstitutional sources of law.
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borrow or incorporate the list of protected interests already recog-
nized under state law or federal nonconstitutional law-a process
that presumably would be more objective and constrained.' 5
As to the content of constitutional property-as opposed to its
source in positive law-Roth was deliberately vague. The Court
described the purpose of granting constitutional protection to
property in extremely broad terms: "The Fourteenth Amend-
ment's procedural protection of property is a safeguard of the
security of interests that a person has already acquired in specific
benefits .... It is a purpose of the ancient institution of property to
protect those claims upon which people rely in their daily lives."'"
Moreover, the Court reaffirmed its holding in Goldberg that wel-
fare benefits are constitutionally protected property."' And with
respect to the precise issue before the Court in Roth and the com-
panion case of Perry v. Sindermann,14 the Court concluded that
tenured instructors at state universities and colleges have a pro-
tected property interest in their jobs.
The phrase the Court selected in characterizing those interests it
deemed to be constitutional property-the interests of welfare re-
cipients in continued benefits and of tenured teachers in continued
employment-was "legitimate claim of entitlement."'' 9 In contrast,
the interests not deemed to be constitutional property-for exam-
ple, the interests of untenured teachers-were characterized as "an
abstract need or desire" for, or "a unilateral expectation" of, some-
thing of value." Thus, it is plausible to read Roth as holding that
constitutional property consists of all previously acquired "legal
entitlements" to specific benefits that find recognition in noncon-
stitutional law.5'
What is a "legal entitlement"? The Court left the phrase unde-
fined in Roth, and its meaning, perhaps surprisingly, never became
an issue in the many cases to follow. There is in the phrase an echo
1'4 See Frank I. Michelman, Property as a Constitutional Right, 38 Wash. & Lee L.
Rev. 1097,1100-01 (1981); Thompson, supra note 20, at 1525.
146 Roth, 408 U.S. at 576.
,41 See id. at 577.
M 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
,49 Roth, 408 U.S. at 577.
'so Id.
,5, See, e.g., Monaghan, supra note 15, at 438 (arguing that Roth and related cases
"absorbed as constitutional 'property' most of the twentieth century entitlements").
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of the rights-privileges distinction-entitlements are "rights"
whereas abstract desires and unilateral expectations are "privi-
leges"-although the Court strongly insisted that the "wooden
distinction" between rights and privileges had been "finally re-
jected."152 There is also a faint echo of the vested rights doctrine
that played such a large role in nineteenth-century jurisprudence
regarding constitutional property:53 Entitlements are claims against
the government that are "vested" as opposed to claims that are
"mere expectancies." Other than these hints at a substantive defi-
nition based on faint reverberations from the past, however, the
overwhelming thrust of Roth was to suggest that constitutional
property is defined exclusively by its source-objective understand-
ings rooted in nonconstitutional law-as opposed to its content.
If we read Roth as defining "property" solely in terms of its
source in "independent source[s] such as state law" and as impos-
ing little or no restriction on the type of "entitlements" that can
qualify as property, then it is appropriate to describe Roth as
having endorsed a method of pure positivism in identifying consti-
tutional property. Federal constitutional law, on this view, has
nothing to say about the identification of constitutional property
interests, other than directing us to turn to nonconstitutional law in
seeking them out.
B. The Positivist Trap
Roth's emphasis on the source of property in nonconstitutional
law, combined with its failure to offer a substantive definition of
constitutional property, gave rise to what Professor Jerry Mashaw
was to call the "positivist trap."'" Mashaw and others have dis-
152 Roth, 408 U.S. at 571. Others have noted that Roth in effect resurrected a version
of the right/privilege distinction at the same time it seemed to bury it. See Karen H.
Flax, Liberty, Property, and the Burger Court: The Entitlement Doctrine in
Transition, 60 Tul. L. Rev. 889, 902-03 (1986); Rubin, supra note 15, at 1067; Smolla,
supra note 15, at 75-82; Comment, Entitlement, Enjoyment, and Due Process of Law,
1974 Duke L.J. 89, 98-99.
13 See James L. Kainen, The Historical Framework for Reviving Constitutional
Protection for Property and Contract Rights, 79 Cornell L. Rev. 87, 103-11 (1993).
15 Jerry L. Mashaw, Administrative Due Process: The Quest for a Dignitary Theory,
61 B.U. L. Rev. 885, 888 (1981); see also Mashaw, supra note 143, at 145-51; Colin S.
Diver, The Wrath of Roth, 94 Yale L.J. 1529 (1985) (reviewing Jerry L. Mashaw, Due
Process in the Administrative State (1985)).
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cussed the positivist trap largely in terms of the controversy over
the bitter-with-the-sweet, which will be described momentarily.
But with the benefit of hindsight, we can see that the trap was a far
more general phenomenon. The trap arose because the Court's
method effectively ceded the domain of constitutional property to
governmental actors over which the Court, in its capacity as consti-
tutional interpreter, had no control.155 In other words, Roth
appeared to require the Court to go along with any and all contrac-
tions or expansions on the domain of property dictated by
nonconstitutional law. This cession of control produced a "trap"
because it could lead to either too little or too much property rela-
tive to other value commitments that were important to the
Justices.
The most notorious example of the positivist trap emerged soon
after Roth was decided, in the form of a heated debate within the
Court over whether a claimant's property should be defined in part
by the procedures set forth in positive law for the protection of that
interest. 6 Writing for a plurality of three Justices in Arnett v. Ken-
nedy," Justice Rehnquist reasoned that a federal civil service
employee's interest in protection against wrongful termination
should not be defined solely by the requirement that the termina-
tion be "for cause."'' 8 In addition, he argued, it was necessary to
consider the rather bare-bone procedures that Congress in the
same statute had designated for determining whether such cause
exists. As he put it in a memorable line, "where the grant of a sub-
stantive right is inextricably intertwined with the limitations on the
procedures which are to be employed in determining that right, a
litigant in the position of appellee must take the bitter with the
sweet."' 9
The bitter-with-the-sweet idea seemed to flow inexorably from
the logic of Roth. If property rights are created and their dimen-
sions defined solely by nonconstitutional law, then presumably one
should look to all relevant provisions of nonconstitutional law to
determine the dimensions of the entitlement. Among the provi-
See Rubin, supra note 15, at 1091-92.
16 See generally id. at 1069-82 (recounting history of the debate).
"7 416 U.S. 134 (1974).




sions that determine the strength of the entitlement, it would seem,
are the procedural rules that have been prescribed to protect the
entitlement." Thus, for example, if a state employee can only be
dismissed for cause, but the employee's supervisor is directed to
make a determination of cause based on written submissions, then
the property right would be the right not to be dismissed except for
cause as determined through written submissions.
This notion that due process rights should expand and contract
in accordance with nonconstitutional procedural provisions is
hardly an outrageous one. If accepted, it would simply transform
due process into the principle of legality-the principle that every
person is entitled to have her case decided in accordance with the
procedural law of the land. Most students of the relevant history
think this was most likely what the Due Process Clause was origi-
nally understood to mean." ' So the effect of Roth's method, as
elaborated by Justice Rehnquist's bitter-with-the-sweet logic, ar-
guably would be to return the Clause to its original signification.162
Yet there can be no gainsaying that this would be a dramatic de-
parture from settled understandings. Ever since Murray's Lessee v.
Hoboken Land & Improvement Co.," the Court has taken the
view that the Due Process Clause reflects not only the principle
of legality, but also imposes limitations on the permissible range
110 See generally Easterbrook, supra note 15 (emphasizing the close connection, in
terms of legislative policy choices, between the decision to create an entitlement and
the procedures prescribed for enforcing it).
161 See Easterbrook, supra note 15, at 95-100; John Harrison, Substantive Due
Process and the Constitutional Text, 83 Va. L. Rev. 493 (1997); Keith Jurow,
Untimely Thoughts: A Reconsideration of the Origins of Due Process of Law, 19 Am.
J. Legal Hist. 265 (1975).
62 As further confirmation that this would not be an outrageous result, it is worth
noting that the Rehnquist approach also reflects the allocation of authority over
procedural rights reflected in the Administrative Procedure Act, as interpreted by
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 435
U.S. 519 (1978). Noting that "this Court has for more than four decades emphasized
that the formulation of procedures was basically to be left within the discretion of the
agencies to which Congress had confided the responsibility for substantive judg-
ments," id. at 524, the Court held that federal courts have no authority to impose
procedural requirements on federal agencies beyond those set forth in the APA or
other enacted law. Vermont Yankee's allocation of the power to prescribe procedures
under federal statutory law has been followed for twenty years, with no clearly
deleterious consequences.
16 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1856).
924 [Vol. 86:885
The Landscape of Constitutional Property
of procedures that can be prescribed by legislatures.' 1 Justice
Rehnquist's thesis thus would have required repudiating more than
a century's worth of precedent, at least insofar as the interests en-
compassed by "property" are concerned.
Given the radical implications of the bitter-with-the-sweet thesis,
it is not surprising that a majority of the Justices in Arnett regarded
it with intense suspicion."6 5 The bitter with the sweet had an "end
game" quality about it: No one who received the procedures re-
quired by state law could ever complain of a violation of due
process, because no one would have any "property" that extended
beyond existing procedural rules. In effect, by looking to all
sources of state law to define property, Roth's pure positivism pro-
duced too little property relative to what judicial norms indicated
was appropriate.
Although it failed to gather a majority in Arnett, the bitter-with-
the-sweet idea did not die quietly. Two years later, in Bishop v.
Wood," the thesis appeared to be gathering support on the
Court.167 Academic commentators grew alarmed. A veritable who's
who of constitutional scholars' weighed in, pronouncing the
164 See Easterbrook, supra note 15, at 100-09 (recounting history).
10 The Justices who declined to join the Rehnquist opinion in Arnett had trouble
explaining why the bitter-with-the-sweet was so troubling. See Arnett, 416 U.S. at
164-70 (opinion of Powell, J.); id. at 171-202 (opinion of White, J.). The separate
opinions revealed the sticking point to be that the judiciary would not have the last
word on the adequacy of procedures, but failed to explain why this was regarded as a
problem. Commentators later attempted to fill the gap by arguing that judges have
unique competence to determine optimal procedures in administrative settings. See,
e.g., Laycock, supra note 15, at 887-89. But this claim was typically just asserted,
rather than demonstrated. One could just as easily argue that judges are uniquely
disqualified to establish administrative procedures because of bias in favor of trial-
type hearings.
W6 426 U.S. 341 (1976).
16, The Bishop Court held that a state statute requiring that an at-will employee be
given a statement of reasons before dismissal did not create a constitutional property
right; thus the statement of reasons was the only process to which the employee was
entitled. See id. at 344-47. The decision did not say that an employee who had tenure
(that is, who could only be dismissed for cause) was entitled to no more than the
.procedures prescribed by statute. But the distinction was subtle, and, not surprisingly,
the dissenting Justices saw the Court as shifting toward the Rehnquist position. See id.
at 350-55 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 355-61 (White, J., dissenting).
163 See, e.g., Glennon, supra note 15; Laycock, supra note 15; Michelman, supra note
15; Monaghan, supra note 15; Tribe, supra note 15; Tushnet, supra note 15; Van
Alstyne, supra note 15.
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Rehnquist thesis "procedural nihilism."169 Soon the tide turned de-
cisively against giving any consideration to nonconstitutional
procedural rules in defining constitutional property.
The question was how the Court was to solve the positivist trap
that the bitter-with-the-sweet controversy revealed. A few aca-
demic commentators perceived that the root of the problem lay in
Roth's emphasis on the source of property in nonconstitutional law
combined with its nominalism about the definition of property.17
But the dominant recommendation of the commentary in these
critical years was that the Court should abandon Roth's positivist
approach altogether and return to some other method of identify-
ing the domain of procedural due process, such as Justice
Frankfurter's "grievous loss" notion 7' or Bell v. Burson's "impor-
tant interest" test." This was not very helpful. Roth was a major
statement by the Court about the method of interpreting the Due
Process Clause, and it would be embarrassing to overrule it. As
each successive case quoted Roth for the proposition that property
is not created by the Constitution but by independent sources such
as state law, the chances of wholesale repudiation grew dim. Thus,
the Court was left to try to find a way out of the trap without much
guidance or feedback from the academic community.
C. Searching for a Solution
One possible solution was soon forthcoming in a little-noted de-
cision, Memphis Light, Gas & Water Division v. Craft." There,
Justice Powell offered an important qualification to Roth's reliance
16 Rubin, supra note 15, at 1091.
" See, e.g., id. at 1085 (noting that Roth failed "to specify whether the term
'property' refers to a federal standard that serves to characterize state law, or to a
state standard that derives its content from state law"); see also Monaghan, supra
note 15, at 435; Terrell, supra note 15, at 896.
7 Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168 (1951)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring).
"7 Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971); see, e.g., Ely, supra note 60, at 19; Van
Alstyne, supra note 15, at 490; see also Rubin, supra note 15, at 1047, 1101 (urging
that the effort to define "liberty" and "property" be dropped in favor of an inquiry
into whether the government is "adjudicating" a claim). But see generally Simon,
supra note 15 (defending Roth as being consistent with both history and the
institutional structure of government).
1 436 U.S. 1 (1978).
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on state law as the source of property rights: "Although the under-
lying substantive interest is created by 'an independent source such
as state law,' federal constitutional law determines whether that in-
terest rises to the level of a 'legitimate claim of entitlement' protected
by the Due Process Clause.""4 In other words, Justice Powell sug-
gested a significant modification to Roth's nominalism about the
meaning of constitutional property. Nonconstitutional law would
still create property interests. But in deciding whether any particu-
lar interest rose to the level of constitutional property, the interest
would be assessed against a federal definition of constitutional
property-a template, if you will, of what kinds of interests qualify
as constitutional property. I will call this the "patterning defini-
tion" approach to constitutional property: Federal constitutional
law prescribes the set of criteria an interest must have to qualify as
property; whether the claimant has an interest that fits the pattern
is then determined by examining independent sources such as state
law. 5 The patterning definition approach is essentially the method
for identifying property recently adopted by the Court for federal
tax purposes in Drye 6
Powell also used the occasion of Memphis Light to suggest, al-
beit somewhat tentatively, what the patterning definition of
constitutional property should be for due process purposes. The
question in the case was whether the respondents had a property
interest in continued utility services, such that they would be enti-
tled to a hearing before those services were cut off. Powell found it
,74Id. at 9 (emphasis added) (quoting Roth, 408 U.S. at 577).
175 This solution was intimated in passing by Professor Henry Monaghan in his
influential 1977 article, "Of 'Liberty' And 'Property."' Monaghan, supra note 15.
Monaghan argued that although the interests of a claimant must be initially created
by state law, "there is a federal content to the word 'property."' Id. at 435. Thus, he
argued, the characterization of the interests as being either property or something less
than property should be a matter of federal constitutional law. See id. Monaghan's
recognition of what I call the patterning definition solution was probably influenced
by his familiarity with Contract Clause cases, see, e.g., Indiana ex rel Anderson v.
Brand, 303 U.S. 95 (1938), in which federal courts had rejected unsupported state
court findings that claimants had no contract rights under state law. See Monaghan,
supra note 15, at 436 n.201.
176See 120 S. Ct. 474, 481 (1999) ("We look initially to state law to determine what
rights the [claimant] has ... then to federal law to determine whether the [claimant's]
state-delineated rights qualify as 'property."'). See supra notes 115-120 and
accompanying text.
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critical that under local law, termination of services was permissi-
ble only if the respondents were delinquent in their payments, and
the respondents had disputed the utility's claim of nonpayment.
After noting the importance of a "for cause" limitation on termina-
tion of employment in cases such as Roth and Arnett, Powell
observed: "Because petitioner may terminate service only 'for
cause,' respondents assert a 'legitimate claim of entitlement' within
the protection of the Due Process Clause."1 In other words, how-
ever strange it might sound to Blackstone and common law
lawyers, "property" for purposes of the Due Process Clause meant
"entitlements that may be terminated only for cause.' 'W 8
Four years later, in Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co.,17 the sug-
gestion that there is a federal definition of property and that it
means entitlements terminable only for cause was reaffirmed and
stated as settled doctrine:
The hallmark of property, the Court has emphasized, is an indi-
vidual entitlement grounded in state law, which cannot be
removed except "for cause." Once that characteristic is found,
the types of interests protected as "property" are varied and, as
often as not, intangible, relating "to the whole domain of social
and economic fact."18
The qualification to Roth reflected in Memphis Light and Logan
offered a way out of the positivist trap, at least in its bitter-with-
the-sweet version. Under the suggested patterning definition, the
only provisions of state law that would be relevant in determining
whether a claimant has property would be those that establish an
entitlement and impose a for-cause requirement on its termination.
Other provisions of state law, such as those that prescribe proce-
dures for determining whether cause exists, would be ignored
under this approach, for the simple reason that they would be ir-
relevant to the federal patterning definition.
- Memphis Light, 436 U.S. at 11-12 (footnote omitted).
178 Professor Monaghan's 1977 article also appeared to foreshadow this suggestion.
See Monaghan, supra note 15, at 443 ("The Court's doctrine is still flexible enough to
permit a holding that a present legal relationship, interruptible only for cause, plus a
practical expectancy of its continuance, might constitute 'property."').
-7 455 U.S. 422 (1982).
'so Id. at 430 (citations omitted).
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Of course, even if one grants that Memphis Light and Logan de-
vised an analytically coherent solution to the positivist trap, it does
not follow that this solution was correct in any ultimate sense.
From all that appears, the definition was derived through a process
of trying to devise a rule that would reconcile the results already
reached in previous cases, especially Goldberg, Roth, and Bishop,
but in a way that would also permit the Court to reject the logic of
Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Arnett. An escape from the positivist
trap by use of a federal patterning definition of property is arbi-
trary, if the definition is arbitrary. Still, Memphis Light and Logan
at least attempted a general doctrinal solution.
Although the Memphis Light/Logan definition of constitutional
property was relied upon in at least one subsequent case,18' the
qualification of Roth recognized in these decisions has never been
given the prominence it deserves. There are several explanations
for this neglect. Part of the problem is that neither decision directly
involved a fight over Justice Rehnquist's bitter-with-the-sweet the-
ory-the most notorious manifestation of the positivist trap. In
addition, both decisions were written as modest applications of set-
tled due process law rather than as an announcement of a major
jurisprudential development. Thus, these decisions did not catch
the eye of the legal community the way other decisions-such as
Goldberg or Roth or Mathews v. Eldridgel uthat marked steps
along the due process revolution did.
The most important reason why Memphis Light and Logan have
remained in relative obscurity, however, is that the bitter-with-the-
sweet thesis made one last run at the Court, and the Justice who
drew the assignment to deliver the coup de grace was not Justice
Powell or Justice Blackmun (the author of Logan), but Justice
White. The occasion was Cleveland Board of Education v. Loud-
ermill.In Although for practical purposes the issue was settled, the
school board tried to argue that state law procedures for firing a
tenured employee should qualify the nature of his property interest
in continued employment. Justice White, the former football star,
1, See O'Bannon v. Town Court Nursing Ctr., 447 U.S. 773, 788 (1980) (relying on
Memphis Light in finding no constitutional property).
424 U.S. 319 (1976).
470 U.S. 532 (1985).
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rejected the contention with all the finesse of a running back deliv-
ering a stiff-arm to pursuing tacklers: 8
[I]t is settled that the "bitter with the sweet" approach miscon-
ceives the constitutional guarantee. If a clearer holding is
needed, we provide it today. The point is straightforward: the
Due Process Clause provides that certain substantive rights-
life, liberty, and property-cannot be deprived except pursuant
to constitutionally adequate procedures. The categories of sub-
stance and procedure are digtinct. Were the rule otherwise, the
Clause would be reduced to a mere tautology. "Property" can-
not be defined by the procedures provided for its deprivation
any more than can life or liberty. The right to due process "is
conferred, not by legislative grace, but by constitutional guaran-
tee. While the legislature may elect not to confer a property
interest in [public] employment, it may not constitutionally au-
thorize the deprivation of such an interest, once conferred,
without appropriate procedural safeguards. ' 15
As this passage suggests, Loudermill rejected the bitter-with-the
sweet thesis for the simple reason that it produced results at odds
with the norm that federal courts should have the last word in as-
sessing the adequacy of legislated procedures. The more formally
elegant solution of Memphis Light and Logan-that state proce-
dures are ignored because they are not relevant to the
constitutional definition of property-went unmentioned. Perhaps
because of its emphatic language and its quality of offering a de-
finitive pronouncement, Loudermill quickly became the leading
case discussed by the treatises and reproduced in case books. The
upshot was that the bitter with the sweet, the most prominent
manifestation of the positivist trap, was dead. But as far as the cas-
ual consumer of due process opinions was concerned, the trap had
been evaded but not disarmed.
4 See Dennis J. Hutchinson, The Man Who Once Was Whizzer White: A Portrait
of Justice Byron R. White 103 (1998) (describing White's skill in stiff-arming).
8 Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 541 (alteration in original) (quoting Arnett, 416 U.S. at
167).
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D. Too Much Property
Roth's positivist method for identifying constitutional property
can give rise to conflicts with competing judicial norms only in spe-
cial circumstances-where the competing norm is not itself clearly
embodied in nonconstitutional law. If a norm is sufficiently crystal-
lized to be reflected in nonconstitutional law, then there should be
no conflict between Roth's method and the norm. Either the norm
will itself be part of "independent source[s] such as state law," or it
will be reflected in federal law, in which case the federalized norm
would preempt state law. Arnett and Loudermill revealed one way
in which Roth could generate a conflict with norms not embodied
in nonconstitutional law: where the rival norm is grounded in in-
terpretation of the Constitution itself. The bitter-with-the-sweet
thesis pitted "property" as defined by nonconstitutional law against
a norm grounded in decisional law interpreting the Due Process
Clause.
Another way in which the positivist method can produce a
"trap" is when it generates outcomes that violate "soft norms,"-
norms that are recognized as important by five or more Justices but
are not sufficiently important to be codified in either nonconstitu-
tional or constitutional law. This, of course, is simply a polite way
of saying that the positivist trap can arise when the domain of
property as defined by nonconstitutional law generates outcomes
that five or more Justices do not like. The Roth method soon re-
vealed problems of this sort as well. The primary difficulty for the
increasingly conservative Court was not that positivism produced
too little property, but rather too much.
As due process cases proliferated in the 1970s and early 1980s,
examples of what many Justices regarded as insubstantial property
interests began to appear. Goss v. Lopez,1" holding that a ten-day
suspension from public school was a deprivation of the property
right to a public education, elicited four dissents. Prison and parole
cases holding that state regulations could create positive liberty in-
terests, analogous to positive property interests, produced even
more extreme examples of claims the Justices regarded as trivial.-
For example, prisoners claimed the right to due process hearings
-- 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
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before tray lunches were replaced with sack lunches or before they
were moved to cells without electrical outlets for television sets.1"
But perhaps the most vivid example of too much property was pro-
vided by Parratt v. Taylor," where a prisoner asserted a due
process violation based on the allegation that prison officials had
lost a hobby kit valued at $23.50 that he had ordered through the
mail. This was unquestionably property under state law, and thus
under the Roth framework it would seem to trigger the protections
of due process. But a majority of Justices were unwilling to find
that this kind of incident would give rise to a federally mandated
due process hearing.
The soft norm that came into conflict with Roth's method of
identifying constitutional property in these cases was the fear of
inundating federal courts with controversies that have traditionally
been adjudicated, if at all, under state tort law.'89 This was highly
ironic, of course. First the Court rebelled against the implications
of Roth because it threatened to divest them of power over deter-
mining the procedures to be followed in state administrative
hearings; then the Court rebelled against the implications of Roth
because it threatened to swamp the federal courts with claims of
entitlement to state administrative hearings.
To date, the Court's solution to the positivist trap in its too-
much-property version has not been to redefine constitutional
property." Rather, it has been to utilize the downstream inquiries
demanded by the language of the Due Process Clause to screen out
such claims, in particular that a claimant show a "deprivation" of
'7 See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472,482-84 (1995) (citing Burgin v. Nix, 899 F.2d
733, 735 (8th Cir. 1990) (sack lunches) and Lyon v. Farrier, 727 F.2d 766, 768-69 (8th
Cir. 1984) (electrical outlets)).
'8 451 U.S. 527 (1981).
19See Monaghan, supra note 15, at 408 (noting the Court's determination "to
prevent the escalation of every grievance against state and local government into a
constitutional claim").
110 Significantly, however, the Court has engaged in re-definition with respect to the
"positive liberty" branch of procedural due process. See Sandin, 515 U.S. at 486
(limiting prisoners' positive liberty claims to those that impose an "atypical,
significant deprivation" on the claimant). In effect, the Court has adopted a restrictive
patterning definition with respect to prisoners' positive liberty claims. This may
foreshadow a similar move with respect to property. See infra notes 293-97 and
accompanying text (arguing that restricting property claims in a similar fashion is
unwarranted).
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property and that the deprivation violated "due process of law."
The biggest inroad here was achieved in Mathews v. Eldridge,9'
where the Court adopted a balancing test for determining what
procedures satisfy "due process of law."' That test turns in part on
the Court's evaluation of the "weight" of the private interest at
stake.193 Under Eldridge, courts faced with property interests that
they regard as trivial or insubstantial can respond by ordering only
an informal pretermination hearing94 or by ruling that a posttermi-
nation tort suit for damages satisfies the requirements of due
process. 5 Another important downstream requirement is that
there be a "deprivation." In Daniels v. Williams196 the Court held
that injuries inflicted by the mere negligence of state officials do
not rise to the level of a deprivation. This ruling can also be used to
screen out routine property claims that seem better suited to state
tort suits.
In short, the Court has escaped from the positivist trap in proce-
dural due process in a variety of ways. The principal problem of
too little property-whether procedural rules would be included in
the definition of the property right-was solved by fiat by declaring
that procedural rules are irrelevant to the definition of property.
The Court has solved problems of too much property by screening
out insubstantial claims under the deprivation and due process re-
quirements. Along the way, the Court also developed a more
formally elegant solution to the trap in the form of a federal pat-
terning definition for identifying constitutional property. This
patterning definition solution, however, has been obscured by
other, more ad hoc techniques the Court has deployed to solve the
pervasive problems of too little or too much property.
191424 U.S. 319 (1976).
19 Id. at 333-49.
13 Id. at 348.
' See, e.g., Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 545; Goss, 419 U.S. at 582-84.
195 See, e.g., Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 536 (1984); Parratt, 451 U.S. at 543-44;
cf. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 677-78 & n.46 (1977) (holding that a post-
termination tort suit for using excessive force in paddling children in public school
satisfies due process).
M 474 U.S. 327 (1986).
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E. The Takings Clause and the Positivist Trap
The extensive jurisprudence seeking to define property for pro-
cedural due process purposes has no counterpart in the law arising
under the Takings Clause. The most likely reason for this disparity
is that there has been no sudden move on the part of the Court ag-
gressively to expand the domain of the Takings Clause in a manner
analogous to Goldberg's expansion of the domain of procedural
due process. To be sure, there has been steady action on the tak-
ings front since the late 1970s, and the direction of the law, on the
whole, has been toward a modest expansion of protection for pri-
vate property from government interference. But the movement of
the law has been incremental, rather than dramatic, resulting in no
perceived need to justify the Court's efforts as falling within the
proper scope of the Constitution's language. Moreover, most of the
controversies to reach the Court during this time have involved
disputes over land use regulation. The "property" in these cases is
typically a fee simple in land, and there is no question that this in-
terest is "private property" within the meaning of the Takings
Clause. Nevertheless, in the few takings cases that arose in the
years after Roth calling into question whether a claimant had
"property," the Court turned to Roth and its positivist method to
answer the question. Not surprisingly, one can find evidence of the
positivist trap lurking just beneath the surface in these cases."
In the Takings Clause context, the trap has revealed itself pri-
marily in the form of a tension between the property identified by
the Roth method and the expectations of ordinary individuals
about property. This should not be surprising. As Robert Ellickson
and others have emphasized, the law in the books can diverge, of-
ten dramatically, from -the understandings about resource uses that
ordinary individuals apply in their daily lives.198 When this happens,
19 Cf. Thompson, supra note 20, 'at 1526 (noting that although "the Court has
explicitly embraced a positivist definition of constitutional property .... [W]hat the
Court says it is doing is not necessarily what it is actually doing").
1 See Robert C. Ellickson, Order without Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes
(1991). For other studies that reveal pronounced divergences between property on
the books and property in action, see, for example, James M. Acheson, The Lobster
Gangs of Maine (1988) and Hendrik Hartog, Pigs and Positivism, 1985 Wis. L. Rev.
899. For a general discussion of the relationship between takings doctrine and public
opinion, see William W. Fisher III, The Significance of Public Perceptions of the
Takings Doctrine, 88 Colum. L. Rev. 1774 (1988).
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a court committed to defining property by looking to nonconstitu-
tional sources of law may find that it cannot recognize a property
right in situations where it might seem reasonable to do so, given
established social understandings about the sorts of things that will
be protected as property.'" Alternatively, a court may find that it
must recognize a constitutional property right where the claim
seems trivial or insubstantial.'
19 Nixon v. United States, 978 F.2d 1269 (D.C. Cir. 1992), provides an interesting
illustration of the potential divergence between positive law and social expectations in
the takings context. The question was whether former President Nixon was entitled to
just compensation when Congress enacted a statute directing that his presidential
papers be placed in the custody and under the control of the United States Archives.
A key point of dispute in the litigation was whether presidential papers are the
"private property" of the President who creates them, or belong to the United States.
There was no statute (at the time Nixon was President) addressing the issue. The
government relied on the common law of employment, which it characterized as
providing that papers produced in the course of employment belong to the employer,
not the employee. See id. at 1276. The D.C. Circuit rejected this approach, and
instead relied on an unbroken practice, acquiesced in by Presidents and Congress
alike, of treating presidential papers as private property. This history, the court
concluded, constituted a "mutually reinforcing understanding[] ... sufficiently well
grounded to support a claim of entitlement." Id. at 1275. In effect, the court
determined that the existence of takings property, at least in this unusual context,
should be based on a very specific, prominent, and robust customary right, even
though the customary right was arguably inconsistent with the more general common
law rule.
Although this theme has been less prominent in the procedural due process cases,
Sindermann, the companion case to Roth, illustrates how social expectations can
generate reliance interests that diverge from the set of entitlements enforceable as a
matter of law. Sindermann had taught in various junior colleges in the Texas state
system for ten years before the Board of Regents terminated his employment. See
Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 594-95. The schools at which he taught had no formal
tenure system, and he had no formal contractual rights to continued employment.
Nevertheless, Sindermann argued that his school's Faculty Guide and the consistent
practices of Texas colleges regarding re-employment gave rise to a "de facto tenure
program." Id. at 600. The Court remanded for further proceedings to determine
whether these facts could be proven. See id. at 601-03. The Court's discussion of the
relevance of the de facto tenure claim is ambiguous, and the decision is probably best
read as saying that Sindermann would have a constitutional property right only if he
could prove that Texas common law would recognize an enforceable contract based
on these understandings. So read, the decision does not qualify in any fundamental
sense the positivist theory of Roth. Still, one can readily imagine a situation in which
state contract law would not provide a remedy, and yet teachers and administrators
had come to act and believe as if a system of tenure is in place. Assuming Roth's
method requires a determination of no property in these circumstances, Roth would
lead to a situation in which there is a divergence between the property recognized in
law and the expectations of the persons most directly affected.
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This divergence between positive law and social expectations is
the only way to account for Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies v.
Beckwith,"' one of the quirkiest of the modem decisions to raise a
question about the meaning of constitutional property. Three Flor-
ida statutes set forth a mechanism for selling the assets of insolvent
corporations in a way that would convey clear title. The first pro-
vided that the proceeds of the sale be deposited with a Florida
circuit court, an interpleader action be filed against all known
creditors of the corporation, and the fund be divided by the court
among the creditors asserting claims. The second provided that the
clerk of the court was to receive a fee for the service of holding the
fund in the court registry. The third, which was the source of the
constitutional challenge, provided that the clerk should invest the
fund in an interest-bearing account while the creditors' claims were
pending, and provided further that the interest was to be "'income
of the office of the clerk of the circuit court investing such mon-
eys. , ,,i=
In Webb's Pharmacies, the receiver sued, contending that the
statute authorizing the clerk to keep the accrued interest-over
$90,000 in that era of double-digit interest rates-was an unconsti-
tutional taking of the creditors' property. The Florida Supreme
Court disagreed, noting that the clerk would have no authority to
deposit the funds in an interest-bearing account absent statutory
authorization, and finding that the statutory scheme therefore
made the interest on the fund "public money" until such time as
the creditors were paid.
The Court in Webb's Pharmacies defined its task as determining
whether interest on a statutorily authorized interpleader fund is
"private property" for Takings Clause purposes. The starting point,
as in the due process cases, was the quotation from Roth coupled
with the observation that "a mere unilateral expectation or an ab-
stract need is not a property interest entitled to protection. '2,2 A
confusing discussion ensued in which the Court shifted back and
forth between noting that the creditors had a property right in the
interpleader fund itself-a proposition no one disputed-and argu-
o449 U.S. 155 (1980).
Id. at 156 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Fla. Stat. ch. 28.33 (1977)).
- Id. at 161.
936 [Vol. 86:885
The Landscape of Constitutional Property
ing that the State's policy of exacting both a fee for the clerk's ser-
vices and all the accrued interest was unreasonable -a
proposition that would be relevant only if it were first established
that the creditors had a property right in the interest on the fund.
The closest the Court came to grappling with the precise issue
before it came in the following passage:
Neither the Florida Legislature by statute, nor the Florida
courts by judicial decree, may accomplish the result the county
seeks simply by recharacterizing the principal as "public
money" because it is held temporarily by the court. The earn-
ings of a fund are incidents of ownership of the fund itself and
are property just as the fund itself is property.... To put it an-
other way: a State, by ipse dixit, may not transform private
property into public property without compensation, even for
the limited duration of the deposit in court.
The Court's conclusion that the interest on the interpleader fund
was the property of the creditors was difficult to square with Roth.
In particular, if Roth means that all sources of Florida law must be
consulted in defining the creditors' property rights, why was the
Florida statute authorizing the creation of an interpleader fund to
resolve creditors' claims a source of property rights for the credi-
tors, while the Florida statute directing the clerk to keep the
interest on the fund was not a source qualifying those property
rights? In other words, in a case where the issue was framed by
three state statutes, why was the Court free to define property by
focusing on two of those statutes while ignoring-or rather, declar-
ing unconstitutional-the third?'
The Court seemed intuitively to grasp that if all sources of Flor-
ida law could be consulted in defining the creditors' property
rights, then the result would be too little property-that is, too lit-
tle relative to the expectations of the creditors based on general
-Various observations were advanced tending to support the conclusion that the
statute permitting the clerk to keep the interest was unreasonable: The statute was
contrary to the dominant rule followed in other states that interest follows principal;
the award of all the interest to the clerk bore no reasonable relationship to the costs
of maintaining and investing the fund; the statute served no valid police power
justification given the separate fee charged for the clerk's services. See id. at 162-64.
Id. at 164.
21 See Thompson, supra note 10, at 1538 ("[G]iven the Court's positivist framework,
the result [in Webb's] was impossible to explain.").
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practices involving the payment of interest on invested funds. But
the Court had no clue about how it might escape from Roth's posi-
tivist trap to recognize a larger property right than the one
delineated by the Florida statutes. The Court accused the State of
seeking to transform private property into public property by ipse
dixit, but in fact it was the Court that shut off inquiry into the pos-
sible sources of state law bearing on the scope of property rights by
ipse dixit.
The same theme appeared several years later in another decision
that required the Court to consider a rather unusual property in-
terest, Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co.' The issue was whether a
federal pesticide registration law had caused an unconstitutional
taking of property in trade secret information belonging to a pesti-
cide manufacturer. Although the government had stipulated that
the manufacturer had "certain property rights" in its trade secret
information that were protected by the Takings Clause,"3 the Court
deemed this stipulation unclear and embarked on a brief discussion
of whether trade secrets are constitutional property.
The Court began its inquiry by quoting the passage from Webb's
Pharmacies, which quotes Roth about property having its source in
nonconstitutional law.' Strict application of the Roth approach
might seem to dictate the conclusion that the manufacturer had no
protected property rights with respect to several of the years in
question. This was because federal pesticide law during these years
mandated public disclosure of trade secret information submitted
with applications for registration and provided no compensation
for the loss of the information."' Hence, when a manufacturer
submitted its trade secrets to the government during these years it
was knowingly participating in a regulatory process that would de-
stroy the information's status as a trade secret.
The Court resisted this line of reasoning, however. After quoting
Roth, the Court proceeded to consider relevant precedents of Mis-
souri law (the principal place of business of the manufacturer),
finding that these decisions protected trade secrets. 1 It then went
467 U.S. 986 (1984).
Id. at 1001.
-See id.
210 See id. at 994-96.
21, See id. at 1001.
The Landscape of Constitutional Property
on to discuss more general sources of law, including Supreme
Court precedents and the legislative history of the federal pesticide
law, in support of the proposition that "[t]rade secrets have many
of the characteristics of more tangible forms of property., 21 ' This
was followed by citations to Blackstone and Locke, and then to
more Supreme Court decisions holding that other types of intangi-
ble interests are property for purposes of the Takings Clause.213 The
only source of law not considered was the provision of the federal
pesticide law mandating disclosure without compensation. The net
effect of this discussion was extremely confusing. Evidently, consti-
tutional property is not to be identified by referring to the law that
is itself alleged to constitute a taking of property. But why this limi-
tation was appropriate, given the language of Roth, was left
unexplained.14
Why was the Court reluctant to use the disclosure statute to de-
feat the manufacturer's claim that it had property? The best
explanation would seem to be that a decision holding that the trade
secrets were not property during the mandatory disclosure years
was just too implausible-too jarring given general expectations
about kinds of interests that are commonly regarded as being
property in our society. The Roth approach, if applied by consider-
ing all relevant sources of nonconstitutional law, generated a result
that the Court regarded as yielding too little property relative to
what most observers would consider to be the intuitive result. So
the Roth inquiry was obscured with smoke and mirrors.
Webb's Pharmacies and Monsanto are examples of how the Roth
approach to identifying constitutional property can lead to the
positivist trap in takings cases. They suggest that when this hap-
212 Id. at 1002.
213 See id. at 1002-03.
214 The discussion of constitutional property in Monsanto is even odder because the
Court held that, during the years when disclosure was mandated without
compensation, there was no taking of trade-secret property. See id. at 1005-07. This
was because the manufacturer was on notice during these years that trade secrets
would be disclosed without compensation, and hence it could have had no
"reasonable, investment-backed expectation" that the loss of trade-secret information
would be compensated. Id. at 1006-07. The Court might as well have said that the
manufacturer had to take the bitter (loss of trade-secret protection) with the sweet
(the benefits of registration). The positivist trap so arbitrarily closed for purposes of
defining property thus quickly reopened in defining what constitutes a taking.
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pens, the Court can see no principled way out of the dilemma, but
instead resorts to Houdini-like moves in order to escape. On some
occasions, however, the Court has been willing to spring the posi-
tivist trap in order to defeat the reasonable expectations of the
parties-all in the name of some higher social good, of course. This
appears to be what happened in Bowen v. Public Agencies 0 p-
posed to Social Security Entrapment ("AOSSE"). 5
AOSSE arose out of a series of amendments to the Social Secu-
rity Act concerning the participation of state government
employees in the federal old age, survivors, and disability pro-
grams. At first, state employees were excluded from Social
Security. Later, Congress amended the Act in a way designed to
entice them to join. The mechanism for participation was a formal
"Agreement," authorized by Section 418 of the Social Security Act,
entered into between the State and the federal government. To re-
assure state employees that they would not be prejudiced by
joining the system, each Agreement expressly provided that state
employees, upon giving two years' advance notice, could withdraw
from participation in the federal program.
Beginning in the late 1970s, a number of associations of covered
state employees concluded that Social Security was not the attrac-
tive proposition they originally thought it was and began exercising
their withdrawal rights. Faced with a potentially severe loss of
revenue from such withdrawals, Congress passed yet another
amendment to the Act, this time repealing the termination provi-
sion. The amendment was expressly made applicable not only to
future notices of termination, but also to any state agency that had
previously given notice of termination pursuit to a Section 418
Agreement but had not yet left the system. A collection of state
agencies with the apt name "Public Agencies Opposed to Social
Security Entrapment" filed suit, contending that the repeal of the
termination provision and resulting impairment of the termination
clauses in the Section 418 Agreements was an unconstitutional tak-
ing of their property.
Here it might seem that the parties had a legitimate expectation
that they had something akin to a property right. The use of a for-
mal contract to memorialize the federal government's pledge of
21477 U.S. 41 (1986).
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termination rights, and the prominence given to that pledge in or-
der to induce state government workers to consent to participation
in the Social Security system, were designed to elicit reliance. Both
Contract Clause cases216 and, more recently, decisions rendered un-
der the law of government contracting 7 have emphasized the
importance of holding the government to its word when it deliber-
ately employs formal contracts to induce a change of position by its
citizens.
Nevertheless, the Court, speaking through Justice Powell, held
unanimously that the state employees' contractual rights did not
constitute "property" within the meaning of the Takings Clause.218
It relied primarily on a boilerplate provision in the original Social
Security Act of 1938, that reserved to Congress the right to "alter,
amend, or repeal" any provision of the Act. Following earlier deci-
sions construing such "reservation clauses" as defeating any claim
of vested rights in charters or contracts with the government,219 the
Court reasoned that each Section 418 Agreement implicitly incor-
porated the reservation clause. Moreover, the clause in the statute
put each state on notice that Congress was free unilaterally to re-
peal the termination right at any time.'
The argument based on the reservation clause was, of course, an
endorsement of the positivist trap with a vengeance. An unquali-
216 See, e.g., United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977) (holding that
bi-state agency violated the Contract Clause when it repealed a clause in a public
bond indenture reserving toll revenues for the repayment of bonds).
217 See, e.g., Mobil Oil Exploration & Producing S.E., Inc. v. United States, 2000
LEXIS 4306 (U.S. Jun. 26, 2000) (holding that oil companies were entitled to
restitution of full amount paid for oil leasing contracts when Congress enacted a new
law imposing additional conditions on engaging in exploratory drilling); United States
v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839 (1996) (holding that when savings and loan
associations were promised favorable accounting treatment if they acquired failing
thrifts, a cause of action for breach of contract arose when Congress amended the law
to prohibit such accounting treatment).
218 See AOSSE, 477 U.S. at 55-56.
2 19 See id. at 51-52. These decisions included, ironically, Flemming v. Nestor, 363
U.S. 603 (1960), the case that roused Professor Reich's ire and led him to write his
articles urging the protection of the new property. See Reich, The New Property,
supra note 132, at 768-71.210 See AOSSE, 477 U.S. at 54 ("The State accepted the Agreement under an Act
that contained the language of reservation. That language expressly notified the State
that Congress retained the power to amend the law under which the Agreement was
executed and by amending that law to alter the Agreement itself.").
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fled promise in a contract with the federal government did not cre-
ate a constitutional property right, the Court reasoned, because the
statute authorizing the contract included in the fine print a provi-
sion reserving the right to Congress to amend the statute (not the
contract) in the future. The Court was evidently anxious to avoid a
ruling that would impair the financial integrity of-the Social Secu-
rity system. The full-blown positivist method of Roth worked just
fine to achieve this outcome, and it was eagerly embraced.
In short, Webb's Pharmacies and Monsanto found that the
claimants had constitutional property by looking to some provi-
sions of nonconstitutional law while ignoring other provisions.
AOSSE concluded that there was no constitutional property by
drawing upon all conceivably relevant provisions of nonconstitu-
tional law, and ignoring none. The apparent difference in approach
can be explained by positing that in Webb's Pharmacies and Mon-
santo the Court thought that the positivist method generated too
little property given the reasonable expectations of the parties,
whereas in AOSSE the Court found the method generated just the
right amount of property (that is, none), even though this probably
conflicted with the expectations of the parties, because this result
was necessary in order to achieve another value commitment em-
braced by the Justices-the desirability of saving Social Security.
III. BEYOND POsmIsM: THE NEED FOR A
FEDERAL PATrERNING DEFINITION
Part H's discussion of Roth and the Court's efforts to deal with
the positivist traps Roth has generated reveals that there are, in
principle, three strategies for defining constitutional property.
First, one could adopt a "natural property" strategy, analogous to
the method that Roth established for liberty interests, and seek to
articulate a list of protected property interests as a matter of direct
interpretation of the constitutional language. Second, one could
follow a "pure positivism" strategy, which I have argued is the
method most likely contemplated by Roth itself, and specify the
source of property while remaining agnostic about its content.
Third, one could embrace the "patterning definition" strategy of
Memphis Light and Logan (and most recently of Drye), which
would first establish federal constitutional criteria for identifying
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protected property interests, and then look to nonconstitutional
sources of law to determine whether any such interest exists."'
I shall argue that the strategy for identifying constitutional prop-
erty should be the patterning definition method. In order to reach
that conclusion, we need to assess the merits of the three basic
strategies: natural property, pure positivism, and the patterning
definition.
A. Natural Property
One possible strategy would ask courts to identify constitutional
property as a matter of direct interpretation of the constitutional
language. Thus, just as the Constitution can be seen as a compact
designed to protect certain "inalienable" rights of liberty that self-
evidently belong to all persons,'m  so one could argue that the
Constitution is a compact designed to protect certain rights of
property that self-evidently belong to all persons.'
It is probably too late in the day to adopt such a natural-
property strategy. The Roth axiom that property rights are created
not by the Constitution but by state law and other independent
sources has far too much gravitational force for the Court to repu-
diate it entirely. In fact, the understanding that property is a
positive right largely (if not exclusively) defined by state law long
antedates Roth."M The understanding also has great staying power,
"1 For an analogous division of available strategies, see Paul, supra note 17, at 1412-
13 (distinguishing substantive rights approach, deference to states, and adoption of
"generalized ideas about property").
mThis interpretation is suggested by the reliance of the opinions of Justices Stevens
and Ginsburg on the Declaration of Independence in order to justify the existence of
natural liberty interests. See supra note 141.
The Declaration of Independence lists as inalienable rights "Life, Liberty, and
the pursuit of Happiness," not "life, liberty, and property." The Declaration of
Independence para 2 (U.S. 1776). Professor Kmiec has suggested that Jefferson
omitted "property" from the Declaration because property rights are transferable,
that is, alienable, and it would therefore be odd to include it in a list of inalienable
rights. See Douglas W. Kmiec, The Coherence of the Natural Law of Property, 26
Val. U. L. Rev. 367, 369-70 (1991). But it is not clear whether this explanation helps
or undermines the natural-rights argument.
See, e.g., Demorest v. City Bank Farmers Trust Co., 321 U.S. 36 (1944); United
States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316 (1917). It is instructive that under the regime of Swift v.
Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 18 (1842), overruled by Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304
U.S. 64 (1938), in which federal courts articulated rules of general common law,
property rights were regarded as distinct and were generally defined with reference to
2000]
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as evidenced by the fact that as recently as Phillips the Court used
this approach to frame its inquiry into whether constitutional prop-
erty exists.'m Thus, it would be extremely difficult for the Court at
this point in time suddenly to "discover" a set of property rights
that originates directly in the Constitution and hence is immune
from legislative modification.
Even if the issue were not settled, it is far from clear that it
would be coherent or desirable to speak of a set of core property
rights protected directly by the Constitution itself. The basic prob-
lem is that property seems always to entail a large component of
positive regulation.' As even its proponents concede, "[n]atural
law does not supply a detailed, unchangeable code of conduct or
the content of specific property definitions or regulation."' 7 If that
is the case, then we cannot turn to natural law to find'a workable
definition of property derived directly from the language of the
Constitution.
The natural-property strategy could be implemented in several
different ways, none of them satisfactory. First, one could pursue
an originalist strategy and seek to define "property" for purposes
of constitutional adjudication by looking to the forms of property
recognized at the time of the Constitution's framing and ratifica-
tion.' Constitutional property would be defined as the set of
local law. For applications of this understanding, see Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v.
Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co., 175 U.S. 91, 100-01 (1899) and Smith
Middlings Purifier Co. v. McGroarty, 136 U.S. 237,241 (1890). But see Black & White
Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518
(1928) (declining to follow state common law rules construing an exclusive franchise
granted by a railroad station to a taxi company).
See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
6The inevitable reference to positive law in understanding property is revealed in
Blackstone, who asserted that property is an absolute right that "every man is entitled
to enjoy, whether out of society or in it." 1 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the
Laws of England *123. Notwithstanding this apparent claim of a natural law
foundation for property, Blackstone then proceeded to classify the laws relating to
property not as the absolute rights of persons but qualified rights concerning things.
See Daniel J. Boorstin, The Mysterious Science of the Law 170-80 (Univ. of Chicago
Press, 1996); Robert P. Bums, Blackstone's Theory of the "Absolute" Rights of
Property, 54 U. Cin. L. Rev. 67 (1985); Carol M. Rose, Canons of Property Talk, or,
Blackstone's Anxiety, 108 Yale L.J. 601 (1998).
Kmiec, supra note 223, at 370.
For a good summary of what little is known about the original understanding of
the Takings Clause, see Andrew S. Gold, Regulatory Takings and the Original Intent:
The Direct, Physical Takings Thesis "Goes Too Far," 49 Am. U. L. Rev. 181 (1999).
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interests that would have been recognized as property by an in-
formed participant in American society of 1791 or 1868, and
reasonable analogues or extrapolations therefrom. 9
But this strategy would encounter severe difficulties. Property is
a dynamic institution that evolves over time in response to chang-
ing technologies and changing levels of supply and demand.' A
definition of property frozen as of 1791 (or 1868) would prove over
time to be increasingly discordant with modem needs."l Would the
fee tail, which was a fairly common form, of conveyance in the late
eighteenth century but has since been abolished in England and in
nearly all states, be a natural-property interest? Would equitable
servitudes, community property rights, condominiums, securitized
debt, and so on, escape protection as natural property rights be-
cause these sorts of interests emerged only well after the
ratification? And what about intellectual property rights? Such
rights were clearly contemplated by the Constitution, 3 but evi-
dently were recognized to have their source in legislation to be
adopted by future Congresses. Would this put them outside the
sphere of natural property?
A less drastic alternative would be to identify as natural-
property -rights those forms of property that are "deeply rooted in
this Nation's history and traditions."' This would avoid the draw-
back of the originalist strategy that the forms of constitutional
property would be permanently frozen as of the time of ratifica-
For the history of the Due Process Clauses, see supra note 161.
For explications of how an originalist would interpret the Constitution in the face
of uncertainty about the meaning of the language, see Robert H. Bork, The Tempting
of America 161-67 (1990) and Michael J. Perry, The Constitution in the Courts: Law
or Politics? 39-53 (1994).
See, e.g., Yoram Barzel, Economic Analysis of Property Rights 85-105 (2d ed.
1997); Terry L. Anderson & P.J. Hill, The Evolution of Property Rights: A Study of
the American West, 18 J.L. & Econ. 163 (1975); Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory
of Property Rights, 57 Am. Econ. Rev. 347 (1967).
31 For an account of some of the changes in the nature of property holdings during
the first one hundred years after ratification of the Constitution, see Kenneth J.
Vandevelde, The New Property of the Nineteenth Century: The Development of the
Modem Concept of Property, 29 Buff. L. Rev. 325,333-57 (1980).
23
1 See 2 Powell on Real Property §§ 193-98 (1998).
- See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (empowering Congress to "promote the Progress
of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors
the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries").
Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503-04 (1977) (opinion of Powell,
J.) (describing the test for identifying fundamental liberties).
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tion. Constitutional property interests, like liberty interests, 5
would be allowed to evolve, as courts reassess what types of inter-
ests are sufficiently "rooted" to earn the mantle of constitutional
protection. 6
But this evolutionary version of natural property would also pre-
sent seemingly unsolvable dilemmas. Courts would have to develop
criteria not only for identifying "property," but also for deciding
which types of property are sufficiently "rooted" to warrant consti-
tutional status. Consider in this regard the so-called "right of
publicity," which protects the images and voices of celebrities from
commercial exploitation without their consent.n7 Is this a property
right or simply a variation on the tort of invasion of privacy? If it is
a property right, then does the fact that a particular state has rec-
ognized such a right for ten years make it a deeply rooted right?
What about twenty years of recognition? Or thirty years? Does the
fact that only about half the states recognize such a right"8 detract
from its status as fundamental property? These questions have no
obvious answers.
The evolutionary version of natural property suffers from a sub-
tler vice as well. Different types of property rights are generally
created and modified by legislation, not through common-law deci-
sionmaking."9 The reasons for this are complex, but it is likely that
they relate to the need for certainty and predictability in property
law, and especially the need to limit the number of permissible
forms of property to provide more effective notice to third parties
- Justice Scalia has advocated this type of evolutionary approach to defining
fundamental liberty interests. See, e.g., Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1,
24-40 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment); Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491
U.S. 110 (1989) (plurality opinion).
For defenses of this type of evolutionary constitutionalism, see, e.g., Anthony T.
Kronman, Alexander Bickel's Philosophy of Prudence, 94 Yale L.J. 1567 (1985);
Thomas W. Merrill, Bork v. Burke, 19 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 509 (1996); Ernest
Young, Rediscovering Conservatism: Burkean Political Theory and Constitutional
Interpretation, 72 N.C. L. Rev. 619 (1994).
7See generally 1 J. Thomas McCarthy, The Rights of Publicity and Privacy (1987
& 1999 Supp.) (defining and exploring the right of publicity).
See id. § 6.1[B], at 6-6.
'1 See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law
of Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 Yale L.J. (forthcoming Oct. 2000);
Bernard Rudden, Economic Theory v. Property Law: The Numerus Clausus Problem,
in Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence: Third Series 239, 243-44 (John Eekelaar & John
Bell eds., 1987).
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about the types of interests that can be held as property in any
given society.'" The standardization of property rights achieved by
relying on legislation would be undermined, at least to a degree, if
a layer of constitutional common law were added on top of the leg-
islatively recognized forms.
A third implementation of the natural-property idea, in many
respects most analogous to the natural-liberty strategy for inter-
preting "liberty" under the Constitution, would be to define a
certain minimal package of property to which all citizens in the pol-
ity would be entitled as an affirmative right. This was effectively
Justice Marshall's position in his dissenting opinion in Roth: He ar-
gued that all citizens have a property right to a government job,
and hence are entitled to at least a statement of reasons when they
apply for government employment and are rejected. 4 Welfare
rights activists in the 1970s and their modem successors have taken
up the cry, urging that every person should get a certain minimum
package of property by constitutional right-forty acres and a
mule242 or, the modem substitute, guaranteed subsistence payments
from the state.43
But there are a variety of problems with the minimum rights ver-
sion of natural property. They include: (1) widespread public
opposition to any guarantee of minimum resources payable to
able-bodied persons who refuse to work;2" (2) a concern that such
a guarantee would seriously undermine incentives to work' 4' and
(3) the difficulty of developing through adjudication criteria for de-
"- See Merrill & Smith, supra note 239.
241 See Roth, 408 U.S. at 588-89 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also Pruneyard
Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 93 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring) (arguing
that property "do[es] not derive [its] meaning solely from the provisions of positive
law... [but has] a normative dimension as well").
242See Akhil Reed Amar, Forty Acres and a Mule: A Republican Theory of
Minimal Entitlements, 13 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 37 (1990).
243 See, e.g., Paul, supra note 17, at 1541-48 (suggesting that constitutional property
be defined as a substantive right to shelter). See generally Helen Hershkoff, Positive
Rights and State Constitutions: The Limits of Federal Rationality Review, 112 Harv.
L. Rev. 1131, 1133 n.9 (1999) (collecting the voluminous legal literature advocating
some kind of substantive constitutional guarantee of welfare rights).
244 See Amy L. Wax, What's So Great About a Constitutional Right to Welfare?, 50
Duke L.J. (forthcoming 2000).
245 See, e.g., Robert C. Ellickson, The Untenable Case for an Unconditional Right to
Shelter, 15 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 17 (1992).
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termining what the minimum package of property would look
like.246 Moreover, even if the judiciary could reach agreement about
the desirability and the description of the minimum package of re-
sources, this would not resolve the problem of how property is to
be identified once we move beyond the minimal package. So Jus-
tice Marshall's version of the natural-property strategy would
necessarily have to be supplemented with some other type of defi-
nition of property.
At best, any natural-property strategy would give rise to a "two-
tiered" system of constitutional property, analogous to the two-
tiered system we have for constitutional liberty." At the base there
would be certain "core" property rights created by the Constitution
itself; above the base there would be a larger set of positive prop-
erty rights defined by sources such as state law. In the case of
property, however, the second or positive property tier would al-
most certainly loom much larger than does the second tier in the
case of liberty. The fact that positive property must be defined in
any event, combined with the conundrums of how we would iden-
tify a core of natural property, suggest that the Court has been well
advised in eschewing any effort to identify a set of property rights
directly protected by the Constitution.
Passionate defenders of private property may object that with-
out a definition of constitutional property grounded directly in the
Constitution, the United States in some future moment of weak-
24 One can readily understand what it means to say that the Constitution confers a
kind of standard package of liberties on every person in the polity: the right to
freedom from bodily restraint, "to contract, to engage in any of the common
occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring
up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience," and so
on. Roth, 408 U.S. at 572. These sorts of freedoms are naturally indivisible: one either
has the right to contract, to marry, or to worship, or one does not. But one cannot say
very easily whether a person either does or does not have some minimum package of
"necessary" resources.
The new liberty idea originated shortly after Roth in Wolff v. McDonnell, 418
U.S. 539, 555-58 (1974), and was most completely rationalized in Meachum v. Fano,
427 U.S. 215, 224-27 (1976). The basic idea is that even in circumstances in which
individuals have no natural liberty because, for example, they have been convicted of
a crime and sentenced to prison, independent sources such as state law can give rise to
liberty interests protected by due process. For further applications, see, for example,
Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460 (1983); Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238 (1983); cases
cited infra notes 294-98.
[Vol. 86:885948
The Landscape of Constitutional Property
ness could embrace socialism, contrary to the "meta-principle" that
the Constitution was designed to protect private property.2'
But the Property Clauses of the Constitution do not mandate the
existence of a private property system. "All they say is that insofar
as there happens to be any property, and you happen to have
some, you won't lose what you have at the hands of the govern-
ment without due process and/or just compensation."'249 And
insofar as the need to pay just compensation would discourage the
government from proceeding with socialism, it would seem that
this retarding effect would be secured under any of the different
definitional strategies. Under pure positivism, for example, if pri-
vate property is recognized to exist by independent sources such as
state law, and the government sought to nationalize this property,
the Takings Clause would require that just compensation be paid
in order to effectuate the transition.' Adopting a natural-property
definition in order to forestall some future socialist revolution
would therefore appear to be both unnecessary and quixotic.
B. Pure Positivism
The second option-pure positivism-is much easier to envision,
since it is essentially the one with which we have been living since
the Court decided Roth in 1972. Property means whatever the non-
constitutional decisionmakers say it means, or whatever the
2See generally Jennifer Nedelsky, Private Property and the Limits of American
Constitutionalism (1990) (reviewing evidence that the Framers' objectives were in
part to enhance the security of property rights).
29 Frank I. Michelman, Process and Property in Constitutional Theory, 30 Clev. St.
L. Rev. 577,585 (1981).
It is occasionally argued that positivism would permit the government to abolish
private property in steps by, for example, declaring that any resource acquired after a
certain date in the future will not be protected as property. See Monaghan, supra note
15, at 440; Thompson, supra note 20, at 1527-30. One problem with this argument is
that it has been and is likely to remain a purely hypothetical concern. Property is a
highly utilitarian institution and no state is likely to put itself at a competitive
disadvantage by seriously undermining the security of property rights. A second
problem with the argument is that the current holders of such resources might have
an action for a regulatory taking based on the radical loss in value that would be
created by the announcement that future transferees would have no property in the
resources. In any event, to the extent that pure positivism creates a danger of
abolishing property in steps, the patterning definition approach provides additional
protections. See note 260 infra.
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nonconstitutional decisionmakers choose legally to protect as a "le-
gitimate claim of entitlement." The nominalism about the meaning
of property inherent in this conception is one of the great truisms
bequeathed to us by legal realism,"' and its influence is hard to
fight. The realists and their successors relentlessly championed the
idea that property is a "bundle of rights," with the implication that
the identity or presence of any one stick is purely contingent. 2 For
the realists, any and all sticks can be inserted into the bundle, or
better yet, taken out of the bundle, and it is still possible to call the
bundle property. As the arch-realist Walton Hamilton put it, prop-
erty is merely "a euphonious collocation of letters which serves as a
general term for the miscellany of equities that persons hold in the
commonwealth."' 3
This legacy of realism is without a doubt a source of the nomi-
nalism about the meaning of property reflected in Roth. If property
is a purely contingent and ever-mutating bundle of rights, then it
would be foolhardy for the Supreme Court to presume to offer a
limiting conception of what "property" means in order to channel
the inquiries of judges as they look out upon the vast realm of "in-
dependent source[s] such as state law." The positivist strategy also
made it possible for Roth to rationalize the program of Goldberg,
which was to redefine the universe of property for instrumentalist
ends, to wit, providing a constitutional imprimatur to welfare rights
and other government entitlement programs.
The problem with pure positivism, as we have seen, is that it
leads to the positivist trap, in the form of too much or too little
property relative to social expectations or other normative com-
21 See Merrill, supra note 102 (contrasting essentialist and nominalist definitions of
property and associating the emergence of the latter with legal realism).
See, e.g., Wesley Holifeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial
Reasoning 28 (Walter Wheeler Cook ed., 1923) (stating that property "has no definite
or stable connotation"); Morris R. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 Cornell L.Q.
8 (1927). For a misguided but highly influential modem version of this perspective,
see Thomas C. Grey, The Disintegration of Property, in XXII NOMOS: Property 69
(J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1980). Today, the notion that property
has no "intuitive core" is often stated as orthodoxy. See, e.g., Rubin, supra note 15, at
1086 ("[P]roperty is simply a label for whatever 'bundle of sticks' the individual has
been granted."); Joan Williams, The Rhetoric of Property, 83 Iowa L. Rev. 277, 297
(1998) ("Labeling something as property does not predetermine what rights an owner
does or does not have in it.").
5311 Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences 528 (Edwin R.A. Seligman ed., 1937).
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mitments of the Justices about the kind of things that should be
protected as property. Further, as we have seen, the Court does not
have the intestinal fortitude to live with the consequences of the
positivist trap. Faced with outcomes that deviate from social expec-
tations, or that seem to threaten other values near and dear to the
judicial heart, "the Court has been unwilling or unable to live by its
own declared rule of self-denial." Lacking any federal definition
of property, however, its response has been arbitrarily to embrace
some provisions of nonconstitutional law while ignoring others, all
the while covering its tracks with circular arguments, ipse dixits,
and smoke and mirrors.
Of course, one could argue that this unedifying spectacle is part
of the settled law of constitutional property, and that we have no
choice at this point but to live with it. But this would be an unwar-
ranted conclusion to draw from the data. First, there is the fact that
the Court carved out a major exception to the pure positivism of
Roth when it quashed the bitter-with-the-sweet thesis. True, in so
doing the Court failed to acknowledge that Roth's nominalism
about the meaning of property was the source of its problem. But
its action reflected a significant qualification all the same. More-
over, we have the examples of Memphis Light and Logan, which
expressly endorse a third strategy-what I have called the pattern-
ing definition. These decisions have not attained great prominence,
for the reasons I have described,' 5 but nevertheless they exist and
have never been repudiated. And as the Court's very recent deci-
sion in Drye demonstrates, the patterning definition appears to be
the emerging norm for defining property for federal tax purposes.
Finally, and I think dispositively, we have the recent decisions in
Eastern Enterprises and College Savings Bank, both of which en-
dorse substantive limitations on the meaning of property without
making any reference at all to Roth's positivist strategy. These de-
cisions create a major tension in the law regarding constitutional
property, certainly enough to permit us to conclude that the undi-
luted Roth method no longer enjoys the status of settled law.
214 ichelman, supra note 249, at 583.
-' See supra notes 181-85 and accompanying text.
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C. The Patterning Definition
On the one hand, this leads to the third strategy, the patterning-
definition approach. Like the natural-property method, the pat-
terning-definition approach requires that courts derive a conception
of property directly from the language of the Constitution itself.
But the conception of property the courts seek is not one that dic-
tates that particular types of interests be constitutionally protected
as property. Instead, they seek to discover from the Constitution's
traditions general criteria that serve to differentiate property rights
from other types of interests. 6 On the other hand, like the method
of pure positivism, the patterning definition approach pays a great
deal of attention to understandings grounded in independent
sources such as state law. But state law is consulted not to discover
the definition of property; it is reviewed to determine if interests
have been created that correspond to the federal criteria for the
identification of constitutional property. Beyond the palpable de-
fects of the other approaches, there are several features that
commend this strategy for identifying constitutional property.
To start with a fairly mundane consideration, the patterning
definition idea allows us to integrate the pronouncements of East-
ern Enterprises and College Savings Bank into the preexisting
jurisprudence grounded in Roth. Roth focuses on the source of
constitutional property, while saying nothing about its content.
Eastern Enterprises and College Savings Bank focus on the content
of constitutional property, and say virtually nothing about its
source. The only way to synthesize these strands into a single fabric
is via an approach that speaks both to source and content. The pat-
terning-definition idea of Memphis Light and Logan (and Drye)
does exactly that
A more fundamental reason to adopt the patterning-definition
strategy is that it would permit the Court to engage in more princi-
2 Resolute originalists will want to know why we do not look for the general
criteria for identifying property in the writings of the Framers or the sources with
which they were familiar. The answer is supplied by Professor Stoebuck: "Down to
the time when the United States and early state constitutions were adopted, the few
writings there were on eminent domain spoke of the taking of 'property.' Never, in
these sources... was there any attempt to describe or define what was meant by
'property."' William B. Stoebuck, A General Theory of Eminent Domain, 47 Wash.
L. Rev. 553, 599-600 (1972).
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pled decisionmaking. The patterning-definition approach promises
to replace the chaotic ad hocery generated by Roth with a process
that looks like legal reasoning. You have the major premise-the
federal definition of constitutional property; the minor premise-
the examination of relevant sources of nonconstitutional law; and
the conclusion-either there is or there is not constitutional prop-
erty.
I do not wish to oversell the importance of principled decision-
making. We have moved a long way since Herbert Wechsler and
the argument that principled decisionmaking is the sole desidera-
tum of constitutional law. 7 In particular, if we choose a patterning
definition that is principled but defective-in the sense that it regu-
larly leads to clashes with other norms or regularly produces results
at odds with social expectations-then the patterning-definition
approach does not solve the problem of the positivist trap. Instead,
it just makes it all the harder to escape, because unstructured ad
hocery is ruled out. Nor would the patterning-definition strategy
root out all willful judging. There would still be occasional oppor-
tunities to jigger the federal definition in response to unanticipated
borderline questions or to fudge findings about the content of non-
constitutional law in specific cases in order to reach preferred
results.
Nevertheless, the patterning-definition approach has its decided
virtues. The patterning definition would tell courts what it is that
they should look for when they undertake to canvas state law and
other sources in search of property. It would give them a basis for
saying that some provisions of nonconstitutional law count, and
others do not count, in conducting this exercise. Moreover, a legal
rule, rather than the whims and preferences of the Justices, would
govern the process of inclusion and exclusion. Such an approach
would permit more meaningful oversight of lower courts by upper
courts, and more confident predictions from lawyers to clients. It
might also temper the ability of courts to indulge in "political"
judging, whether it be of the sort reflected in Bowen v. Public
2 See Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73
Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1959); see also, e.g., Michael J. Perry, The Constitution, the Courts,
and Human Rights 25-27 (1982) (arguing that neutral principles are a necessary but
not a sufficient condition of legitimate constitutional interpretation).
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Agencies Opposed to Social Security Entrapment '2 where the
Court sacrificed the contractual rights of state employees on the al-
tar of Social Security solvency, or in Phillips v. Washington Legal
Foundantion2 where the Court wanted to add the war-cry of
"confiscation" to the Washington Legal Foundation's assault on
IOLTAs.
Finally, the patterning-definition approach strikes a much better
balance between flexibility and rigidity than does either the natural
property idea or the pure positivism of Roth. Unlike natural prop-
erty, the third approach does not require that constitutional
property be created in any particular form, or indeed that there be
any property at all. The decision to create property, and whatever
powers and prerogatives are associated with it, is vested in noncon-
stitutional actors. On the one hand, this permits substantial
experimentation and evolution of property institutions over time."
On the other hand, unlike Roth's positivism, property is not
thought to be synonymous with all of law, or at least all "legitimate
claims of entitlement" recognized by law. We start, instead, with a
general conception of the kinds of interests that are eligible to be
called property, and hence are eligible for constitutional protec-
tion. This imposes some structure on the process of identifying
constitutional property.
IV. DELINEATING APPROPRIATE PATTERNING DEFINITIONS
So much for the easier part of the analysis. The problem with the
patterning-definition strategy is that it requires courts to commit to
general federal constitutional criteria for the identification of
property interests. There is remarkably little useful law to assist in
this endeavor. Courts and commentators have been conditioned by
477 U.S. 41 (1986).
= 524 U.S. 156 (1998); see supra Section I.A.
The patterning definition would nevertheless help minimize the possible danger
of a state seeking to eliminate constitutional protections for property through step
transactions. See supra note 250. Under the patterning-definition approach, the label
a state attaches to an interest does not matter-it is the incidents actually recognized
by state law that count. Thus, for example, if a state confers on an individual the right
to exclude others from a discrete asset, that individual would have property whether
or not the state calls the interest property. This makes it harder for a state to
eliminate constitutional protection of property without sacrificing the utility
associated with the institution.
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years of legal realism to be skeptical of general definitions of
"property."' And the reign of Roth-now approaching three dec-
ades-has discouraged courts from seeing any need to articulate
the defining features of property. It is probably also true that most
judges are by nature wary of attempting to define widely used con-
cepts at a fairly abstract level. The judiciary needs help from legal
academics with this task, but there has been very little forthcoming.
In keeping with the general perspective adopted in this Article-
that of an internal participant trying to integrate the Supreme
Court's pronouncements into the larger landscape of the law-I
will use three evaluative standards in attempting to identify appro-
priate patterning definitions: (1) Does the definition demarcate a
set of issues for constitutional protection that is reasonably congru-
ent with the issues earmarked for protection by existing decisional
law? (2) Is the definition reasonably congruent with other norms
that are widely shared by the judiciary-that is, will it minimize
positivist traps of the too little or too much property variety? (3) Is
the definition reasonably congruent with social expectations about
what kinds of interests should be protected as property?
The first and most fundamental question that we confront in ap-
plying these standards is whether there should be one patterning
definition, or two, or three. To answer that question, we must take
at least a rough cut at addressing our first standard of evaluation,
and consider whether any one definition is capable of marking off
the existing spheres of protection that exist under procedural due
process, takings law, and substantive due process.
A. The Need for Three Definitions
The natural impulse of any trained legal interpreter is to favor
giving a word the same meaning whenever it appears in a docu-
ment.262 Yet we are not entirely without textual support for
different meanings of property, depending on the nature of the
claim being asserted. Of particular significance, the Due Process
261 See supra notes 251-53 and accompanying text.
62 See, e.g., Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 570 (1995) (adhering "to the
'normal rule of statutory construction' that 'identical words used in different parts of
the same act are intended to have the same meaning') (quoting Department of
Revenue v. ACF Indus., 510 U.S. 332, 342 (1994)); Sullivan v. Stroop, 496 U.S. 478,
484 (1990) (same).
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Clause speaks of "property" whereas the Takings Clause refers to
"private property." This may provide some support for construing
property for takings purposes more narrowly to mean common law
property (that is, "private" property), while adopting a broader
definition in the context of substantive and procedural due process.
Moreover, there is precedent for adopting different meanings of
the same word for purposes of different clauses of the Constitution.
As Justice Breyer noted in Eastern Enterprises, the word "person"
as used in the Fifth Amendment has been construed to include
corporations for some purposes (for example, the Double Jeopardy
Clause), but not for other purposes (for example, the Self-
Incrimination Clause).' Thus, although legal interpreters should
resist attributing multiple meanings to the same word in a single
document, there are contexts where this may be unavoidable, at
least if our objective is to accommodate settled doctrine and to
reach results that are normatively defensible.
If the range of interests protected by each doctrine under con-
sideration were significantly overlapping, then perhaps one
definition would do. If the ranges are significantly skewed, how-
ever, then in all likelihood we need more than one definition. The
Court is not going to commit to any single definition that requires
either the wholesale repudiation of large chunks of settled applica-
tions under one or more doctrines or, conversely, that commits it to
expanding dramatically the scope of constitutional protection un-
der particular doctrines.
With this in mind, it seems clear that the domain of procedural
due process must be a relatively large one. Given the landmark de-
cisions in Goldberg and Roth, and the legions of cases that follow
them, we know that procedural due process protection cannot be
confined to property in the common law sense. It must be broad
enough to encompass the legislative "entitlements" such as statuto-
rily mandated transfer payments, government employment, and
professional licenses that the Court in the 1970s decided should
also be protected as property for procedural due process purposes.
Whether the Goldberg revolution and the radical expansion of
procedural due process that occurred in its wake was justified or
See Eastern Enterprises, 524 U.S. at 557 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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wise are questions about which reasonable minds may differ.'l But
there is no sign that the Court is poised to repudiate these deci-
sions. Yet, procedural due process applies only when a relatively
small number of persons are "exceptionally affected, in each case
upon individual grounds."' This suggests that procedural due
process property should have some feature that differentiates
among individual claimants and eliminates interests that apply to
broad categories of persons on a similar basis. For example, a gen-
eral increase in income tax rates should not trigger procedural due
process protections.
The Takings Clause, in sharp contrast to procedural due process,
has remained fixed within a common-law orbit.' 6 Virtually all tak-
ings cases involve common-law property interests, such as a fee
simple or an easement.267 One reason for the congruence between
takings property and common-law property is that the Takings
Clause serves primarily as a restriction on the exercise of the gov-
ernment's power of eminent domain. Eminent domain proceedings
nearly always involve the condemnation of conventional interests
in land.' Another reason is that the constitutional right protected
by the Takings Clause is the right to just compensation. Just com-
pensation, in turn, is ordinarily measured by market value.269 This
means that the rights protected by the Takings Clause tend to be
those that are bought and sold in the market7 which in turn
equate to common-law property rights.
- Compare, e.g., Mashaw, supra note 143 (generally supportive with reservations),
with Pierce, supra note 122 (generally critical).
2 Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 446 (1915); see
also Texaco v. Short, 454 U.S. 516, 531-33 (1982); cf. Londoner v. City and County of
Denver, 210 U.S. 373,378-79 (1908).
2See Stephen J. Massey, Note, Justice Rehnquist's Theory of Property, 93 Yale
L.J. 541, 542-45 (1984) (noting that the Court protects different types of interests as
property under due process and takings doctrines and that the Takings Clause covers
only "common law property").
7See McUsic, supra note 17, at 608.
2See Merrill, supra note 18, at 95 (reporting that in one sample of decisions nearly
99% (303 of 308) of eminent domain cases involved interests in land).
29 See, e.g., United States v. 50 Acres of Land, 469 U.S. 24, 25 & n.1 (1984); United
States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 374 (1943).
20 Or those that are otherwise susceptible to monetary valuation on some objective
basis. See Thomas W. Merrill, The Constitution and the Cathedral: Prohibiting,




The implied limitation of the domain of the Takings Clause to
common-law property rights is confirmed by the fact that when the
courts have been confronted with claims that "new property" in-
terests such as Social Security or welfare benefits are entitled to
substantive constitutional protection, those claims have been re-
jected out of hand. One year after Goldberg was decided, the
Court in Richardson v. Belche 1 stated that while statutory enti-
tlements may be "property" for procedural due process purposes,
"the analogy drawn in Goldberg between social welfare and 'prop-
erty' cannot be stretched to impose a constitutional limitation on
the power of Congress to make substantive changes in the law of
entitlement to public benefits."'2 The proposition that Goldberg-
type "property" exists only for procedural due process purposes
has been perceived to be so self-evidently correct that it has never
been revisited.273 Thus, takings property should be more narrowly
defined than procedural due process property.
The domain of property for substantive due process purposes is
the most difficult to pin down, if only because substantive due
process is so rarely enforced to protect property interests. In gen-
eral, substantive due process serves as a line of last defense. This
suggests, as Justices Kennedy and Breyer reasoned in Eastern En-
terprises, that substantive due process should have a broader
application than does the Takings Clause. Indeed, the cases dis-
cussing the substantive due process principle that legislation must
satisfy a standard of minimum rationality appear to assume that
271404 U.S. 78 (1971).
2n Id. at 81 (citation omitted).
m" Other decisions have repeated the pronouncements in Belcher. See Bowen v.
Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 605 (1987) (referring to the "unquestioned premise" that the
government can reduce welfare benefits and that doing so "does not constitute a
taking of private property without just compensation"); United States R.R.
Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 174 (1980) (stating that the Takings Clause does
not apply to "railroad [retirement] benefits [because such benefits], like Social
Security benefits, are not contractual and may be altered or even eliminated at any
time"); Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960) (holding that Social Security benefits
are not an "accrued property right"); see also Kizas v. Webster, 707 F.2d 524, 539-40
(D.C. Cir. 1983) (distinguishing between "property" for takings purposes and
"property" for due process purposes, as defined in Goldberg); cf. Director v. Ball, 826
F.2d 603 (7th Cir. 1987) (holding that Social Security benefits are not "property" for
purposes of computing eligibility under the Black Lung Benefits Act).
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this principle applies to virtually any type of economic regulation.27'
Similarly, the cases discussing the principle that there must be a
separate justification for making legislation retroactive appear to
assume that this principle applies to all economic regulation.275
Thus, property should probably take on the broadest possible
meaning where substantive due process protection is concerned.276
The foregoing discussion suggests that it is desirable to have
three separate patterning definitions of constitutional property,
one each for procedural due process, takings law, and substantive
due process. These definitions would act as allocational devices,
steering different types of claims involving government interfer-
ence with economic interests to different bodies of constitutional
doctrine. Note also that the three definitions would be "nested."
That is, takings property, which has the narrowest range, would
also be property for purposes of substantive due process and pro-
cedural due process.2' Procedural due process property, which is
the next narrowest, would also generally be property for substan-
tive due process purposes. Substantive due process, however,
would serve as the general catchall doctrine that would encompass
274 See, e.g., Concrete Pipe & Prods. v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust, 508
U.S. 602, 637-41 (1993) (reviewing under substantive due process the imposition of
liability on an employer for withdrawal from multi-employer pension fund); Bowen v.
Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 598-603 (1987) (reviewing under substantive due process a
reduction in welfare benefits ); Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214,
222-23 (1985) (assuming without deciding that continued enrollment in a medical
school program is a property interest protected by substantive due process).
'" See, e.g., United States v. Carlton, 512 U.S. 26, 31 (1994) (applying the double
justification doctrine to retroactive changes in tax laws); Pension Benefit Guar. Corp.
v. R.A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717, 730 (1984) (suggesting the double justification
requirement for retroactive lawmaking applies to all legislation); Usery v. Turner
Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 16-18 (1976) (same).
2
6 In fact, as noted earlier, see supra note 4 and accompanying text, some cases from
the 1960s and early 1970s appear to operate on the understanding that substantive
due process does not require a showing that the claimant has any liberty or property
interest at stake at all. Although College Savings Bank renders this interpretation
untenable, it is consistent with the observation that substantive due process protection
is quite broad.
This helps explain how it is that the Takings Clause, alone among the provisions
of the original Bill of Rights, is incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment
through the Due Process Clause's protection of "property" rather than "liberty." See




a residual class of claims that would not be covered by either pro-
cedural due process or the Takings Clause.
B. Procedural Due Process: Property-as-Entitlement
Identifying the appropriate definition of constitutional property
for procedural due process purposes is probably the easiest of the
tasks imposed by the patterning-definition strategy. The Court has
already pointed the way for us in Memphis Light and Logan. As
stated in Logan: "[t]he hallmark of property [at least for proce-
dural due process purposes] ... is an individual entitlement
grounded in state law, which cannot be removed except 'for
cause.' ' ' "S I will call this conception property-as-entitlement.
The Memphis Light definition was apparently derived by Justice
Powell in an effort to satisfy three objectives. First, the definition is
broad enough to describe a universe of interests that includes both
"old property" rights recognized at common law and Goldberg's
"new property" rights embodied in statutory benefit programs.
Second, the definition is narrow enough to accommodate Bishop v.
Wood'se79 holding that a law requiring a statement of reasons for
termination, without more, is not enough to create a property right.
Third, the definition is couched so as to exclude nonconstitutional
procedural rules associated with statutory entitlements, and hence
avoids the positivist trap associated with the bitter-with-the-sweet
thesis.
The Memphis Light/Logan definition appears to work reasona-
bly well in achieving these objectives. I would offer a few modest
revisions in the interests of clarity. First, the source of entitlements
protected as property for procedural due process purposes is not
just state law, but can also be federal statutory and regulatory law.
Thus, the definition should be expressed in terms of "nonconstitu-
tional law" rather than state law. Second, because the phrase "for
cause" is a term of art with special relevance in employment cases,
it may be desirable to express the root idea behind for-cause re-
moval somewhat more broadly. I would suggest a phrase such as
"specific condition justifying termination" rather than "for cause."
Third, for reasons elaborated below, I would make explicit that the
2 Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422,430 (1970).
- 426 U.S. 341 (1976); see supra note 167.
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entitlements protected as property are ones that have a "monetary
value" to the claimant. In sum, therefore, I would suggest that the
patterning definition should ask whether nonconstitutional sources
of law confer on the claimant an entitlement having a monetary
value that can be terminated only upon a finding that some specific
condition has been satisfied.
Several features of the definition merit further comment before
we ask whether it satisfies the standards for evaluation.
1. Entitlement
The proposed definition, tracking Goldberg and subsequent de-
cisions,' describes the relevant interest as an "entitlement." One is
tempted to leave this term unexplained, since the Court has seen
no need to explain it over the span of nearly three decades. This
element, however, is a member of a family of concepts that speak
to the degree of expectation the claimant must have before we de-
scribe the interest as property. Since this dimension is present in all
our definitions, a few words of explication are in order.
The Court's use of the term "entitlement," as noted earlier," con-
tains a distinct echo of the rights/privileges distinction that prevailed
before Goldberg, and fainter echoes of the vested rights/expect-
ancies distinction that dominated judicial thinking prior to the New
Deal. These intellectual forbearers have been much criticized. The
legal realists savaged the vested rights/expectancies doctrine in the
early decades of the twentieth century, and the legal process school
attacked the rights/privileges distinction in the 1960s.' Two espe-
cially telling points were advanced in each wave of criticism.
See Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 262 ("[Welfare benefits] are a matter of statutory
entitlement for persons qualified to receive them."); see also Roth, 408 U.S. at 577
(stating that property includes "legitimate claim[s] of entitlement").
28 See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Arthur L. Corbin, Legal Analysis and Terminology, 29 Yale L.J. 163
(1919); Bryant Smith, Retroactive Laws and Vested Rights, 5 Tex. L. Rev. 231 (1927);
Comment, The Variable Quality of a Vested Right, 34 Yale L.J. 303 (1925). See
generally, Kainen, supra note 153, at 103-11 (describing the legal-realist assault on
vested-rights analysis).
m See, e.g., Reich, The New Property, supra note 132; William W. Van Alstyne, The




First, both the rights/privileges distinction and the vested
rights/expectancies distinction erroneously assume that interests fall
on one side or another of a fixed dividing line, when in fact legal in-
terests come with different degrees of expectation about how secure
they are against legal change. The classic example is provided by
married women's dower rights (the modification of which was often
a matter of controversy in the nineteenth century).' A woman who
is not married has some expectation that if she marries, and if her
husband acquires land, and if her husband dies while married to her,
she will have dower rights; a woman who is married has a stronger
expectation that if her husband acquires land, and if he dies while
married to her, she will have dower rights; a woman who is married
and whose husband has acquired land has an even stronger expecta-
tion that if her husband dies married to her, she will have dower
rights; a widow whose husband acquired land while married has the
strongest expectation of dower rights. At what point in time, as the
various contingencies fall away, is a woman's expectation of receiv-
ing dower strong enough to be regarded as a "vested" right? There
is no clearly correct answer to this question, and it seems artificial
to insist that there is a single condition or set of circumstances that
defines when interests become vested.
Second, the rights/privileges distinction and the vested rights
doctrine are both prone to circularity. This is because whether an
interest is regarded as a "right" or as "vested" is in part a function
of whether courts find legislative interference with the interest to
be a violation of the Constitution. Thus, critics maintained that the
identification of an interest as a "right" or as "vested" often simply
begged the question; courts enjoined legislation interfering with
vested rights or required the state to compensate for taking vested
rights, but the right was regarded as vested, of high security, be-
cause the court deemed it to be immune from legislative
abrogation or deemed its taking to require compensation.
1 See Kainen, supra note 153, at 105-06.
Courts disagreed about the point in time when the right vested, some taking the
position that this occurred only when a woman became a widow, see, e.g., Randall v.
Kreiger, 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 137, 148 (1874), and others the position that it occurred
when the husband acquired property during marriage. See, e.g., Class v. Strack, 96 A.
405 (N.J. Ch. 1915).
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These points are not without force. But they are not necessarily
fatal, once we embrace the patterning definition strategy. Under
the patterning definition approach, one can readily accept that dif-
ferent interests have different degrees of strength of expectation,
but still attempt to specify how strong the expectation must be be-
fore an interest will qualify as property. Moreover, one can avoid
problems of circularity under this approach because the relevant
question is how strong of an expectation must be created by non-
constitutional sources of law before an interest will be regarded as
property for purposes of constitutional law. In other words, one
can look to the degree of security of expectation that an interest
enjoys under nonconstitutional law as one signpost or criterion of
whether it should be categorized as constitutional property.
The Supreme Court's use of the term "entitlement" in proce-
dural due process cases can be seen as invoking, in an oblique
fashion, the notion that an interest must have a relatively strong
degree of expectation before it becomes property. Just how strong
is, of course, very difficult to pinpoint. On the one hand, Roth says
that an "entitlement" is something grounded in positive law that
reasonable persons would rely upon in their everyday lives.' Thus,
a purely discretionary benefit-one that a government agent is free
to dispense or withhold at will-does not qualify. Moreover, those
interests regarded as entitlements by Roth and its progeny tend to
be the product of legal mandates that provide in effect that all per-
sons who satisfy certain prescribed conditions of eligibility are
entitled by law to receive prescribed benefits that can be calculated
in advance. On the other hand, we know that the legislature is free
to terminate Roth-type entitlements prospectively at any time.'
Thus, Roth-style entitlements are not irrevocable in the strong
sense that they have been guaranteed for a predetermined amount
of time without regard to the preferences of future legislatures.
Perhaps the best characterization of the degree of expectation
associated with "entitlements" is that they are guaranteed in the
present against discretionary denial in individual cases by executive
21 See Roth, 408 U.S. at 577.
-See Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 604 (1987) ("Congress is not, by virtue of
having instituted a social welfare program, bound to continue it at all, much less at the
same benefit level."); Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78 (1971); supra notes 257-59
and accompanying text.
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or judicial agents, but are not guaranteed against wholesale with-
drawal or diminution by the legislature in the future. ' This degree
of "vestedness" reflects a sort of intermediate degree of security,
somewhere between an interest which is awarded in the discretion
of executive or judicial actors (a research grant, for example) and a
common law property right that is irrevocable for a determinable
period of time in the future (a fee simple, a life estate, or a lease).
2. Monetary Value
Although there are no precedents that directly address the ques-
tion, it also seems implicit in the concept of the Roth-type
property-as-entitlement that these interests have some ascertain-
able monetary value. One basis for this conclusion is again
inductive. The various interests recognized as property for proce-
dural due process purposes nearly all have a monetary value. This
generalization covers not only traditional common-law property
rights, which nearly always can be sold, but also the major catego-
ries of "new" property, including welfare and Social Security
benefits, government employment, and professional licenses."
In addition, given the Court's recognition of positive liberty in-
terests-liberty interests that are grounded in independent sources
such as state law rather than being found directly in the Constitu-
tion -it is necessary to find some basis for differentiating "new"
property rights from "new" liberty rights. Positive liberty interests
typically involve freedoms from restraint or punishment that the
state is otherwise free to inflict, although the concept may have
broader extensions.29' In any event, "new" liberty interests typically
Cf. Joseph William Singer, No Right to Exclude: Public Accommodations and
Private Property, 90 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1283, 1473 (1996) ("The concept of entitlement
may express (better than does the concept of title) the ability of property rights to be
secure in certain ways and defeasible in others.").
The right to a public education, recognized to be a property right in Goss v.
Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 576 (1975), is perhaps a more borderline case, although any
parent who has contemplated sending their children to private schools knows that
public schooling has a monetary value. Goss, it should be noted, also relied in part on
the liberty interest in reputation implicated by a school suspension. See id.
See supra note 247 and accompanying text.
29, Stigmatization by the state can provide the basis for a liberty interest when
coupled with some other tangible interest. See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 708-10
(1976). Given the Court's recognition of positive liberty interests in the prison and
parole context, it is possible that a state by positive regulation could create a free-
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do not have a readily ascertainable monetary value, so the fact that
the entitlement has a monetary value would appear to provide a
reasonable basis for differentiating Roth-type property from new
liberty interests.
Finally, requiring that entitlements have some monetary value
before they can be protected as property preserves a degree of con-
tinuity between the constitutional definition and the ordinary
understanding of property. "Property," in most of its uses, con-
notes something of value or something that enhances individual
wealth.2" Imposing the condition that the entitlement have mone-
tary value therefore helps prevent the concept of constitutional
property from ballooning to include "all interests valued by sensi-
ble men,"' and losing any connection with the constitutional text.
3. Termination
The proposed definition further specifies that the individual en-
titlement must be one that cannot be terminated unless some
specific condition is satisfied. The word "termination" is chosen
advisedly. It is consistent with the formulations of Memphis Light
("terminate") and Logan ("remove"), and gains further support
from recent experience in the new liberty context. The Court in
this last decade has recognized two significant modifications in the
threshold definition for identifying positive liberty rights, greatly
complicating the task of identifying those rights.
First, in an opinion authored by Justice Blackmun, the Court
ruled that new liberty hearing rights are triggered whenever non-
constitutional law constrains official discretion by adopting
"substantive predicates" containing "explicitly mandatory lan-
guage."'2 This formulation of the scope of positive liberty is much
broader than the Memphis Light/Logan definition of property. In
effect, the Court expanded the right beyond action terminating an
standing entitlement to freedom from government stigmatization.
There are multiple dictionary definitions of property, but the one most closely on
point is "[t]he exclusive right to possess, enjoy, and dispose of, a thing; ownership; in a
broad sense, any valuable right or interest considered primarily as a source or element
of wealth." Webster's New International Dictionary of the English Language (2d ed.
1936).
r Monaghan, supra note 15, at 409.




interest to include any change in status with respect to an interest
recognized by nonconstitutional law. The predictable result was
too much liberty, in that prisoners (the primary beneficiaries of the
positive liberty line of authority) increased their filing of suits seek-
ing to vindicate a host of positive liberty interests."
In reaction, the Court adopted a second qualification to the
sphere of interests protected as positive liberty: In an opinion au-
thored by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Court announced that,
beyond constraining official discretion, there must be state action
that imposes "atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in re-
lation to the ordinary incidents of prison life." '296 The new limitation
was adopted precisely because the Court was concerned that the
focus on discretion-constrained changes in status, without more,
was resulting in litigation based on interests too trivial or insub-
stantial to warrant the protection of procedural due process.2" In
effect, the Court has now imposed a dual requirement for identifi-
cation of a positive liberty interest in the prison context: Such an
interest must be (1) protected by nonconstitutional rules that cabin
official discretion, and (2) the change in status with respect to the
interest must entail a "grievous loss" to the inmate.
Whatever may be said about engrafting the old "grievous loss"
notion into the jurisprudence of positive liberty, there is no indica-
tion that such doctrinal complexity is needed in the property
context. In contrast to the flood of litigation by prisoners raising
new liberty claims, there is no sign of increasing numbers of cases
raising new property claims. This is due in part to the absence of
the peculiar incentives that prisoners have to litigate. But it is also
due to the fact that the Court has never expanded the definition of
property beyond action removing or terminating an interest to in-
clude all limitations on official discretion to effect a modification in
status. Actions that terminate entitlements are likely to be per-
ceived by both claimants and the courts as being serious claims of
the sort that merit adjudicatory hearings. Lesser types of adverse
actions-those that modify, reduce, or redefine entitlements-are
See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 482-83 (1995) (collecting lower court cases
involving insubstantial claims of infringement of positive liberty brought by
prisoners).
29 Id. at 484.
See id. at 482-83.
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much less likely to be regarded as giving rise to serious claims.' 98
Requiring that the threatened government action seek to terminate
an entitlement thus helps allocate procedural due process rights to
the types of claims that are most deserving of due process protec-
tion.'
4. An Assessment of the Definition
How does the Memphis Light/Logan definition (as modified and
explained) fare in terms of avoiding problems of too little or too
much property and otherwise tracking the expectations of persons
about when they will be afforded adjudicatory hearings before
adverse government action is taken? As already noted,' the defi-
nition avoids any problem of the bitter-with-the-sweet, because
state-law procedural requirements are irrelevant under the defini-
tion. The definition thus preserves the settled understanding that
courts have the final, authority to say whether any given package of
procedures comports with due process of law. Similarly, by requir-
ing that the entitlement be one that can be terminated based only
upon an individual determination of "cause," the definition pre-
serves the understanding that procedural due process applies only
when the government takes action that affects particular individu-
als on an exceptional basis. The definition thus comports with
major landmarks demarcating the domain of procedural due proc-
ess rights.
Numerous psychological studies have found that individuals are prone to find the
loss of an existing object or interest more painful than the failure to acquire an
equivalent object or interest. See Elizabeth Hoffman & Matthew L. Spitzer,
Willingness to Pay vs. Willingness to Accept: Legal and Economic Implications, 71
Wash. U. L.Q. 59 (1993) (summarizing studies).
Lower courts have reached varying results in considering whether procedural due
process guarantees apply to government decisions denying initial claims to benefits,
and the Supreme Court has reserved judgment on the question. See American Mfrs.
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 61 n.13 (1999). The modified Memphis
LightlLogan definition would resolve this dispute by finding no property unless the
state seeks to terminate a presently existing entitlement. This result is consistent not
only with the perception that individuals experience a loss of existing benefits more
sharply than they do the failure to gain new benefits, but, more importantly, with the
objective of avoiding the too-much-property trap, with the inevitable watering-down
of protections that follows for claimants with more serious claims.
'4 See supra text accompanying note 180.
2000] 967
Virginia Law Review
The positivist trap in the form of too much property is a greater
concern, given the vast range of government "entitlements" estab-
lished by existing nonconstitutional law. In general, however, the
social costs of overbroad procedural due process protection are
much reduced today compared to what they were in the heyday of
the due process revolution. The Court in recent years has effectively
confined Goldberg's actual holding-that a full pretermination hear-
ing is required before government benefit payments can be
terminated-to its facts. Instead, the Court has tended to defer to
legislative judgments about what procedures are appropriate in dif-
ferent contexts, especially when those judgments have the sanction
of historical practice."' And when it has imposed additional proce-
dures, it has required at most only informal pretermination
requirements.3' This more deferential attitude has held the costs of
due process hearings in check, and has tempered the strategic use of
hearings by frustrated claimants. The contemporary Court's moder-
ately deferential, not-very-intrusive procedural due process doctrine
is thus much easier to couple with a broad patterning definition that
includes "new" property rights than a more extreme version of pro-
cedural due process would be.
Still, the breadth of the concept of "entitlement," standing alone,
could give rise to a danger of too much property. Thus, I think it is
important that the patterning definition adhere to the other fea-
tures of the definition-limiting protection to entitlements that
have a monetary value and to government actions that terminate
entitlements. As long as the Court holds the line in the property
context to government actions that impinge on these kinds of in-
terests, there is hope that there will be no need to impose
additional filters, such as the grievous loss notion, to minimize
problems of too much property.
301 See, e.g., Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S. 163, 177 (1994) (addressing due process
in the military context); Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 446 (1992) (addressing
due process in the criminal law context).
See, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 545-46 (1985)
(requiring an informal pretermination hearing before dismissal from government
employment); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 349 (1976) (requiring no
pretermination hearing before loss of Social Security disability benefits); Goss v.
Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 577-84 (1975) (requiring an informal pretermination hearing
before school suspension).
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C. Takings: Property-as-Ownership
Identifying the appropriate patterning definition of constitu-
tional property in the takings context is a more difficult task. Since
the decision in Roth, if not before, and up through the decision in
Phillips, the Court's position was simply that takings property is
defined by "independent source[s] such as state law," that is to say,
pure positivism. Consequently, the Court made no effort to deline-
ate the elements of a federal definition. This has changed
dramatically with the decisions in Eastern Enterprises and College
Savings Bank. Both cases identify, as a matter of federal constitu-
tional law, isolated features of property for purposes of substantive
constitutional protection. In each case, however, the feature is ex-
pressed merely as one necessary condition of concluding that
property is at issue. The Court has made no effort to integrate ei-
ther feature into the established understanding that property is
created not by constitutional but rather by nonconstitutional law;
nor has the Court suggested what other necessary conditions may
exist for the identification of constitutional property.
In this Section, I will attempt to outline-in a preliminary fash-
ion-what a more complete federal patterning definition of takings
property might look like. I call this the property-as-ownership con-
ception. In deriving this definition, I take Eastern Enterprises and
College Savings Bank as starting points, and adopt the "right to ex-
clude" condition of College Saving Bank and the "discrete assets"
condition of Eastern Enterprises as crucial elements of such a defi-
nition. In addition, drawing on the larger sweep of takings law, I
suggest that takings property must have a strong degree of security
of expectation, which I describe as a requirement that the interest
be irrevocable. Putting these elements together, we can derive a
federal patterning definition for takings purposes that would ask
whether nonconstitutional sources of law confer an irrevocable right
on the claimant to exclude others from specific assets. I will discuss
the rationale for each of these conditions in turn, and then briefly
consider whether the resulting definition satisfies the standards of




1. The Right to Exclude
The statement in College Savings Bank that the hallmark of
property is the right to exclude others should be adopted as part of
the definition of property for takings clause purposes. This of
course is not the holding of College Savings Bank. The case holds
that property for purposes of the Due Process Clause includes as
an essential element the right to exclude others. I have my doubts
about this proposition; certainly, it is untenable to insist that the
right to exclude be adopted as a necessary condition of all pro-
cedural due process property, including the "new property"
recognized in Goldberg. But I will put aside these due process puz-
zles for a moment and concentrate on the Takings Clause. There
are several reasons why Justice Scalia's identification of the right to
exclude as being a central identifying element makes sense in the
takings context.
First, the right to exclude does a good job of identifying those in-
terests that we may loosely call common-law property rights."
Most thinkers who have devoted themselves to a sustained analysis
-In speaking of "common-law property rights" I do not mean to distinguish
between those rights created by judge-made law as opposed to those created by
statute. I use common-law property as shorthand for those rights that are regarded as
private property in Anglo-American legal systems, such as land, personal property,
intangibles such as securities, and intellectual property. Such rights quite commonly
have statutory origins. Cf. Lynn E. Blais, Takings, Statutes, and the Common Law:
Considering Inherent Limitations on Title, 70 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1 (1996) (criticizing
Justice Scalia's opinion in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003
(1992), for defining the nuisance exception to the total taking per se rule solely in
terms of judge-made law). The fact that right-to-exclude criterion tracks those
interests regarded as private property also helps rationalize the Court's statements in
Lucas and Phillips intimating that takings property should be defined in terms of
those interests recognized as property at common law. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027-32
(holding that the scope of the nuisance exception to the total takings rule should be
defined in terms of the common law of nuisance); Phillips, 524 U.S. at 165-68
(holding that the expectation of earning interest on a fund should be determined by
the common-law principle that interest follows principal). If by these statements the
Court meant to suggest that takings property is defined by judge-made law, then the
Court was being radically underinclusive; many interests regarded as private property,
including intellectual property, condominiums, and most security interests, are the
product of statutory law, not judge-made law. See Merrill & Smith, supra note 239.
But if we interpret the Court as meaning that takings property should track those
entitlements recognized as private property under nonconstitutional law, then these
statements are consistent with and provide further support for the right-to-exclude
criterion, which reliably singles out such interests.
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of the concept of property have reached the conclusion that the
right to exclude, or something like it, is an invariant characteristic
of private property. Whether one calls this the right to "determine
how the object shall be used and by whom,"' or a "right to ex-
clude others from things which is grounded by the interest we have
in the use of things," 5 or the right of "direct trespassory protec-
tion, " or the "gatekeeper" right,' this conclusion has been
independently reached over and over again. Skeptical readers are
urged to read the Dialogue on Private Property,3" a posthumously
published lecture by Felix Cohen. Cohen was an influential New
Deal lawyer' and legal realist who is best known for his attack on
formalist reasoning in the law.31 Yet when he sought to unpack the
various attributes associated with property, he concluded that
property could be reduced to the following functional core:
[T]hat is property to which the following label can be attached:
To the world:




The consensus view of scholars that the right to exclude is an es-
sential feature of common-law property has been reached largely
through a process of induction by considering the sorts of interests
that are regarded as property in developed legal systems.312 The
- Jeremy Waldron, The Right to Private Property 39 (1988).
J.E. Penner, The Idea of Property in Law 71 (1997).
J.W. Harris, Property and Justice 13 (1996).
Merrill, supra note 102, at 748.
Felix S. Cohen, Dialogue on Private Property, 9 Rutgers L. Rev. 357 (1954).
He was the author of the Handbook on Federal Indian Law (1941), which
became the foundation of most of the modem understanding of law governing
relations with Native American tribes.
3,0See Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35
Colum. L. Rev. 809 (1935).
31 Cohen, supra note 308, at 374.
31,2 The following discussion draws upon Merrill, supra note 102, at 747-51.
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right to control and manage access to the resource is obviously a
feature of "full ownership" of land or chattels. But it is also the de-
fining feature of leaseholds, where the tenant and not the landlord
exercises the right to exclude. Future interests, including a land-
lord's reversion, may be said to represent the maturation of the
right to exclude upon the occurrence of specified conditions hap-
pening in the future. Servitudes, including easements, profits, and
real covenants, all include the right to exclude others from interfer-
ing with a particular use of land. Intellectual property rights are
defined by the right to exclude others from the use of certain in-
tangible ideas and images. Mortgages and liens entail the right to
exclude others from impairing a security interest in resources.
Even public property can be intelligibly described as property be-
cause, notwithstanding Justice Scalia's equation of public property
with a res nullius,"3 the government and its agents have the right to
exclude others from these resources. In short, the right to exclude,
understood to mean the power to direct how a resource will be
used and by whom-or as Drye puts it, the "power to channel" a
resource31 -appears to be an invariant attribute of all common-law
property.3
15
Second, the right to exclude captures the. central features of
common-law property that make it such a valuable social institu-
tion.16 Property is sovereignty, 1 or rather, thousands of little
sovereignties parceled out among the members of society. This
devolution of sovereignty over the control of resources encourages
investment in and improvement of resources by allowing owners to
capture the full value of their efforts."8 It also makes it relatively
easy to identify with whom one must deal to acquire resources,
thereby lowering the transaction costs of exchange, and allowing
313 See College Savings Bank, 527 U.S. at 673.
3 14 See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
315 As explained below, the right to exclude is not itself the property right. The
property right comes about because nonconstitutional law confers an entitlement on
an individual to exclude others from a discrete asset. To describe the right to exclude,
considered independently of the asset, as itself a property right, would be to engage in
unwarranted conceptual severance.
316For a succinct overview, see Emily Sherwin, Two- and Three-Dimensional
Property Rights, 29 Ariz. St. LJ. 1075,1080-84 (1997).317 See Cohen, supra note 252, at 8-11 (1927).
318 See Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 36 (5th ed. 1998).
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resources to move to their highest and best use."9 The right to ex-
clude others protects subjective values associated with resources,
such as homes and personal property, and thereby fosters the de-
velopment of personality and the stability of communities.' And it
diffuses power in society, thus helping to preserve liberty. 1
Third, although I have emphasized the novelty of the Court's as-
sertion of the right to exclude as an unqualified attribute of
property, the Court's emphasis on this dimension of property
draws support from previous judicial ruminations. The Court in
previous takings cases has repeatedly described the right to exclude
others as "one of the most essential" rights of property,3" "one of
the most treasured" rights,323 or something "universally held to be a
fundamental element of the property right., 324 Although these
statements imply that the right to exclude is not the only right as-
sociated with property, no other right had been singled out for such
extravagant endorsement by the Court. Thus, the Court's identifi-
cation of the right to exclude as the "hallmark" of property could
be said to be the logical outgrowth of its prior statements about
this interest in takings cases.
Fourth, not only is College Savings Bank consistent with prior
judicial rhetoric, it is also congruent with prior judicial holdings in
the takings area. The Court's takings decisions suggest that gov-
ernmental interference with the right to exclude is more likely to
be considered a taking than are interferences with other traditional
elements of property.' In contrast, I am aware of no decision of
19 See Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 Yale L.J. 1315, 1331 (1993).
See Margaret Jane Radin, Reinterpreting Property 35-97 (1993).
32' See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, On Property and Constitutionalism, 14 Cardozo L.
Rev. 907, 914-15 (1993); Williams, supra note 15, at 11-12.
E.g., Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 384 (1994) (quoting Kaiser Aetna v.
United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979)).
3 Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419,435 (1982).
324 Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164,179-80 (1979).
-The Court has found complete abrogations of the right to exclude others with
respect to a portion of land to be a taking, even if the portion in question is relatively
trivial. See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 393; Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S.
825, 831 (1987); Loretto, 458 U.S. at 435-36 (1982) (holding that abrogation of the
right to exclude others from small space on roof of apartment building was a taking);
Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 174-80 (holding that abrogation of the right to exclude
others from marina was a taking). In Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S.
74 (1980), the Court held that abrogation of the right to exclude a particular category
of customers (political protesters) from a shopping center was not a taking. But later
2000]
Virginia Law Review
the Court holding that a government action is a compensable tak-
ing of property that involves a resource that would not be
identified as property under the fight-to-exclude test. Thus, for all
these reasons, it appears sensible to embrace Justice Scalia's invo-
cation of the right to exclude as the "hallmark of property"-at
least for purposes of the Takings Clause.
2. Discrete Assets
The Breyer/Kennedy position in Eastern Enterprises that prop-
erty for purposes of the Takings Clause should be limited to
specific property interests should also be adopted as part of the
patterning definition of constitutional property-provided we de-
fine specific property in a way that avoids exacerbating problems
of conceptual severance. Correctly understood, "specific property
interest" should be understood to mean "discrete asset," not "inci-
dent of property." By discrete asset, I mean a valued resource that
(1) is held by the claimant in a legally recognized property form
(for example, a fee simple, a lease, an easement, and so forth), and
(2) is created, exchanged or enforced by economic actors with
enough frequency to be recognized as a distinct asset in the rele-
vant community. An incident of property, in contrast, is a power or
privilege that belongs to one who holds property, but is not itself a
legally recognized form of property.
Some examples should help clarify the distinction. In Hodel v.
Irving, 6 the issue was whether a federal statute eliminating the
right of Native Americans to inherit fractional interests in tribal
property was a taking.' The "right to inherit" is not a legally rec-
cases explained this on the ground that "the owner had not exhibited an interest in
excluding all persons from his property." Loretto, 458 U.S. at 434. Thus, the Court
viewed a partial abrogation of the right to exclude as more like a regulation of use of
the property-a classic exercise of the police power rather than a taking. For an
especially striking illustration of the importance of the right to exclude, see Nixon v.
United States, 978 F.2d 1269, 1285-87 (D.C. Cir. 1992), holding that a special statute
transferring control over President Nixon's presidential papers to the United States
was an unconstitutional taking. Under the statute, President Nixon was allowed to
continue to view and use the documents. But the court stressed that the Act "had
completely abrogated Mr. Nixon's right unilaterally to exclude others from the
materials," id. at 1286, and largely for that reason had to be regarded as a per se
taking of his property.
481 U.S. 704 (1987).
See id; see also Babbitt v. Youpee, 519 U.S. 234 (1997) (invalidating an amended
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ognized form of property, nor is it created, exchanged, or enforced
as a separate asset. The right to inherit is, on the contrary, an inci-
dent that ordinarily attached to ownership in American society.
Irving thus involved discrete assets, but the relevant assets were the
interests in tribal lands that either would or would not be inherited.
The Court was correct in concluding that the regulation affected
property, but wrong to suggest that the "right to inherit" was the
relevant property.'
On the other hand, Dolan v. City of Tigard'29 involved a local
government exaction of a "greenway" along the edge of a creek, to
be used as a flood control area and bicycle path, in exchange for
the granting of a building permit."3 The exaction was the functional
equivalent of a permanent public easement on the land -in question.
Easements are a recognized form of property and are created, ex-
changed, and enforced as distinct assets. Thus, the greenway
exaction was properly viewed as a discrete asset, and the Court
correctly held that requiring the exaction as a quid pro quo for the
permit was subject to the unconstitutional conditions doctrine.3'
Correctly understood, the discrete asset requirement is a neces-
sary complement to the right to exclude, if we are to make sense of
the meaning of property for takings purposes. The discrete asset
requirement tells us what it is the owner has a right to exclude oth-
ers from; the right to exclude tells us why this particular resource
can be identified as something that is owned, as opposed to being
just "stuff." Discreteness and the right to exclude should thus be
seen as complementary filters. They largely, but do not completely,
overlap. In most cases involving takings property, it will be obvious
that there is both a readily identifiable discrete resource (the land,
the chattel, the bank account) and a right to exclude with respect to
version of the statute).
m Commentators have read Irving as making this suggestion. See, e.g., Frank
Michelman, Takings, 1987, 88 Colum. L. Rev. 1600, 1621-25 (1988). On its face, the
decision merely applies the standard three-part balancing test to determine whether
the interest in land was taken.
"' 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
3 See id. at 379-80.
-3 Dolan is often described as regulatory takings case. See, e.g., McUsic, supra note
17, at 631-40. It is not; it is a case about when the government can condition a benefit
on an agreement by a property owner to waive her rights under the Takings Clause.
See Thomas W. Merrill, Dolan v. City of Tigard: Constitutional Rights as Public
Goods, 72 Deny. U. L. Rev. 859 (1995).
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that resource (conferred by ownership of a fee simple, a lease or an
easement). In other cases, both filters will be missing. In College
Savings Bank, for example, the claim based on the loss of future
customers and revenues was not based on any discrete asset-the
future customers were an unascertained class-nor was it based on
any legally recognized right to exclude others from dealing with
these customers. If framed as a takings case, the Court would have
been warranted in finding no constitutional property on either or
both bases.
In a few cases, however, either the right to exclude or discrete-
ness, but not both, will be missing, in which case there should also
be a finding of no takings property. A common-law license, for ex-
ample a tenant's permission to a repairman to enter an apartment
to fix a dishwasher, is an example of an interest in discrete re-
sources that does not entail any right to exclude. A license is a
"permission slip" from someone with the right to exclude that al-
lows another to gain access to a resource. 32 Such a license describes
a discrete resource (the apartment), but does not give the repair-
man any right to exclude, and hence should not be deemed
property for takings purposes?33
The discrete-asset limitation is also necessary if the inquiry into
whether there has been a "taking" of property is to make any
sense. Certainly, if we adopt the traditional view of the Takings
Clause as a prohibition on expropriations (and regulations that go
so far that they are the functional equivalent of expropriations),"
this limitation is necessary. In order to expropriate, confiscate,
seize, or take property, one must identify a particular piece of
property-a "thing"-that has been expropriated, confiscated,
- Cf. Saul Levmore, Licensing: Permission Slips in Corporate and Fourth
Amendment Law, 93 Nw. U. L. Rev. 709 (1999) (developing the root concept of a
license as a permission slip in different contexts).
333 Whether the opposite also holds-that one can have the right to exclude but not
have a discrete asset-is more doubtful. I take up the question below in connection
with substantive due process. See infra notes 361-64 and accompanying text.
3 See John D. Echeverria & Sharon Dennis, The Takings Issue and the Due
Process Clause: A Way Out of a Doctrinal Confusion, 17 Vt. L. Rev. 695, 696 (1993)
("[The] Takings Clause should be interpreted to apply only to outright appropriations
or physical invasions of property, and to regulatory activities that are the functional
equivalent of appropriations or occupations.").
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seized, or taken. One cannot "take" the bottom line of a balance
sheet.
But even if we are willing to relax this understanding, and accept
the notion that regulations that "go[] too far" are also takings,3'
the structure of the inquiry mandated by the modem decisional law
presupposes that the regulation must have such an impact on a dis-
crete resource. The standard three-part regulatory takings test
focuses on (1) the extent of diminution in value caused by the gov-
ernment action, (2) whether the government action interferes with
distinct investment-backed expectations, and (3) whether the gov-
ernment action entails a direct intrusion or merely an adjustment
of the benefits and burdens of ownership. 36 Each of these factors
makes sense only in the context of government interference with a
discrete resource. The diminution in value is the loss in value of a
discrete thing. The interference with investment-backed expecta-
tions refers to the expectations regarding a discrete investment.
And the character of the government's action, that is to say, how
intrusive it is, refers to its action with respect to an identified re-
source.
That the three-part test makes no sense as applied to general li-
abilities is confirmed by Justice O'Connor's strained and
implausible plurality opinion in Eastern Enterprises. Each factor
had to be reformulated in order to generate anything even ap-
proaching a defensible conclusion. For example, diminution in
value was not expressed, as is the convention, in terms of a per-
centage diminution before and after the challenged government
action.3 Rather, it was expressed in terms of the absolute financial
loss associated with the Coal Act (a $50 to $100 million hit).3 The
plurality also found it necessary to reformulate (or effectively to
ignore) the other two variables.39 The very implausibility of the ex-
ercise is most likely the reason why Justice Kennedy concurred
'35 Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393,415 (1922).
'See, e.g., Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 225 (1986)
(restating the doctrine).
3 See, e.g., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003,1019 n.8 (1992).
- See Eastern Enterprises, 524 U.S. at 529.
339 See id. at 528-29 (reformulating interference with discrete investment-backed
expectations to mean "substantially disproportionate to the parties' experience" and
reformulating the nature of the government action (direct invasion versus regulation
of use) to mean "imposes severe retroactive liability").
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only in the judgment and signed on to Justice Breyer's suggestion
that the Takings Clause was the wrong legal rubric in the first
place.
3. Irrevocable Right
As in the case of procedural due process, the definition of tak-
ings property should have as one element the specification of a
certain degree of security of expectation. For takings purposes, a
stronger degree of expectation appears to be required than under
procedural due process., Takings property must be "vested" in
roughly the same sense that a common-law property right is vested
and a mere license is not. Basically, takings property must be ir-
revocable for a predetermined period of time, and there must be
no understanding, explicit or implicit, that the legislature has re-
served the right to terminate the interest before this period of time
elapses. In order to distinguish this degree of expectation from
what we find with respect to the "individual entitlements" of pro-
cedural due process, I have described the claimant's interest as
being an "irrevocable right."
The requirement that takings property must have a strong de-
gree of security of expectation has not been highlighted in recent
decisions, but is reflected in the general landscape of the law. Con-
sider in this regard Dames & Moore v. Regan." When President
Carter seized Iranian assets in response to the embassy hostage cri-
sis, he issued orders that authorized Americans with claims against
Iran to obtain licenses allowing attachments of Iranian assets.
Later, when a diplomatic solution to the crisis was reached, the
President issued orders nullifying all such attachments. The Court
rejected the contention that the nullification of these attachments
was a taking of property, on the ground that the licenses permitting
the attachments were revocable at any time. The Court reasoned
that because the licenses and hence the attachments were revoca-
ble, "petitioner did not acquire any 'property' interest in its
attachments of the sort that would support a constitutional claim
for compensation."' 1
- 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
34 Id. at 674 n.6.
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The requirement of irrevocability was also decisive in United
States ex rel. Tennessee Valley Authority v. Powelson, 2 an eminent
domain case. The question was whether the United States, in con-
demning the property of a private utility as part of the effort to put
together the Tennessee Valley Authority, had to provide addi-
tional compensation because the utility had been delegated the
power of eminent domain by the state-that is, whether a dele-
gated power of eminent domain is itself a compensable property
right. The Court concluded that such a power, which could be re-
voked by the state at any time, should be classified as a license
(that is, a privilege) rather than a property right, and hence did not
give rise to any right to additional compensation."
The requirement that the right be irrevocable does not mean, of
course, that it must be a fee simple absolute or otherwise have an
indefinite duration. It simply means that the right is not subject to
discretionary revocation for some predetermined period of time.
Thus, for example, a lease for years is an irrevocable right for the
term of the lease; indeed, the Court has held that leasehold inter-
ests can be property for takings purposes.' 4
4. An Assessment of the Definition
What would be the consequences of adopting the property-as-
ownership definition for takings cases? Overall, I think the signs
are auspicious. As we saw earlier, a key problem of Roth is that it
generates a positivist trap, either in the form of too little or too
much property. In the takings context, the primary source of the
trap appears to be the divergence between the set of interests pro-
tected by nonconstitutional law and the expectations of persons
about what sort of interests are or are not protected property. The
best way to reduce this type of divergence, in keeping with the
general patterning-definition strategy, is to adopt a federal defini-
tion that closely tracks people's actual expectations about property.
The right-to-exclude feature of the definition means that it
should reliably track those interests that are regarded as "prop-
erty" as a matter of private common law: real property interests,
319 U.S. 266 (1943).
3" See id. at 280-81.
3 " See United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 378 (1945).
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personal property interests, intellectual property interests, and se-
curities. Thus, the test should result in a very high level of
congruence between those interests deemed constitutional prop-
erty and those interests that people expect to be protected as
property. In contrast to the undiluted Roth method, where the
courts are left at sea to decide which elements of nonconstitutional
law do or do not establish property, the proposed definition should
home in on a set of interests that are regarded most frequently as
being property. Structured this way, the definition should reduce
the severity of the positivist trap in takings cases.
The discrete-assets element of the definition also significantly
constrains the potential applications of takings law, and does so in
ways that should produce greater congruence between expecta-
tions and doctrine. If "discrete asset" is understood to refer to a
resource that exists in a legally recognized property form and is
created, exchanged, or enforced as a distinct asset in the relevant
community, it should reduce the opportunities for claimants and
courts to engage in conceptual severance. Some potential for ma-
nipulation of "denominators" would remain,. 5 for example, by
subdividing parcels of land into smaller physical units. But the
greater danger has always been severance along the lines of sepa-
rate incidents or interests in property, and the discrete-asset
requirement should impose a brake on this kind of manipulation.
More controversially, the discrete-asset test would also eliminate
the possibility of using the Takings Clause as an instrument for liti-
gating issues of general distributive justice. This interpretation of
the Takings Clause would bar only the singling out of specific par-
cels of land or other isolated property rights for special burdens; it
would not affect general taxes or changes in liability rules. But this
feature, too, works to confine the Takirgs Clause to its traditional
orbit. The implicit understanding has always been that the Takings
Clause has no application to legislation that imposes taxes or allo-
-
5This is a reference to the practice of calculating the diminution in value caused by
government regulation by comparing the loss due to the regulation (the "numerator")
to the total value of the property before the regulation (the "denominator"). See
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1016-17 n.7 (1992);
Michelman, supra note 17, at 1192-93; John E. Fee, Comment, Unearthing the
Denominator in Regulatory Taking Claims, 61 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1535 (1994). The
smaller the denominator, the larger the percentage diminution in value.
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cates government spending.46 Similarly, there is nothing in our con-
stitutional traditions to support academic suggestions that the
Takings Clause should be applied differently depending on the
wealth of the claimant so that, for example, poor persons whose
houses are taken for a highway project would be compensated,
whereas rich persons would not be.?' The adoption of a doctrine
that insulates the decisional law from such ideas simply makes offi-
cial what has been understood as a matter of practice for many
years.
Several other interrelated considerations provide further sup-
port for keeping the scope of the Takings Clause within fairly
narrow bounds corresponding to common-law property interests.
The Takings Clause is strong medicine. It is often enforced through
categorical or per se rules-most prominently the rules making any
permanent physical invasion a taking and requiring the payment
of compensation for any regulation that deprives an owner of all
economically viable use of property. 9 Even the orthodox "ad hoc"
balancing test for determining when property is taken is applied by
the Supreme Court with little or no deference to the decisions of
local officials or regulators.35 And the Takings Clause has been
held to incorporate a self-executing waiver of state and federal
sovereign immunity against claims for monetary compensation."
Each of these features suggests that the Takings Clause is best lim-
ited to a relatively compact and easily identified domain of
controversies. The property-as-ownership definition should have
this effect.
See, e.g., Eastern Enterprises, 524 U.S. at 556 (Breyer, J., dissenting); United
States v. Sperry Corp., 493 U.S. 52 (1989) (holding that a 1.5% deduction from a
claims tribunal award was a reasonable user fee, not a taking of property); Ackerman,
supra note 17, at 109.
31 See Blume & Rubinfeld, supra note 17, at 608-09.
See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
-3 See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1003.
3-0 See, e.g., Eastern Enterprises, 524 U.S. 526-27 (plurality opinion); Kaiser Aetna v.
United States, 444 U.S. 164, 174-80 (1979). See generally Michelman, supra note 328,
at 1605-14 (arguing that the Court has adopted a form of heightened scrutiny in
takings cases).




D. Substantive Due Process: Property-as-Wealth
By far the most difficult definitional issue is presented by sub-
stantive due process. As in the case of the Takings Clause, there is
no authoritative guidance as to what sort of threshold showing
must be made to invoke substantive due process protection. What
is worse, because of the dearth of precedent enforcing substantive
due process in the context of property rights, we do not even have
a very clear road map of what kinds of economic interests are en-
forceable as a matter of substantive due process."2
Two things can be said in general about the domain of substan-
tive due process protection of property interests. First, as Justices
Breyer and Kennedy recognized in Eastern Enterprises, there are
interests protected by substantive due process that are not pro-
tected by the Takings Clause. Consequently, the domain of
substantive due process should be broader than that of the Takings
Clause. Second, the Court has suggested over the years that all
economic regulation is subject to the substantive due process re-
quirement of minimum rationality,353 and all retroactive economic
regulations have a higher burden of justification than prospective
regulations.' Given these propositions, which appear to be settled,
it would seem that substantive due process has an even broader
application than does procedural due process.355
Identifying a patterning definition that secures these points of
reference is difficult in the absence of more concrete benchmarks
upon which to draw. In general, however, the intuitive notion
seems reasonably clear: For purposes of substantive due process,
property should include everything relevant to calculating a per-
son's material wealth or net worth. I will call this conception
3-2 Other than Eastern Enterprises, which was regarded as a substantive due process
case by only one Justice voting to invalidate the Coal Act (Kennedy), the only
modem decision by the Court that strikes down state action interfering with property
under the substantive due process doctrine is BMW of N. Am. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559
(1996), a punitive damages case.
See supra note 274 and accompanying text.
314 See supra note 275 and accompanying text.
35- Procedural due process property is limited by the "for cause" termination
element, which serves to confine due process rights to those who suffer individuating
injury. See supra note 265 and accompanying text. Substantive due process is
available to whole classes of persons complaining of legislated inequities.
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property-as-wealth. Exactly how to flesh out this conception with a
more specific definition is less clear.
One possible point of departure is simply to embrace both Col-
lege Savings Bank (a substantive due process decision) and Eastern
Enterprises (which the Breyer and Kennedy opinions regarded as a
substantive due process decision). This yields the following synthe-
sis: Property for substantive due process purposes includes the
right-to-exclude hallmark endorsed by five Justices in College Sav-
ings Bank, but does not include the discrete-asset limitation
adopted by five Justices in Eastern Enterprises for takings property
(but not due process property). In other words, substantive due
process property should be defined just like takings property, mi-
nus the discrete-assets limitation.
1. Dropping the Discrete-Assets Limitation
At least half of the proposed synthesis-the half taken from the
Kennedy/Breyer position in Eastern Enterprises-makes sense.
Dropping the discrete-assets requirement is necessary if the scope
of substantive due process is to be broad enough to include a num-
ber of issues not reached by the Takings Clause, such as the
understanding that disproportionate punitive damages awards are
unconstitutional, that retroactive economic legislation requires
greater constitutional justification than does prospective legisla-
tion, and that all economic legislation must be minimally rational.
Each of these settled understandings would be called into doubt if
the Due Process Clause, like the Takings Clause, applied only to
interference with discrete assets. Thus, if we are to preserve settled
understandings-a key operating premise of the path-dependent
system of constitutional common law-it is necessary to jettison
the discrete-asset requirement from the definition of substantive
due process property.
Differentiating between takings and substantive due process on
discrete-assets grounds is also consistent with the text and history
underlying the two clauses. The textual basis is the harder part, but
perhaps the relevant bit of text is the distinction between the
verbs-"taken" as opposed to "deprived." To take property con-
notes to seize, expropriate, or confiscate some thing, that is, a
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discrete asset. 6 To deprive someone of property has a broader
range of meanings; especially when coupled with the ideas of de-
priving someone of life or liberty, to deprive someone of property
is either to dispossess them or to remove something of material
value from them.' Thus, the contrast between "take" and "de-
prive" may support the conclusion that the Due Process Clause is
concerned with property in a broader sense that includes the pro-
tection of wealth against government-imposed liabilities as well as
the protection of things from expropriation.
The historical understanding of the purposes of the two Clauses
supports the distinction even more directly. The Takings Clause
was prompted in part by concerns that emerged during the Revolu-
tionary War years about military units requisitioning supplies
without compensation.35" The then-recent history of expropriations
of property belonging to colonists loyal to Britain and anxieties
about legislative nullification of land grants may have also played a
role.359 In any event, all the "paradigmatic cases" involved takings
of discrete assets. The Due Process Clause, in contrast, was de-
signed to cover deprivations in the form of the three types of
punishment historically meted out by the state: executions ("life"),
imprisonment ("liberty"), and fines and forfeitures ("property").3"
Forfeitures, of course, implicated discrete assets. But fines were a
form of general liability. A fine could be paid out of any resources
the defendant could muster, either by drawing down his own as-
sets, borrowing, or hoping for the beneficence of friends and
relatives. Thus, the extension of due process protection to fines was
clearly incompatible with any specific-assets limitation on the do-
main of the Clause.
3m See Webster's New International Dictionary 2569 (2d ed. 1936) (defining "take"
in part as "[t]o get possession or control of... [t]o seize or capture physically").
See id. at 703 (defining "deprive" to mean "[t]o dispossess" and "deprivation" to
mean in part "privation," "loss," or "want").
See 1 St. George Tucker, Blackstone's Commentaries: With Notes of Reference
to the Constitution and Laws of the Federal Government of the United States and of
the Commonwealth of Virginia 305-06 (Philadelphia, W.Y. Birch and A. Small, 1803).
359 See Gold, supra- note 228, at 210-211; William Michael Treanor, Note, The
Origins and Original Significance of the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth
Amendment, 94 Yale L.J. 694 (1985).
'oSee Easterbrook, supra note 15, at 97; Williams, supra note 15, at 20.
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This allocation of claims between the two Clauses also makes
rough sense from a functional perspective. As previously noted, the
Takings Clause, with its per se rules, its lack of a tradition of defer-
ence to local authorities and agencies, and its waiver of state
sovereign immunity against claims for money damages, is strong
medicine, best channeled into fairly narrow paths of government
liability. Substantive due process, in contrast, is a very deferential
doctrine that seldom results in money judgments against the state.
It functions as a kind of a catchall doctrine that polices against the
most egregious forms of governmental misbehavior. This justifies
broader coverage, since the costs of judicial review under this doc-
trine are likely to be low.
2. A Right to Exclude Without Discrete Assets?
The other half of the proposed synthesis-adopting Justice
Scalia's right-to-exclude hallmark for substantive due process pur-
poses-is something about which I have greater reservations.
Using the right-to-exclude criterion to identify substantive due
process property appears to encounter one of two serious difficul-
ties. Either the concept of the "right to exclude" must be
interpreted in an attenuated manner, such that the right to exclude
takes on a meaning closer to "right" than to "exclude," or, if given
its traditional meaning-the right to control access to a particular
resource-it is likely to restrict the sphere of substantive due proc-
ess property to something close to the realm of takings property,
requiring a serious retrenchment of the broad scope that substan-
tive due process doctrine is understood to enjoy. Neither option
seems particularly promising.
As previously discussed,361 the right to exclude clearly does be-
long in the takings definition, where it works well in tandem with
the discrete-assets limitation to delineate traditional common law
property interests. Once we drop the discreteness limitation, how-
ever, and admit net worth or wealth into the fold as part of
"property," then talking about a "right to exclude" takes on a dis-
tinctly different meaning. Here the right to exclude metamorphoses
into something like a right to general protection against extortion. If
the right to exclude is extended in this fashion beyond its common-
-6 See supra notes 303-24 and accompanying text.
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law sense of managerial control, it loses its power to constrain judi-
cial choice in any meaningful manner.
This kind of attenuated meaning of the "right to exclude" may in
fact be what College Savings Bank contemplates. College Savings
Bank holds that a statutory cause of action for false advertising by
a competitor does not implicate any substantive due process prop-
erty.2' Justice Scalia explained that this is because such a cause of
action does not itself entail any right to exclude others, nor does
the underlying activity protected by the cause of action-the right
to compete for future customers and revenues-entail a right to
exclude others. 3 But Justice Scalia conceded that the assets of a
business, including business goodwill, are "property" for substan-
tive due process purposes.' Business goodwill, however, is not a
discrete asset that owners manage and control like gatekeepers. It
is a bookkeeping entry, based on the difference between the total
assets of a company including retained earnings and its liabilities.
One has a "right to exclude" others from business goodwill only in
the attenuated sense that one can call upon the state and its courts
to protect the company from extortion. To say that a firm has the
"right to exclude" others from its business goodwill tells us little
more than saying that the firm has a "right" or an "entitlement" to
its business goodwill.
But, if the "right to exclude" is not watered down to accommo-
date the intuition that business assets and goodwill are property,
and we continue to insist that there be a general power to manage
and control access to resources, then this would severely constrict
the realm of substantive due process property. For example, many
contract rights, which have long been regarded as property for
substantive due process purposes," would no longer enjoy consti-
tutional protection under the Fifth Amendment. Bilateral contracts
give rise to rights among the parties to the contract, but entail only
weak rights to exclude others. Thus, adopting a strong right-to-
exclude hallmark for substantive due process property might well
See College Savings Bank, 527 U.S. at 673-74.
3 See supra notes 97-100 and accompanying text.
3, See College Savings Bank, 527 U.S. at 674.
36 See infra note 392 and accompanying text.
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immunize all federal impairments of contract from constitutional
scrutiny, contrary to at least two holdings of the Court."6
3. A Different Direction
The basic problem with College Savings Bank's right-to-exclude
criterion in the context of substantive due process is that it takes
the intuitive core of takings property-property-as-ownership-and
seeks to transpose it to a doctrine that historically has performed a
much broader function. For Justice Scalia, who is on record as op-
posing all manifestations of substantive due process, this, of
course, is hardly a drawback; to the contrary, it is a step toward
evisceration of an illegitimate doctrine. But from the vantage point
of an internal observer seeking to preserve settled understandings
such as the requirement of special justification for retroactive legis-
lation, this move is destabilizing.
As an alternative strategy for moving toward a workable concept
of substantive due process property, I suggest we to look to the
other half of the Due Process Clause-procedural due process
property, with its property-as-entitlement conception. Perhaps if we
start with that definition, which omits any discrete-assets require-
ment, and make appropriate modifications, we can develop a more
satisfactory working definition of property for substantive due
process purposes. Given the scarcity of the case law, it is necessary
to proceed with particular hesitation here. Nevertheless, we can
perhaps tentatively suggest a definition that asks whether noncon-
stitutional sources of law confer an entitlement on a claimant having
a monetary value.
Let me briefly note several features of this definition, referring
the reader to earlier discussion of property-as-entitlement for back-
ground."6 The most striking aspect of the proposed definition is
how spare it is. Several features previously encountered are here
omitted: There is no right to exclude, no discrete-assets limitation,
and no individuating requirement of termination because some
specific condition has been satisfied. These features, which confine
property-as-entitlement to adjudicated disputes, and property-as-
- See infra note 393 and accompanying text.
3 See supra note 61.
- See supra notes 280-92 and accompanying text.
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ownership to common-law property interests, are deliberately left
out in order to assure that substantive due process has the broadest
possible application.
By adopting the term "entitlement," the definition is intended to
pick up the intermediate degree of security of expectation associ-
ated with procedural due process, rather than the stronger degree
of security of expectation associated with takings property. Thus,
substantive due process would encompass not only interests that
are irrevocable for a predetermined period of time (such as com-
mon-law property rights), but also legislated interests that are
irrevocable from the perspective of executive or judicial actors, but
are subject to repeal by future legislatures. This assures that
disruptions to settled expectations grounded in law that escape
constitutional scrutiny under the Takings Clause-such as retroac-
tive taxes and liability rules-are nevertheless subject to review as
a matter of substantive due process.369
Second, the proposed definition, like the procedural due process
definition, requires that the individual entitlement have an ascer-
tainable monetary value. As in the case of procedural due process,
this element tracks the relevant decisional law; it serves to differen-
tiate property interests from liberty interests; and it supplies
continuity with the ordinary meaning of the word "property."
Does the proposed definition-the broadest of the three
patterning definitions-mean that the Court in College Savings
Bank erred in concluding that a suit against a state agency for false
advertising implicated no property interest as a matter of substan-
tive due process? At first blush, one might think so. The cause of
action conferred by the Lanham Act, which is part of existing non-
constitutional law, would seem to be an "entitlement" under the
broad definition that comes to us from procedural due process. Af-
ter all, recall that the Court in Logan (and arguably in other cases)
found that an unadjudicated cause of action was property for pur-
poses of procedural due process.7 And an unadjudicated cause of
-Thus, for example, although "a taxpayer has no vested right in the Internal
Revenue Code," United States v. Carlton, 512 U.S. 26,33 (1994), a taxpayer's reliance
on existing Code provisions is sufficient to trigger substantive due process review
when those provisions are repealed retroactively. See id. at 27.
370 See supra notes 108-10 and accompanying text.
The Landscape of Constitutional Property
action often has a monetary value-it can be settled before trial for
consideration.
But perhaps this way of thinking about causes of action is mis-
taken. If causes of action are property, then are defenses property
too? What about other important rules of process, like burdens of
proof? And why should a state not be able to replace a cause of ac-
tion with other methods of adjudication, such as administrative
action or arbitration?37' Perhaps a sounder approach would focus
not on the cause of action, but rather on the underlying interest
that the cause of action seeks to vindicate, and would ask whether
the underlying interest is itself property.' Only if the underlying
interest is property would abrogation of a cause of action (without
affording equivalent protection) trigger substantive due process re-
view based on a deprivation of property.373
If we view causes of action in this way, then College Savings
Bank was rightly decided, although the opinion should have been
written somewhat differently. Assuming causes of action implicate
property for substantive due process purposes only if they seek to
vindicate a property right, then College Savings Bank had to show
that its interest protected by the Lanham Act was a property inter-
est, in the sense of property-as-wealth. The interest being asserted
by the Bank, however, was in securing future customers and reve-
nue that would otherwise be lost to Florida Prepaid because of the
state agency's false advertising. Because the Bank had no entitle-
ment protected by nonconstitutional law to any share of future
7 See Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 88 n.32 (1978)
(citations omitted) ("[A] person has no property, no vested interest, in any rule of the
common law.").
m Cf. Jack M. Beermann, Government Official Torts and the Takings Clause:
Federalism and State Sovereign Immunity, 68 B.U. L. Rev. 277, 302-05 (1988)
(arguing that all causes of action should be property); Rubin, supra note 15, at 1110-
14 (arguing that "property" is in effect the cause of action itself).
-a This way of viewing causes of action would not necessarily mean that Logan was
wrongly decided. The underlying interest in Logan was the interest in being free of
employment discrimination, presumably a liberty interest. Thus, the correct inquiry in
Logan should have been whether the state's deprivation of the cause of action
interfered with a positive liberty right, not whether it deprived Logan of property. If
the answer was "yes," then the case came out the right way, even if wrongly
rationalized. As previously noted, see supra note 110, the underlying interest in
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950), was a property




customers or revenues, its cause of action under the Lanham Act
protected at most an interest sounding in tort.374 On this view,
therefore, the Court correctly concluded that College Savings Bank
had no property at stake in the controversy and hence Congress
had no authority under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to
extend the Lanham Act cause of action to state agencies.
V. CONTRACTS AS CONSTITUTIONAL PROPERTY
One last point of reference bears consideration, not only be-
cause it has been important historically,375 but also because it helps
confirm the workability of our proposed patterning definitions.
This is the question of whether, or to what extent, contract rights
are constitutional property.
Here we encounter one of the major discrepancies in the way the
text of the Constitution treats the federal government and the
states. Article I, Section 10 prohibits the states from enacting any
law "impairing the Obligation of Contracts." There is no parallel
provision in Article I, Section 9, which adopts restrictions on the
federal Congress. The current understanding is that the Contract
Clause applies only to the states, not to the federal government,"'
and, as a textual and historical matter, this conclusion is clearly
correct.3
This disparity in the treatment of contract impairments has at
least one significant implication for how we interpret property for
constitutional purposes. Property for Takings Clause purposes
should not be construed in such a broad fashion that it automati-
cally includes all contract rights. This is because the modern
Court's regulatory takings doctrine is almost certainly more protec-
tive than is the Court's Contract Clause doctrine.7 8 Thus, if all
See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
The Contract Clause was the most important source of federal constitutional
protection of property rights through the end of the nineteenth century. See Thomas
W. Merrill, Public Contracts, Private Contracts, and the Transformation of the
Constitutional Order, 37 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 597, 600-09 (1987).
'7 See United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 875-76 (1996); Pension Benefit
Guar. Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717,732 n.9 (1984).
'n See Michael W. McConnell, Contract Rights and Property Rights: A Case Study
in the Relationship Between Individual Liberties and Constitutional Structure, 76
Cal. L. Rev. 267,270-87 (1988).
38 See, e.g., Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987)
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contract impairments were reviewed under the Takings Clause, the
Contract Clause would become superfluous. Further, if contract
impairments are reviewed under the Takings Clause, then the
Framers' distinction between federal and state impairments of con-
tract would be erased."9 Regardless of how we ultimately define
property for federal constitutional purposes, those definitions
should be framed in a way that preserves independent operation
for the Contract Clause and maintains the principle that state im-
pairments of contract are subject to closer scrutiny than federal
impairments. Let us then give brief consideration to how contract
rights would be assessed under the definitions proposed in Part IV.
In the procedural due process context, it would seem that claim-
ants holding contracts with the government should be able to
satisfy the property-as-entitlement definition, at least in some cir-
cumstances. The key questions would be whether the contract is
irrevocable from the perspective of executive and judicial actors,
whether it has a monetary value, and whether it can be terminated
only on the finding that some specific condition has been satisfied.
The Supreme Court appeared to assume that contract rights can
give rise to property for procedural due process purposes in Perry
v. Sindermann,' the companion case to Roth, and the lower courts
have generally agreed. 1
One interesting case testing the understanding that contract
rights can form the basis of procedural due process property is Vail
v. Board of Education.' An Illinois public school entered into a
(providing a more exacting review under a takings claim than under a Contract
Clause claim); Energy Reserves Group v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400,
416-17 (1983) (applying relatively deferential standard of review under the Contract
Clause).
If federal impairments are reviewed under substantive due process, then federal
impairments will be scrutinized less closely than state impairments. Compare National
R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 470 U.S. 451 (1985)
(assessing federal impairment of contract under rational basis test), with Allied
Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234 (1978) (assessing state impairment of
contract under intermediate standard of review).
- 408 U.S. 593, 601 (1972); see also Tulsa Prof'l Collection Servs. v. Pope, 485 U.S.
478, 485 (1988) (treating cause of action for breach of contract as property for
procedural due process purposes).
31 See Leonard Kreynin, Note, Breach of Contract as a Due Process Violation: Can
the Constitution Be a Font of Contract Law?, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 1098 (1990).
706 F.2d 1435 (7th Cir. 1983), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 466 U.S. 377
(1984) (per curiam).
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two-year employment contract with an athletic coach, who was
then fired before the two-year term had elapsed. The Seventh Cir-
cuit, relying on Sindermann, held that the two-year contract was a
property right and hence that the coach was entitled to a hearing
before he was dismissed." Judge Posner dissented, arguing that
contract rights are different than property rights, and that the fired
coach had nothing more than an action for damages for breach of
contract against the Board. Under the definition set forth in Part
IV, the majority was right. The contract satisfied the property-as-
entitlement test, because the promise was binding from the perspec-
tive of administrative actors, it had a monetary value, and it could
be terminated only upon the finding of a specific condition-that
two years had elapsed.
This conclusion is potentially troubling, since it augurs the as-
similation of all government contracts to the realm of procedural
due process. As Judge Posner noted, even "a supplier of paper
clips" would be protected by procedural due process if terminated
before the contract expired." But the potential for too much prop-
erty here has been largely defused by the Court's recent decisional
law injecting greater flexibility into what it means to be "deprived"
of property "without due process of law."3 If, under applicable
nonconstitutional law, there is no right to specific performance of a
particular type of contract, then the promisee will not be deprived
of the right unless and until the government fails to pay damages
for breach of contract. Alternatively, applying the Mathews v. El-
dridge3" balancing test, the courts could find that a post-termination
action for damages satisfies "due process of law." Since either one or
both conclusions is likely to be reached in a case involving the
breach of an ordinary supply contract, the danger of creating too
much property by assimilating binding contracts to property is not
great.
With respect to the Taking Clause, the matter is more complex.
The property-as-ownership definition requires that the claimant
have an irrevocable right to exclude others from discrete assets.
Some rights grounded in contract will satisfy this definition, others
See Vail, 706 F.2d at 1438.
Id. at 1449 (Posner, J., dissenting).
See supra notes 192-95 and accompanying text.
424 U.S. 319 (1976).
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will not. Most choses in action originate as contract rights, as do
bonds, common stock, and even money issued by the government.
These interests are commonly regarded as property and are as-
sumed to be protected by the Takings Clause.' And indeed, there
is little difficulty in saying that they would satisfy the definition.
They are discrete assets, both in the sense of existing in a recog-
nized form of property and being created, exchanged, and enforced
as distinct assets within the relevant community. The holder of
such an interest can call upon the full force and authority of the
state to exclude others from interfering with the asset. And such in-
terests are nearly always irrevocable either for a defined period of
time (as with bonds) or indefinitely (as with money).
Other contract rights will not satisfy the definition. Consider, for
example, the promise made by the federal government to state
employees in Bowen v. Public Agencies Opposed to Social Security
Entrapment' that they could withdraw from the Social Security
system if they first elected to participate and later changed their
minds.3 9 This contract right does not correspond to any established
form of property (the way a share of stock or cash does), and cer-
tainly was not assignable the way property rights usually are. Nor
would it make sense to say that the parties had any general right to
exclude others with respect to such a contract. They may have had
rights against each other, and perhaps certain rights with respect to
third parties who induced breach or tortiously interfered with the
contract, but such an agreement creates no general right to manage
access to a discrete resource, as in the case of ordinary owned
property. Thus, the Court was correct in holding that abrogation of
the agreements was not subject to a takings claim. The Court
should have done so, however, because the contracts did not satisfy
the patterning definition of property-as-ownership, not because
Congress in 1938 had reserved the right to repeal the Social Secu-
rity Act.
Clearly there will be intermediate cases, for example, annuity
contracts, that will cause some difficulty. But the general principle
is clear: Contract rights are not property for takings purposes inso-
See, e.g., Eastern Enterprises, 524 U.S. at 555 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (listing a
"specific, separately identifiable fund of money" as property).
477 U.S. 41 (1986).
See supra notes 215-19 and accompanying text.
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far as they reflect nothing more than a bilateral agreement; as con-
tract rights break free from the initial contracting parties and enter
into general circulation as investments or money, they become
property.
One issue that has come to the fore in recent years in response
to deregulatory initiatives in different industries is whether "regu-
latory contracts"-essentially implied promises by the government
that it will forbear from certain types of regulation in the future-
are protected under the Takings Clause.3" The property-as-
ownership definition also provides the appropriate criteria for re-
solving these sorts' of claims. If a regulated utility can show that
nonconstitutional law gives it an irrevocable right to exclude others
from a discrete asset, then it should be deemed to have a regula-
tory contract that is property for takings purposes. Thus, if state
law unambiguously gives a public utility company a monopoly ser-
vice territory for a predetermined number of years, this should
qualify as a property right for takings purposes. The right to serve
the territory is a valuable asset. By making it exclusive the state has
given the utility the right to exclude rival companies seeking to sell
within the territory. And the right is irrevocable during the term. In
contrast, if a utility has simply come to expect that regulators will
permit it to earn a certain rate of return on invested capital, it is
hard to see how this would translate into the kind of contract that
would satisfy the elements of property-as-ownership. If the right to
earn a certain minimum return on capital is embodied in state law,
then this would be a substantive due process entitlement, but the
Takings Clause would not be implicated.
Substantive due process functions as the line of last defense and,
as we would expect, contracts that escape protection under the
Takings Clause will generally be covered by substantive due proc-
ess. As suggested by the property-as-wealth definition, a contract
would have to be binding on executive and judicial actors (vested
39°There are several competing perspectives. See J. Gregory Sidak & Daniel F.
Spulber, Deregulatory Takings and the Regulatory Contract (1997) (urging broad
protection of regulatory contracts under the Takings Clause); William J. Baumol &
Thomas W. Merrill, Deregulatory Takings, Breach of the Regulatory Contract, and
the Telecommunications Act of 1996,72 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1037 (1997) (adopting a more
cautious approach); William J. Baumol & Thomas W. Merrill, Does the Constitution
Require that We Kill the Competitive Goose? Pricing Local Phone Services to Rivals,
73 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1122 (1998) (same).
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in the weak sense), and have a monetary value, before it enjoys this
level of protection. But nearly all commercial contracts should
qualify.
This appears to be the Supreme Court's understanding as re-
flected in cases alleging contract impairment by the federal
government. In such cases, the Contract Clause does not apply as it
would in any case involving impairment by state governments. Al-
though on occasion the Court has spoken as if the Takings Clause
is relevant to these claims,39' in fact the Court has without excep-
tion assessed alleged impairments of contract by the federal
government under the Due Process Clause.3" In two cases from the
1930s, the Court ruled that the impairment violated due process."
Although these cases were decided before property rights began
their long hibernation, they have been cited with approval in sub-
sequent decisions3" and evidently are regarded by the Court as
good law. They serve as a reminder that although substantive due
process protection is weak, it does not represent a complete judi-
cial abdication if the government acts in an arbitrary or oppressive
fashion in depriving individuals of their contract rights against the
government.
391 See, e.g., Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1003 (1984) (describing
Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 579 (1934), as holding that "valid contracts are
property within [the] meaning of the Taking Clause"); Omnia Commercial Co. v.
United States, 261 U.S. 502, 508, 510 (1923) (stating that the requisition of a contract
by the United States would give rise to a takings claim, but finding that the
government had requisitioned the property that was the subject matter of the
contract, not the contract itself).
39 See, e.g., National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co.,
470 U.S. 451 (1985) (federal impairment of contract challenged under the Due
Process Clause); Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330 (1935) (same); Lynch v. United
States, 292 U.S. 571 (1934) (same-notwithstanding Court's later characterization, see
supra note 391, that the case arose under the Takings Clause); The Sinking-Fund
Cases, 99 U.S. 700 (1878) (same).
3 See Perry, 294 U.S. at 354, 358 (holding that the abrogation of gold clauses in
United States financial obligations violated due process, although no damages were
proven); Lynch, 292 U.S. at 579-80 (finding that the abrogation of life insurance
policies issued to soldiers in World War I violated due process).
3N See, e.g., United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 875-76, 884-87, 894-96 &




The Supreme Court in recent years has offered four visions of
how courts should define property in a federal system. These vi-
sions are both incomplete and disconcertingly disconnected. None
of the authors of the key opinions appeared to feel any obligation
to contribute to a cumulative jurisprudence of constitutional prop-
erty. Rather, the reigning impulse seems to be a desire to advance
some personal objective that is the product of value commitments
that remain below the surface.
Chief Justice Rehnquist's unpersuasive opinion in Phillips ap-
pears to be the product of his dual allegiance to federalism and
property rights, 5 filtered through an increasingly indifferent atti-
tude toward the requirements of analytical rigor. Thus, he
simultaneously reaffirms Roth's injunction that property is not cre-
ated by the Constitution, but by independent sources such as state
law (the federalism allegiance), and yet ignores certain provisions
of state law to achieve a symbolic vindication of a client's right to
block interest payments to legal aid clinics (the property alle-
giance).
The opinions of Justices Kennedy and Breyer in Eastern Enter-
prises are driven by a very different concern-the specter of a
revival of Lochner v. New York.3" Challenges to retroactive taxes
and liability rules have been considered in recent decades under a
deferential substantive due process standard. In Eastern Enter-
prises, it looked as if the pro-property faction of the Court had
discovered a way around this tolerant attitude toward legislative
retroactivity: by shifting the doctrinal rubric from due process to
the Takings Clause. At the last minute, however, Justice Kennedy
balked and joined Justice Breyer in erecting a new doctrinal bar-
rier to such a shift-the thesis that the Takings Clause applies only
to property in the form of discrete assets.
-15 See Sue Davis, Justice Rehnquist and the Constitution 32 (1989) (concluding that
Rehnquist ranks "federalism in the highest position in his hierarchy of values, with
property rights in second place and individual rights in the lowest position"); Thomas
W. Merrill, Chief Justice Rehnquist, Pluralist Theory, and the Interpretation of
Statutes, 25 Rutgers L.J. 621, 623, 641 (1994); David L. Shapiro, Mr. Justice
Rehnquist: A Preliminary View, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 293,294 (1976).
3 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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College Savings Bank presents yet a third personal agenda on
display-that of Justice Scalia. The case could have easily been re-
solved without making any broad pronouncements about the
meaning of property. But Justice Scalia could not resist the oppor-
tunity to read what is in effect the common-law definition of
property into the Constitution. This reflects a familiar theme in his
jurisprudence," but in the context of College Savings Bank the act
was a reckless one. Adopting the right to exclude as.the sine qua
non of property works reasonably well in the takings context. But
College Savings Bank was a substantive due process case and the
right-to-exclude definition is inconsistent with broad swaths of due
process law.
The most recent decision, Drye, appears to be mercifully free of
any ulterior jurisprudential objectives. But it bears the marks of be-
ing rushed into print with considerable haste: Barely one month
elapsed between argument and decision."8 As one would expect of
an opinion written and circulated for approval in such a short time,
Justice Ginsburg's opinion rests on an extrapolation of prior
precedent-which is to be commended, given the extraordinary in-
attention to precedent reflected in the prior constitutional-property
decisions. On the other hand, Ginsburg's opinion makes no at-
tempt to draw any connections between the "property" issue as it
arises in federal tax law and the recent turmoil about "property"
for federal constitutional purposes. This is understandable; any
reference to the highly controversial constitutional question would
run the risk of bogging down the process of securing a quick
unanimous approval and release of the decision. The consequence,
however, is to reinforce the impression of nine Justices speaking
past one another about the meaning of property.
I have attempted in this Article to suggest ways in which the
Court's disconnected essays might be integrated into a larger and
more coherent landscape of constitutional property. The most
critical step is to move beyond the pure positivism reflected in Roth
and to adopt what I have called the federal patterning-definition
'9"his theme is reflected most prominently in Lucas, where Justice Scalia
recognized a nuisance exception to the rule that a complete loss in value is a taking,
and defined the exception solely in terms of the common law. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at
1029.
"I Drye was argued on November 8,1999, and decided on December 7,1999.
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approach to property: Federal law establishes general criteria for
identifying property; state law and other nonconstitutional law
sources tell us whether these criteria have been met. This move
does not require that Roth and the many cases that follow it be
overruled. All that is needed is a judicious reinterpretation, build-
ing on the due process decisions in Memphis Light and Logan, and
cross-referencing to the method for defining property for tax pur-
poses endorsed in Drye.
Identifying appropriate patterning definitions for constitutional
property is the more difficult task. Eastern Enterprises' discrete-
assets limitation on property for takings purposes, although a novel
doctrine, is in fact consistent with the broad run of takings cases
and offers a potentially useful line of division between takings
claims and substantive due process claims. Operating in conjunc-
tion with the right to exclude-the feature of property emphasized
by College Savings Bank-the discrete-assets test would function
to confine the Takings Clause to property in the common-law
sense, and would limit the clause to redressing singling-out rather
than larger claims of distributive justice. This would largely con-
firm and consolidate existing practice.
College Savings Bank is a more troublesome precedent. Its insis-
tence on a single "hallmark of property" in the form of the right to
exclude works well in the takings context, but as a basis for deter-
mining the limits of the broad doctrine of substantive due process
claims, it is not clear that the Court seized on the right element of
property. Arguably the fact that an interest has a monetary value
and is irrevocable from the vantage point of executive and judicial
actors supplies a better basis for identifying property for substan-
tive due process purposes than does the right to exclude.
My reconstruction of the landscape of constitutional property is
offered with varying degrees of confidence, depending on the den-
sity of the landmarks that exist from one part of the landscape to
another. It is my sense, however, that an integrated understanding
is still possible-if just barely. A few more years of unconnected
pronouncements from the Supreme Court, and even this effort will
be beyond our reach. A Court that feels no obligation to reconcile
its statements about constitutional meaning made in closely related
contexts is no match for those who try to make things fit together.
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All that will be left at that point is to pick the precedents you like,
ignore the ones you don't, and hope for five votes.
